Category: CPLR R. 3025

3025

CPLR 3025

United Fairness, Inc. v Town of Woodbury, 2014 NY Slip Op 00343 [2nd Dept. 2014]

Under the circumstances presented herein, the Supreme Court should have decided, on the merits, that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to amend the complaint before the court decided the motions of the Town and the Village to dismiss the complaint (see generally Cooke-Garrett v Hoque, 109 AD3d 457). Leave to amend a pleading should be freely given absent prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see CPLR 3025[b]; Carroll v Motola, 109 AD3d 629; Finkelstein v Lincoln Natl. Corp., 107 AD3d 759, 761; Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 227). Moreover, a court shall not examine the legal sufficiency or merits of a pleading unless such insufficiency or lack of merit is clear and free from doubt (see Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d at 227). Here, the proposed amended complaint, which principally sought to shift the claims from the plaintiff to a party who could have asserted those claims in the first instance, is proper, since "such an amendment, by its nature, did not result in surprise or prejudice to the [defendants], who had prior knowledge of the claim[s] and an opportunity to prepare a proper defense" (Fulgum v Town of Cortlandt Manor, 19 AD3d 444, 446; see JCD Farms v Juul—Nielsen, 300 AD2d 446; New York State Thruway Auth. v CBE Contr. Corp., 280 AD2d 390). In addition, the proposed amended complaint was not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit.

Accordingly, that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to serve an amended complaint should have been granted. Additionally, since the proposed amended complaint rectified the plaintiff's lack of standing, the Supreme Court should not have granted the motions to dismiss the complaint on the basis of lack of standing.

Emphasis mine.

The 4401 and 3025

CPLR  R. 4401 Motion for judgment during trial

CPLR R 3025 Amended and supplemental pleadings

Pitre v City of New York, 2012 NY Slip Op 00946 (2nd Dept., 2012)

The plaintiffs did not identify in their complaint or verified bill of particulars the specific sections of the Industrial Code relied upon in opposition to the defendants' motions. Additionally, the plaintiffs did not move to amend their pleadings pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) or (c). Nearly 10 years elapsed from the time the plaintiffs served their verified bill of particulars until they sought at trial to rely upon the contested Industrial Code sections, and the plaintiffs offered no explanation as to why they had not earlier moved to amend their pleadings. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motions pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the plaintiffs' Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action (see Owen v Commercial Sites, 284 AD2d 315; Smith [*2]v Hercules Constr. Corp., 274 AD2d 467, 468).

 


Late Amendment

CPLR R 3025 Amended and supplemental pleadings
(c) Amendment to conform to the evidence.

Panasia Estate, Inc. v Broche, 2011 NY Slip Op 07922 (1st Dept., 2011)

Although motions for leave to amend may be granted on the eve of trial (see CPLR 3025[c]; Reyes v City of New York, 63 AD3d 615, 616 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 710 [2009]), the motion court properly denied plaintiff's motion because defendants would be unduly prejudiced by the proposed amendment, which seeks to add a new theory of liability (see Spence v Bear Stearns & Co., 264 AD2d 601 [1999]). The record reveals that discovery, which had been tailored to the theories of liability set forth in the second amended complaint, was nearly complete and the filing date of the note of issue was imminent (see Chichilnisky v Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y., 49 AD3d 388 [2008]). Plaintiff sought this amendment 18 months after the action was commenced, after it had amended its complaint twice, and after it and defendants had submitted motions for summary judgment that Supreme Court had resolved (see Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20 [2003]).

Furthermore, the proposed amendment, wherein plaintiff seeks specific performance of an oral modification of the parties' contract, is lacking in merit (see e.g. Eighth Ave. Garage Corp. v H.K.L. Realty Corp., 60 AD3d 404, 405 [2009], lv dismissed 12 NY3d 880 [2009]). Plaintiff's conduct, as alleged in the proposed third amended complaint, does not unequivocally refer to the purported oral modification, and thus does not fall within the partial performance exception to General Obligations Law § 5-703(4) (see Messner Vetere Berger McNamee Schmetterer Euro RSCG v Aegis Group, 93 NY2d 229, 235 [1999]).

Weingarten v S & R Medallion Corp., 2011 NY Slip Op 06655 (1st Dept., 2011)

The court providently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion. The proposed allegation of a "tacit" modification of the parties' written agreement, which required modifications to be in writing, is clearly devoid of merit (see Bishop v Maurer, 83 AD3d 483, 485 [2011]). Plaintiff denies that there was any oral modification of the written agreement, and he makes no allegations to support a claim of modification based upon conduct. With respect to the remaining proposed allegations, plaintiff asserts that they merely clarify the existing pleading. Accordingly, the court properly determined that they may be proved at trial and, if necessary, the pleadings can be amended to conform to the proof.

3025 and 2106

CPLR R. 3025

CPLR R. 2106

Schwartz v Sayah, 2011 NY Slip Op 03227 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

Leave to amend pleadings should be freely granted (see CPLR 3025[b]; Thomas Crimmins Contr. Co. v City of New York, 74 NY2d 166, 170) in the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting from the delay (see Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v Vengroff Williams & Assoc., 306 AD2d 435, 436). Moreover, where the motion is made during trial, as here, the court's discretion in deciding the motion for leave to amend should be discrete, circumspect, prudent, and cautious (see Alrose Oceanside, LLC v Mueller, 81 AD3d 574; Morris v Queens Long Is. Med. Group, P.C., 49 AD3d 827, 828). Leave to amend should not be granted where the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient as a matter of law or is totally devoid of merit (see Jenal v Brown, 80 AD3d 727; Morton v Brookhaven Mem. Hosp., 32 AD3d 381).

In this case, given the appellant's extensive and unexcused delay in seeking leave to amend, the obvious prejudice which the amendment would create in delaying the trial and confusing the proceedings with collateral issues, and the totally meritless nature of the proposed counterclaim given the absence of allegations regarding an intent to deceive on the part of the plaintiff and damages suffered by the appellant (see generally Moormann v Perini & Hoerger, 65 AD3d 1106, 1108; Boglia v Greenberg, 63 AD3d 973, 975; Pui Sang Lai v Shuk Yim Lau, 50 AD3d 758, 759), the Supreme Court properly denied the motion for leave to amend (see Jenal v Brown, 80 AD3d 727; Tarantini v Russo Realty Corp., 273 AD2d 458, 459; County of Suffolk v Caccavalla, 227 AD2d 511, 513). We note in this regard that the submission by the appellant, an attorney, of an affirmation rather than an affidavit in support of the motion was improper (see CPLR 2106), and that document should have been disregarded because it was not in admissible form (see Matter of Nazario v Ciafone, 65 AD3d 1240, 1241; Lessoff v 26 Ct St. Asso.s., LLC, 58 AD3d 610, 611; Finger v Saal, 56 AD3d 606, 607; Pisacreta v Minniti, 265 AD2d 540).

CPLR R. 3025(c): Amend the pleadings to conform to the facts

CPLR R. 3025(c)

Rodriguez v Panjo, 2011 NY Slip Op 01259 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

In August 2009 the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3025(c) for leave to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence, and the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants' motion. We reverse.

"Leave to conform a pleading to the proof pursuant to CPLR 3025(c) should be freely granted absent prejudice or surprise resulting from the delay" (Alomia v New York City Tr. Auth., 292 AD2d 403, 406; see Worthen-Caldwell v Special Touch Home Care Serv., Inc., 78 AD3d 822). Mere lateness is not a barrier to amendment, but it will preclude amendment if it is coupled with significant prejudice to the other side (Worthen-Caldwell v Special Touch Home Care Serv., Inc., 78 AD3d at 822). Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion by denying the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence as Panjo, having himself been involved in the accident and having spoken to Estaban at the scene, was fully aware of the facts and that the accident involved three vehicles, not two vehicles as originally alleged in the complaint. Furthermore, the details of how the accident occurred, the number of vehicles involved, the make and year of the vehicle which hit the plaintiff's vehicle, and who operated the vehicles, were fully explored at Panjo's deposition. Accordingly, the defendants would not have suffered surprise or prejudice by an amendment of the complaint to conform to the evidence (see Rizzo v Kay, 79 AD3d 1001; Alomia v New York City Tr. Auth., 292 AD2d at 406).

Wu-Tang and CPLR 3025

CPLR R. 3025 Amended and supplemental pleadings

Coles v Wu-Tang Prods., Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 00789 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

The record supports the trial court's determination that plaintiff, as a lyricist of the compositions, and defendant Diggs, as a producer of the music, regarded themselves as joint authors sharing equally in the ownership of a joint work (see Childress v Taylor, 945 F2d 500, 508 [2d Cir 1991]). The court properly granted plaintiff leave to conform the complaint to the evidence presented at trial by adding a claim against Diggs for his unauthorized receipt of a 50% producer's fee (see CPLR 3025[c]; Gonfiantini v Zino, 184 AD2d 368, 369-370 [1992]).

The bold is mine

CPLR R. 3025(b): Amendment on the eve.

I know someone is researching this issue right now. You're welcome.  I really could have used this case a few weeks ago. 

CPLR R 3025 Amended and supplemental pleadings

Alrose Oceanside, LLC v Mueller, 2011 NY Slip Op 00631 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

Additionally, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for leave to amend the complaint to add a cause of action on behalf of Alrose based on concerted action liability insofar as asserted against the infant defendant. "Although leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given' in the absence of surprise or prejudice, the determination whether to grant such leave is within the court's discretion, and the [*2]exercise of that discretion will not be lightly disturbed" (Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., Inc., 15 AD3d 523, 524, quoting CPLR 3025[b]; see Fischer v RWSP Realty, LLC, 53 AD3d 595, 596). "[W]here the application for leave to amend is made long after the action has been certified for trial, judicial discretion in allowing such amendments should be discrete, circumspect, prudent, and cautious'" (Morris v Queens Long Is. Med. Group, P.C., 49 AD3d 827, 828, quoting Clarkin v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 242 AD2d 552, 552). "Moreover, when . . . leave is sought on the eve of trial, judicial discretion should be exercised sparingly" (Morris v Queens Long Is. Med. Group, P.C., 49 AD3d at 828; see American Cleaners, Inc. v American Intl. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 68 AD3d 792; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., Inc., 15 AD3d at 525). In light of Alrose's delay in moving for leave to amend its complaint to add a cause of action based on concerted action liability insofar as asserted against the infant defendant, and in light of the failure of Alrose to set forth a reasonable excuse for the delay in seeking such relief, we discern no reason to disturb the Supreme Court's determination on this issue (see American Cleaners, Inc. v American Intl. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 68 AD3d 792; Sampson v Contillo, 55 AD3d 591; Fischer v RWSP Realty, LLC, 53 AD3d at 596-597; Cohen v Ho, 38 AD3d 705, 706; Comsewogue Union Free School Dist. v Allied-Trent Roofing Sys., Inc., 15 AD3d at 525).

Green v New York City Hous. Auth., 2011 NY Slip Op 01436 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

While leave to amend a bill of particulars is ordinarily to be freely given in the absence of prejudice or surprise (see CPLR 3025[b]), when leave is sought on the eve of trial, judicial discretion should be exercised sparingly (see Torres v Education Alliance, 300 AD2d 469, 470; Danne v Otis El. Corp., 276 AD2d 581, 582; Reape v City of New York, 272 AD2d 533). Furthermore, where there has been an inordinate delay in seeking leave to amend to include a new injury, the plaintiff must establish a reasonable excuse for the delay and submit an affidavit to establish the merits of the proposed amendment (see Itzkowitz v King Kullen Grocery Co., Inc., 22 AD3d 636, 637; Fuentes v City of New York, 3 AD3d 549, 550; Smith v Plaza Transp. Ambulance Serv., 243 AD2d 555). The plaintiffs failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay. Further, the purported affirmation of the plaintiffs' expert physician submitted with the purpose of demonstrating that the "post concussion syndrome and neuropsychological impairment secondary to cerebral dysfunction" were causally linked to the infant plaintiff's accident "provided no data to indicate the basis [for the physician's] conclusion [and] was therefore speculative, conclusory, and lacking in probative value" (Paladino v Time Warner Cable of N.Y. City, 16 AD3d 646, 648; see Itzkowitz v King Kullen Grocery Co., Inc., 22 AD3d at 637; Youthkins v Cascio, 298 AD2d 386, affd 99 NY2d 638; Smith v Plaza Transp. Ambulance Serv., 243 AD2d 555).

The bold is mine.

 

CPLR R. 3025

This really isn't groundbreaking, but I was looking for a case on this issue the other week and couldn't find a recent one.  So I'll just leave this here.

CPLR R 3025 Amended and supplemental pleadings

Jenal v Brown, 2011 NY Slip Op 00487 (App. Div. 2nd, 2011)

While leave to serve an amended pleading should be freely given upon such terms as are just (see CPLR 3025[b]; Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957; AYW Networks v Teleport Communications Group, 309 AD2d 724; Charleson v City of Long Beach, 297 AD2d 777; Holchendler v We Transp., 292 AD2d 568), leave should not be granted where "the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient as a matter of law or is totally devoid of merit" (Morton v Brookhaven Mem. Hosp., 32 AD3d 381, 381; see Thone v Crown Equip. Corp., 27 AD3d 723). Here, the proposed amendment was clearly without merit as the plaintiffs' motion was made nearly one year after the statute of limitations had expired, and there was no basis in the record to support a claim that the Town of Babylon should be estopped from relying upon the expiration of the statute of limitations (see Luka v New York City Tr. Auth., 100 AD2d 323, 325, affd 63 NY2d 667; Yassin v Sarabu, 284 AD2d 531; Nowinski v City of New York, 189 AD2d 674, 675). 

found another

Schroeder v Good Samaritan Hosp., 2011 NY Slip Op 00500 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

Where, as here, a summons and complaint are timely filed but not served, service of a substantively similar amended summons and complaint without leave of court under the same index number is proper when it is served "before the period for responding to the original complaint has expired" (see O'Keefe v Baiettie, 72 AD3d 916, 917, citing CPLR 3025[a]). Thus, the Supreme Court obtained personal jurisdiction over the defendants because they were served with substantively similar amended pleadings during the 120-day period when service of the original pleadings was required under CPLR 306-b (see O'Keefe v Baiettie, 72 AD3d 916). Moreover, under the circumstances, the action was timely commenced as against the defendants.

The bold is mine.

CPLR R. 3025

CPLR R. 3025 Amended and supplemental pleadings
(b) Amendments and supplemental pleadings by leave

Giunta's Meat Farms, Inc. v Pina Constr. Corp.

Generally, leave to amend a pleading pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) should be freely granted in the absence of prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay in seeking leave (see Rosicki, Rosicki & Assoc., P.C. v Cochems, 59 AD3d 512; Janssen v Incorporated Vil. of Rockville Ctr., 59 AD3d 15, 27; Bennett v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 51 AD3d 959; Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 222, 227). Furthermore, a court should not examine the merits or legal sufficiency of the proposed amendment unless it is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit on its face (see Rosicki, Rosicki & Assoc., P.C. v Cochems, 59 AD3d at 514; Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d at 227).