On Summary Judgment [CPLR 3212]

Nill v Schneider, 173 AD3d 753 [2d Dept. 2019]

“It is a defendant’s burden, when it is the party moving for summary judgment, to demonstrate affirmatively the merits of a defense, which cannot be sustained by pointing out gaps in the plaintiff’s proof” (Quantum Corporate Funding, Ltd. v Ellis, 126 AD3d 866, 871 [2015]).

Rivera v City of New York, 173 AD3d 790 [2d Dept. 2019]

We also agree with the Supreme Court’s determination denying that branch of Carter’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing all cross claims insofar as asserted against it. The papers submitted in support of the motion failed to include copies of the relevant pleadings as required by CPLR 3212 (b), thereby precluding review of the purported cross claims (see Mieles v Tarar, 100 AD3d 719, 720 [2012]; Matsyuk v Konkalipos, 35 AD3d 675, 676 [2006]; Wider v Heller, 24 AD3d 433, 434 [2005]).

Bargil Assoc., LLC v Crites, 173 AD3d 958 [2d Dept. 2019]

Motions for summary judgment “shall be made no later than one hundred twenty days after the filing of the note of issue” (CPLR 3212 [a]) unless the Supreme Court has set a different deadline. A party may not file a late summary judgment motion without leave of the court “on good cause shown” (CPLR 3212 [a]), which requires the movant to articulate a “satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness” of the motion (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 [2004]; see Milano v George, 17 AD3d 644, 645 [2005]). “In the absence of a showing of good cause for the delay in filing a motion for summary judgment, the court has no discretion to entertain even a meritorious, nonprejudicial motion for summary judgment” (Bivona v Bob’s Discount Furniture of NY, LLC, 90 AD3d 796, 796 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Greenpoint Props., Inc. v Carter, 82 AD3d 1157, 1158 [2011]).

Here, the plaintiff’s motion was made almost five years after the 120-day deadline expired. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate, in its moving papers, good cause for not filing the motion in a timely manner, and only attempted to do so, improperly for the first time, in its reply papers (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d 866, 869 [2016]).  Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s determination denying, as untimely, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

Mazzurco v Gordon, 173 AD3d 1003 [2d Dept. 2019]

Here, the defendants failed to meet their initial burden on their motion. The defendants sought to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by relying on the Supreme Court’s preclusion order, but they failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that the plaintiff could not meet his burden of proof at trial through evidence other than the precluded fact witnesses. To the contrary, the defendants’ own motion papers demonstrated the availability of other proof on which the plaintiff could rely at trial. Accordingly, we agree with the court’s determination to deny the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]).

Saunders v J.P.Z. Realty, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 06573 [1st Dept. 2019]

 In this regard, CPLR 3212(b) provides that a summary judgment motion “shall be supported by affidavit” of a person “having knowledge of the facts” as well as other admissible evidence (see GTF Mktg. v Colonial Aluminum Sales , 66 NY2d 965, 967 [1985]). A conclusory affidavit or an affidavit by an individual without personal knowledge of the facts does not establish the proponent’s prima facie burden (see e.g. Vermette v Kenworth Truck Co. , 68 NY2d 714 [1986]).

Cannot establish prima facie case in reply

GMP Fur Trade Fin., LLC v Brenner, 2019 NY Slip Op 00858 [2d Dept. 2019]

Additionally, the plaintiff could not sustain its prima facie burden by relying on unauthenticated bank records submitted through an attorney affirmation for the first time with its reply papers (see Poole v MCPJF, Inc., 127 AD3d 949, 949-950; DiLapi v Saw Mill Riv., LLC, 122 AD3d 896, 900; Daguerre, S.A.R.L. v Rabizadeh, 112 AD3d 876, 879; Damas v Valdes, 84 AD3d 87, 96).

Court should not grant motions based on grounds not addressed in the papers

Patel v Sharma, 2019 NY Slip Op 00452 [2d Dept. 2019]

The Supreme Court should not have granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on a ground not raised in the defendant’s motion (see Singletary v Alhalal Rest., 163 AD3d 738Mew Equity, LLC v Sutton Land Servs., LLC, 144 AD3d 874, 877; Quizhpe v Luvin Constr., 70 AD3d 912, 914). “[O]n a motion for summary judgment, the court is limited to the issues or defenses that are the subject of the motion before the court” (Matter of Pritchett, 128 AD3d 836, 837; see Dunham v Hilco Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 425, 429-430; Philogene v Duckett, 163 AD3d 1015). The plaintiff had no opportunity to address the issue regarding the allegedly defective summons, and this “lack of notice and opportunity to be heard implicates the fundamental issue of fairness that is the cornerstone of due process” (Rosenblatt v St. George Health & Racquetball Assoc., LLC, 119 AD3d 45, 54; see Frank M. Flower & Sons, Inc. v North Oyster Bay Baymen’s Assn, Inc., 150 AD3d 965, 966; Matter of Meighan v Ponte, 144 AD3d 917, 918).

SJ generally

Moscatiello v Wyde True Value Lbr. & Supply Corp., 2019 NY Slip Op 00269 [2d Dept. 2019]

The proponent of a summary judgment motion bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of material issues of fact (see e.g. Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324). Only after this showing has been made does the burden shift to the party opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material triable issues of fact (see id. at 324).


The plaintiff’s contention that Mid-Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment was untimely, and therefore should not have been considered by the Supreme Court, is without merit (see CPLR 2211; Lennard v Khan, 69 AD3d 812, 814; Rivera v Glen Oaks Vil. Owners, Inc., 29 AD3d 560, 561).

A motion is made when it is served.

Uncertified electronic records (judicial notice)

Gibson v U’SAgain Holdings, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 09012 [1st Dept. 2018]

The copies of the electronic records from the Secretary of State’s official government website were admissible despite being uncertified, and the motion court properly considered them (see Matter of LaSonde v Seabrook, 89 AD3d 132, 137 n 8 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 911 [2012]; Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 61 AD3d 13, 19-21 [2d Dept 2009]).

Incorporated by reference [CPLR 3212]

Canty v 133 E. 79th St., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 09022 [1st Dept. 2018]

The court should have dismissed the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims against 133 East. The fact that 133 East had submitted only an attorney’s affirmation is not fatal to its motion, as the affirmation incorporated by reference deposition testimony of plaintiff and Spieler’s foreman, Laurence Bisso, which had been submitted by Spieler (see Carey v Five Brothers, Inc., 106 AD3d 938, 940 [2d Dept 2013]; Daramboukas v Samlidis, 84 AD3d 719, 721 [2d Dept 2011]).

Interesting insufficient SJ

Alexander v Annarumma, 2018 NY Slip Op 07695 [2d Dept. 2018]

Since the defendant did not sustain her prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff—either in opposition to the defendant’s original motion or in support of that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for leave to renew her opposition to that motion—were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853). Therefore, the Supreme Court, upon renewal and reargument, should have vacated the order entered October 22, 2015, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and thereupon, denied that motion.

Successive SJ

Rogers v DeGennaro, 2018 NY Slip Op 07343 [2d Dept. 2018]

“Generally, successive motions for summary judgment should not be entertained, absent a showing of newly discovered evidence or other sufficient cause” (Tingling v C.I.N.H.R., Inc., 120 AD3d 570, 570; see Vinar v Litman, 110 AD3d 867, 868; Blanche, Verte & Blanche, Ltd. v Joseph Mauro & Sons, 91 AD3d 693, 693; Soto v City of New York, 37 AD3d 589, 589). Here, Rogers made neither showing. Therefore, we agree with the Supreme Court’s denial of that branch of Rogers’s motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Appeal from Judgment: 5501

Anderson & Anderson LLP-Guangzhou v North Am. Foreign Trading Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 06971 [1st Dept. 2018]

The February 2017 order, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to vacate an October 2014 order that disqualified counsel for plaintiffs, and the September 2017 order, which denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave for West to appear as counsel, are not brought up for review by the instant appeal from the judgment, because they do not “necessarily affect[] the final judgment” (see CPLR 5501[a][1]; Paul v Cooper, 100 AD3d 1550, 1552 [4th Dept 2012], lv denied 21 NY3d 855 [2013]). However, the November 2016 order, which granted defendant’s motion to vacate the note of issue and denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, is reviewable, because, if reversed, it could be dispositive (see CPLR 5501[a][1]; Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v East 149th Realty Corp., 20 NY3d 37, 41-43 [2012]).


Mack v Harley, 2018 NY Slip Op 06521 [2d Dept. 2018]

The plaintiff commenced this negligence action to recover damages for the personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the accident. A first note of issue was filed on September 20, 2013, but the parties subsequently stipulated to take the matter off the trial calendar in order to resolve outstanding discovery issues. In an order dated July 31, 2015, the Supreme Court directed the plaintiff to file a new note of issue no later than August 20, 2015. The plaintiff filed the second note of issue on or about August 6, 2015. The plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability. In an order dated January 29, 2016, the Supreme Court granted the motion. The defendants appeal.

Contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiff’s motion was not untimely pursuant to CPLR 3212(a). The note of issue filed on September 20, 2013, was, in effect, nullified when the case was removed from the trial calendar (see Lance Intl., Inc. v First Natl. City Bank, 86 [*2]AD3d 479, 480; Farrington v Heidkamp, 26 AD3d 459, 460; Negron v Helmsley Spear, Inc., 280 AD2d 305, 305; Bono v Barzallo, 260 AD2d 592). Therefore, the operative note of issue was filed on or about August 6, 2015 (see Lance Intl., Inc. v First Natl. City Bank, 86 AD3d at 480; Williams v Peralta, 37 AD3d 712, 713), and the motion was timely.

Khan v Macchia, 2018 NY Slip Op 06519 [2d Dept. 2018]

Upon the filing of a note of issue, there are two separate and distinct methods to obtain further disclosure. The first method, pursuant to Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR) § 202.21(e), provides, in pertinent part, that: “Within 20 days after service of a note of issue and certificate of readiness, any party to the action or special proceeding may move to vacate the note of issue, upon affidavit showing in what respects the case is not ready for trial, and the court may vacate the note of issue if it appears that a material fact in the certificate of readiness is incorrect, or that the certificate of readiness fails to comply with the requirements of this section in some material respect.”

The second method, pursuant to Uniform Rules for Trial Courts (22 NYCRR) § 202.21(d), provides, in pertinent part, that: “Where unusual or unanticipated circumstances develop subsequent to the filing of a note of issue and certificate of readiness which require additional pretrial [*2]proceedings to prevent substantial prejudice, the court, upon motion supported by affidavit, may grant permission to conduct such necessary proceedings.”

Here, it appears that Macchia did not comply with either method, but, because depositions of the parties had not yet been conducted, the Court Attorney Referee so-ordered a stipulation which directed that further discovery take place beyond the date that summary judgment motions were to be filed. Given the Court Attorney Referee’s implicit consent to the basis for the extension of the time to move for summary judgment, Macchia reasonably believed that the deadline for summary judgment motions would likewise be extended. Thus, under these particular facts and circumstances, we find that Macchia demonstrated good cause for allowing an extension of time to move for summary judgment (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652; Parker v LIJMC-Satellite Dialysis Facility, 92 AD3d 740; 741-742; Grochowski v Ben Rubins, LLC, 81 AD3d 589, 591; Richardson v JAL Diversified Mgt., 73 AD3d 1012, 1012-1013; Kung v Zheng, 73 AD3d 862, 863; Abdalla v Mazl Taxi, Inc., 66 AD3d 803, 804; Jones v Grand Opal Constr. Corp., 64 AD3d 543, 544; McArdle v 123 Jackpot, Inc., 51 AD3d 743, 745; Sclafani v Washington Mut., 36 AD3d 682, 682). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted Macchia’s motion for leave to extend the time to move for summary judgment, and we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for the selection of a new date by which summary judgment motions shall be filed.