Nill v Schneider, 173 AD3d 753 [2d Dept. 2019]
“It is a defendant’s burden, when it is the party moving for summary judgment, to demonstrate affirmatively the merits of a defense, which cannot be sustained by pointing out gaps in the plaintiff’s proof” (Quantum Corporate Funding, Ltd. v Ellis, 126 AD3d 866, 871 ).
Rivera v City of New York, 173 AD3d 790 [2d Dept. 2019]
We also agree with the Supreme Court’s determination denying that branch of Carter’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing all cross claims insofar as asserted against it. The papers submitted in support of the motion failed to include copies of the relevant pleadings as required by CPLR 3212 (b), thereby precluding review of the purported cross claims (see Mieles v Tarar, 100 AD3d 719, 720 ; Matsyuk v Konkalipos, 35 AD3d 675, 676 ; Wider v Heller, 24 AD3d 433, 434 ).
Bargil Assoc., LLC v Crites, 173 AD3d 958 [2d Dept. 2019]
Motions for summary judgment “shall be made no later than one hundred twenty days after the filing of the note of issue” (CPLR 3212 [a]) unless the Supreme Court has set a different deadline. A party may not file a late summary judgment motion without leave of the court “on good cause shown” (CPLR 3212 [a]), which requires the movant to articulate a “satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness” of the motion (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 ; see Milano v George, 17 AD3d 644, 645 ). “In the absence of a showing of good cause for the delay in filing a motion for summary judgment, the court has no discretion to entertain even a meritorious, nonprejudicial motion for summary judgment” (Bivona v Bob’s Discount Furniture of NY, LLC, 90 AD3d 796, 796  [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Greenpoint Props., Inc. v Carter, 82 AD3d 1157, 1158 ).
Here, the plaintiff’s motion was made almost five years after the 120-day deadline expired. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate, in its moving papers, good cause for not filing the motion in a timely manner, and only attempted to do so, improperly for the first time, in its reply papers (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d 866, 869 ). Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination denying, as untimely, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
Mazzurco v Gordon, 173 AD3d 1003 [2d Dept. 2019]
Here, the defendants failed to meet their initial burden on their motion. The defendants sought to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by relying on the Supreme Court’s preclusion order, but they failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the plaintiff could not meet his burden of proof at trial through evidence other than the precluded fact witnesses. To the contrary, the defendants’ own motion papers demonstrated the availability of other proof on which the plaintiff could rely at trial. Accordingly, we agree with the court’s determination to deny the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 ).
Saunders v J.P.Z. Realty, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 06573 [1st Dept. 2019]
In this regard, CPLR 3212(b) provides that a summary judgment motion “shall be supported by affidavit” of a person “having knowledge of the facts” as well as other admissible evidence (see GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales , 66 NY2d 965, 967 ). A conclusory affidavit or an affidavit by an individual without personal knowledge of the facts does not establish the proponent’s prima facie burden (see e.g. Vermette v Kenworth Truck Co. , 68 NY2d 714 ).