Interesting insufficient SJ

Alexander v Annarumma, 2018 NY Slip Op 07695 [2d Dept. 2018]

Since the defendant did not sustain her prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff—either in opposition to the defendant’s original motion or in support of that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to renew her opposition to that motion—were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853). Therefore, the Supreme Court, upon renewal and reargument, should have vacated the order entered October 22, 2015, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and thereupon, denied that motion.

Successive SJ

Rogers v DeGennaro, 2018 NY Slip Op 07343 [2d Dept. 2018]

“Generally, successive motions for summary judgment should not be entertained, absent a showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause” (Tingling v C.I.N.H.R., Inc., 120 AD3d 570, 570; see Vinar v Litman, 110 AD3d 867, 868; Blanche, Verte & Blanche, Ltd. v Joseph Mauro & Sons, 91 AD3d 693, 693; Soto v City of New York, 37 AD3d 589, 589). Here, Rogers made neither showing. Therefore, we agree with the Supreme Court’s denial of that branch of Rogers’s motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Appeal from Judgment: 5501

Anderson & Anderson LLP-Guangzhou v North Am. Foreign Trading Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 06971 [1st Dept. 2018]

The February 2017 order, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to vacate an October 2014 order that disqualified counsel for plaintiffs, and the September 2017 order, which denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave for West to appear as counsel, are not brought up for review by the instant appeal from the judgment, because they do not “necessarily affect[] the final judgment” (see CPLR 5501[a][1]; Paul v Cooper, 100 AD3d 1550, 1552 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 855 [2013]). However, the November 2016 order, which granted defendant’s motion to vacate the note of issue and denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, is reviewable, because, if reversed, it could be dispositive (see CPLR 5501[a][1]; Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v East 149th Realty Corp., 20 NY3d 37, 41-43 [2012]).


Mack v Harley, 2018 NY Slip Op 06521 [2d Dept. 2018]

The plaintiff commenced this negligence action to recover damages for the personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the accident. A first note of issue was filed on September 20, 2013, but the parties subsequently stipulated to take the matter off the trial calendar in order to resolve outstanding discovery issues. In an order dated July 31, 2015, the Supreme Court directed the plaintiff to file a new note of issue no later than August 20, 2015. The plaintiff filed the second note of issue on or about August 6, 2015. The plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. In an order dated January 29, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The defendants appeal.

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiff’s motion was not untimely pursuant to CPLR 3212(a). The note of issue filed on September 20, 2013, was, in effect, nullified when the case was removed from the trial calendar (see Lance Intl., Inc. v First Natl. City Bank, 86 [*2]AD3d 479, 480; Farrington v Heidkamp, 26 AD3d 459, 460; Negron v Helmsley Spear, Inc., 280 AD2d 305, 305; Bono v Barzallo, 260 AD2d 592). Therefore, the operative note of issue was filed on or about August 6, 2015 (see Lance Intl., Inc. v First Natl. City Bank, 86 AD3d at 480; Williams v Peralta, 37 AD3d 712, 713), and the motion was timely.

Khan v Macchia, 2018 NY Slip Op 06519 [2d Dept. 2018]

Upon the filing of a note of issue, there are two separate and distinct methods to obtain further disclosure. The first method, pursuant to Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR) § 202.21(e), provides, in pertinent part, that: “Within 20 days after service of a note of issue and certificate of readiness, any party to the action or special proceeding may move to vacate the note of issue, upon affidavit showing in what respects the case is not ready for trial, and the court may vacate the note of issue if it appears that a material fact in the certificate of readiness is incorrect, or that the certificate of readiness fails to comply with the requirements of this section in some material respect.”

The second method, pursuant to Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR) § 202.21(d), provides, in pertinent part, that: “Where unusual or unanticipated circumstances develop subsequent to the filing of a note of issue and certificate of readiness which require additional pretrial [*2]proceedings to prevent substantial prejudice, the court, upon motion supported by affidavit, may grant permission to conduct such necessary proceedings.”

Here, it appears that Macchia did not comply with either method, but, because depositions of the parties had not yet been conducted, the Court Attorney Referee so-ordered a stipulation which directed that further discovery take place beyond the date that summary judgment motions were to be filed. Given the Court Attorney Referee’s implicit consent to the basis for the extension of the time to move for summary judgment, Macchia reasonably believed that the deadline for summary judgment motions would likewise be extended. Thus, under these particular facts and circumstances, we find that Macchia demonstrated good cause for allowing an extension of time to move for summary judgment (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652; Parker v LIJMC-Satellite Dialysis Facility, 92 AD3d 740; 741-742; Grochowski v Ben Rubins, LLC, 81 AD3d 589, 591; Richardson v JAL Diversified Mgt., 73 AD3d 1012, 1012-1013; Kung v Zheng, 73 AD3d 862, 863; Abdalla v Mazl Taxi, Inc., 66 AD3d 803, 804; Jones v Grand Opal Constr. Corp., 64 AD3d 543, 544; McArdle v 123 Jackpot, Inc., 51 AD3d 743, 745; Sclafani v Washington Mut., 36 AD3d 682, 682). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Macchia’s motion for leave to extend the time to move for summary judgment, and we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the selection of a new date by which summary judgment motions shall be filed.


The failure to annex the pleadings isn’t quite so terrible [CPLR 3212(b) and CPLR 2001]

Sensible Choice Contr., LLC v Rodgers, 2018 NY Slip Op 05790 [2d Dept 2018]

The defendants' contention that the plaintiff's failure to annex the pleadings to its motion papers was a fatal defect is without merit. CPLR 3212(b) requires, inter alia, that a moving party support its motion for summary judgment by attaching a copy of the pleadings. However, [*2]CPLR 2001 permits a court, at any stage of an action, to disregard a party's mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced (see Wade v Knight Transp., Inc., 151 AD3d 1107, 1109). Here, the pleadings were not only electronically filed and available to the Supreme Court and the parties, but the answer was submitted by the defendants in opposition to the motion, and the summons and complaint were submitted in reply by the plaintiff. The defendants did not assert that they were prejudiced by the omission. Under such circumstances, the court properly disregarded the plaintiff's omission (see Brightman v Prison Health Serv., Inc., 108 AD3d 739, 742; Studio A Showroom, LLC v Yoon, 99 AD3d 632Welch v Hauck, 18 AD3d 1096, 1098).

3212(a) prior to service of the answer

Ferrera v City of New York, 2018 NY Slip Op 05824 [2d Dept 2018]

To the extent the defendants sought to have their motion treated as one for summary judgment, because the defendants moved prior to service of their answer, their motion could not properly be considered as a motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3212[a]), and the Supreme Court did not convert it to a motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3211[c]). Thus, neither the plaintiff nor the City (which had cross-claimed against the defendants) was required to "lay[ ] bare their proof," and both were entitled to a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery (Wesolowski v St. Francis Hosp., 108 AD3d 525, 526 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

3212 – limited to the issues or defenses that are the subject of the motion

Green v Price Chopper, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 05578 [2d Dept 2018]

In determining a motion for summary judgment, a court is generally limited to the issues or defenses that are the subject of the motion (see Rosenblatt v St. George Health & Racquetball Assoc., LLC, 119 AD3d 45, 52). Here, the Supreme Court should not have granted the motion on the ground that the plaintiff did not know what caused her to fall, since the issue was not raised by the defendants in their motion papers

Preliminary injunction converted to summary judgment

Carroll v Dicker, 2018 NY Slip Op 04305 [2d Dept. 2018]

A motion for a preliminary injunction "opens the record and gives the court authority to pass upon the sufficiency of the underlying pleading" (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 272). "However, the inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, and the court's power does not extend to an evaluation of conflicting evidence" (Livas v Mitzner, 303 AD2d 381, 382; see Alexandre v Duvivier, 96 AD3d 788, 789; Masjid Usman, Inc. v Beech 140, LLC, 68 AD3d 942, 942; Ugiri Progressive Community, Inc. v Ukwuozo, 57 AD3d 656, 656-657; Cellular Tel. Co. v Village of Tarrytown, 210 AD2d 196, 197). "Accordingly, the motion court may not, on its own initiative, convert a motion for a preliminary injunction into one for summary judgment without giving adequate notice to the parties and affording them an opportunity to lay bare their proof" (Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles v Mostrando, 94 AD3d 1050, 1052; see Hoeffner v John F. Frank, Inc., 302 AD2d 428, 430).

Here, the plaintiffs correctly contend that the Supreme Court, in effect, improperly converted their motion for a preliminary injunction into one for summary judgment without notifying the parties of its intent to do so (see Grand Aerie of Fraternal Order of Eagles v Mostrando, 94 AD3d at 1052). Consequently, the court's determination "was procedurally premature, and it erred in adjudicating the rights of the parties with regard to issues beyond those related to the requested preliminary injunction" (Alexandre v Duvivier, 96 AD3d at 789-790).

Summary judgment

Poon v Nisanov, 2018 NY Slip Op 04365 [2d Dept 2018]

With certain limitations not applicable here, "[a]ny party may move for summary judgment in any action" (CPLR 3212[a]). "A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions" (CPLR 3212[b]). The moving party's submissions must show "that there is no defense to the cause of action or that the cause of action or defense has no merit" (id.). A motion for summary judgment "shall be granted if, upon all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of any party" (id.; see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324).

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment on a cause of action asserted in a complaint generally has the burden of establishing, prima facie, "all of the essential elements of the cause of action" (Nunez v Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 AD3d 641, 643; see Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18, 23). By contrast, a defendant moving for summary judgment dismissing one of the plaintiff's causes of action may generally sustain his or her prima facie burden "by negating a single essential element" of that cause of action (Nunez v Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 AD3d at 643). To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party need only rebut the prima facie showing made by the moving party so as to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324; Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d at 23-24).

Beard v Chase, 2018 NY Slip Op 04636 [1st Dept 2018] 

Plaintiffs were not required, as movants, to disprove any possible defenses defendants might assert in opposition to their motion, such as partial performance (see C.H. Sanders Constr. Co. v Bankers Tr. Co., 123 AD2d 251, 252 [1st Dept 1986]).

There was a dissent.

Can’t grant leave to renew, while denying a motion, all willy nilly like

Foo-Lu Co. v Rojas, 2018 NY Slip Op 02772 [2d Dept 2018]

The Supreme Court, upon denying the plaintiffs' and Chao's initial motion for summary judgment, improvidently exercised its discretion by, in effect, granting the moving parties leave to renew. The defect in the initial motion was not merely technical but substantive, inasmuch [*2]as the moving parties failed, without explanation, to submit evidence, in admissible form, establishing, inter alia, their ownership of the subject mortgage note or the existence of Rojas' default. Such evidence could, and should, have been submitted on the original summary judgment motion (see Vinar v Litman, 110 AD3d 867), and sufficient cause was not shown to warrant entertaining a second motion (cf. Varsity Tr. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 300 AD2d 38, 39). Therefore, the order dated April 7, 2015, must be modified accordingly, and the provision of the order dated November 23, 2015, upon renewal, granting the second summary judgment motion must be vacated. In light of our determination with respect to the order dated April 7, 2015, the appeal from that portion of the order dated November 23, 2015, must be dismissed.

The Supreme Court also erred in awarding summary judgment to Fong. It is undisputed that Fong's motion was untimely, having been made 309 days after the filing of the note of issue, or 189 days after the expiration of the 120-day statutory deadline (see CPLR 3212[a]; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d 866Giambona v Hines, 104 AD3d 811). Even assuming that the court granted an oral application by Fong for leave to file the late motion, as Fong's counsel represented in his papers, such determination would have been an improvident exercise of discretion under the circumstances presented, since leave can be granted only upon a showing of good cause "for the delay in making the motion" (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652), and no such showing appears in the record (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d at 869; cf. Matter of Gilmore, 131 AD3d 1058). Fong's failure to establish good cause for his delay warranted denial of the motion, "without consideration of the merits thereof" (Jones v City of New York, 130 AD3d 686, 687; see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d at 869; Carrasco v Weissman, 120 AD3d 534, 536; Giambona v Hines, 104 AD3d at 812).

The bold is mine.