4518

City Natl. Bank v Foundry Dev. Group, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02765 [2d Dept. 2018]

Contrary to the defendants' contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that certain exhibits presented at the inquest were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a]). " A proper foundation for the admission of a business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker's business practices and procedures'" (Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v Trombley, 150 AD3d 957, 959, quoting Citibank, N.A. v Cabrera, 130 AD3d 861, 861). Here, the plaintiff's witness testified that she was personally familiar with the record keeping practices and procedures of the plaintiff and Imperial, and, thus, the plaintiff laid a proper foundation for the admission of the records (see Yellow Book of N.Y., L.P. v Cataldo, 81 AD3d 638, 639-640).

Was this a dare or an oversight

    On December 18, 2013 the Appellate Division, Second Department decided Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.2013 NY Slip Op 08430 [2nd Dept. 2013].  In short, the Appellate Division held that a no-fault Plaintiff was not required to establish that its bills was a business record under CPLR 4518 to prove its prima facie case.

    On January 24, 2014, in Horton Med., P.C. v Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 50116(U) [App. Term, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2014] the Appelalte Term decided an appeal where the plaintiff's motion was unopposed.  The Appellate Term held "Upon a review of the record, we are in agreement with the Civil Court's determination that the affidavit by plaintiffs' billing manager in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment failed to comply with CPLR 4518 (see Dan Med. P.C. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 Misc 3d 44 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2006])"

    Of note, the reasoning in Dan Med was rejected by the Appelalte Division in Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.

    On February 5, 2014, the Appellate Division decided New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v QBE Ins. Corp., 2014 NY Slip Op 00639 [2nd Dept. 2014]. It held: "A medical provider is not required, as part of its prima facie showing, to demonstrate the admissibility of its billing records or to prove the truth of their content under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a]; Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co.,AD3d, 2013 NY Slip Op 08430,  [2d Dept 2013])."

    While the Horton decsion could have been an oversight, it also could have been an attempt to somehow distinguish Viviane Etienne Med. Care, P.C. v Country-Wide Ins. Co..  But if that were the case New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v QBE Ins. Corp., 2014 NY Slip Op 00639 [2nd Dept. 2014] put that to bed.  But–and im not saying that this is the case–what if the Appellate Term (or any court for that matter) refused to follow precedent?  What is the remedy?  Recusal?  Disband the Appellate Term–the Appellate Term would not exist but for the Appellate Division's say so.  That, however, is not a remedy for a party.  Should a party request recusal of an entire Appellate Term?  I haven't seen that happen oustide of pro se cases.

 

 

 

4518 germane to diagnosis or treatment/police report

CPLR R. 4518

Sermos v Gruppuso, 2012 NY Slip Op 03623 (2nd Dept., 2012)

Initially, we observe that the notations in the hospital record upon which the defendants rely were not attributed to the injured plaintiff. In any event, even if the subject notations were statements attributable to him, none of these notations was germane to his diagnosis or treatment and, at trial, would not be admissible for their truth under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518; People v Ortega, 15 NY3d 610; Williams v Alexander, 309 NY 283; Merriman v Integrated Bldg. Controls, Inc., 84 AD3d 897; Carcamo v Stein, 53 AD3d 520). The inadmissibility of these notations is especially apt where, as here, such evidence is the sole proffered basis for the denial of summary judgment (see Phillips v Kantor & Co., 31 NY2d 307, 310), and where the nonmoving party is not able to demonstrate an acceptable excuse for its failure to tender that evidence in admissible form (see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562; Friends of Animals v Associated Fur Mfrs., 46 NY2d 1065, 1068; Merriman v Integrated Bldg. Controls, Inc., 84 AD3d 897; Allstate Ins. Co. v Keil, 268 AD2d 545, 545-546).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly excluded the medical records from its consideration, and properly held that the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion (see Monteleone v Jung Pyo Hong, 79 AD3d 988; Joseph v Hemlok Realty Corp., 6 AD3d 392, 393; Allstate Ins. Co. v Keil, 268 AD2d 545; Schiffren v Kramer, 225 AD2d 757; Henderson v L & K Collision Corp., 146 AD2d at 571).

Hazzard v Burrowes, 2012 NY Slip Op 03409 (2nd Dept., 2012)

Moreover, the police accident report was inadmissible, as it was not certified as a business record (see CPLR 4518[a]), and the statements by both the appellant and Burrowes were self-serving, did not fall within any exception to the hearsay rule, and bore upon the ultimate issues of fact to be decided by the jury (see Noakes v Rosa, 54 AD3d 317, 318; Casey v Tierno, 127 AD2d 727, 728).

4518

CPLR R. 4518 Business records

Landmark Capital Invs., Inc. v Li-Shan Wang, 2012 NY Slip Op 02430 (1st Dept., 2012)

The record supports the finding that defendant Wang (defendant) was properly served. The detailed description of the service attempts on defendant and of the interior of defendant's building supported the determination that the process server was credible. Although the process server was under investigation for improper record keeping by the Department of Consumer Affairs, the relevant portions of the record support the finding that his version of facts was accurate (cf. Matter of Barr v Department of Consumer Affairs of City of N.Y., 70 NY2d 821 [1987]).

Plaintiff established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by relying in part on the original loan file prepared by its assignor. Plaintiff relied on these records in its regular course of its business (see Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs. Inc. v Trataros Constr., Inc., 30 AD3d 336, 337 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 715 [2006]). Defendant failed to raise a triable issue as to whether plaintiff was "doing business in this state without authority," which, under Business Corporation Law § 1312(a), would preclude it from bringing suit. Although plaintiff often purchased debt held by New York debtors, this, as an activity carried on by an Ohio company with no offices or employees in New York, is not sufficient to constitute doing business under section 1312 (see Beltone Elecs. Corp. v Selbst, 58 AD2d 560 [1977]).

Not a business record: CPLR 4518 and a DVD

CPLR R. 4518 Business records

Lambert v Sklar, 2012 NY Slip Op 00755 (2nd Dept., 2012)

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. According to the deposition testimony of the decedent's widow, which was submitted by the defendants, she did not know the purpose of the payments identified in the check register. Moreover, even if the check register were the decedent's, it was inadmissible as a business record (see CPLR 4518[a]), and incompetent to prove that the corresponding checks were loans, rather than repayments of advances (see Matter of Roge v Valentine, 280 NY 268; Leask v Hoagland, 205 NY 171; Nappi v Gerdts, 103 AD2d 737; Shea v McKeon, 264 App Div 573; Bogatin v Brader, 243 App Div 856; Matter of Levi, 3 Misc 2d 746; In re Purdy's Will, 73 NYS2d 38 [Sur Ct 1947]; see also Nay v Curley, 113 NY 575, 577; Koehler v Adler, 78 NY 287). Given the plaintiffs failure to set forth admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants made any material misrepresentations to the public administrator, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, in effect, dismissing the cause of action alleging fraud, and, in effect, properly denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment, in effect, on the cause of action alleging fraud.

National Ctr. for Crisis Mgt., Inc. v Lerner, 2012 NY Slip Op 00758 (2nd Dept., 2012)

Additionally, the Supreme Court properly declined to consider a DVD recording submitted by the defendant in support of her motion for summary judgment, as it cannot be concluded that the video recording truly and accurately represented what the defendant purported it to show (see Zegarelli v Hughes, 3 NY3d 64, 69; see also People v Patterson, 93 NY2d 80, 85; cf. People v Byrnes, 33 NY2d 343, 349).

Hearsay (4518)

CPLR R. 4518 Business records

Steinberg v New York City Tr. Auth., 2011 NY Slip Op 07480 (1st Dept., 2011)

Supreme Court correctly found that, as movant, defendant failed to show that it did not breach a duty to plaintiff. Defendant relied on hearsay testimony and accident reports submitted without an adequate foundation for their admission as business records (see Wen Ying Ji v Rockrose Dev. Corp., 34 AD3d 253, 254 [2006]; compare Buckley v J.A. Jones/GMO, 38 AD3d 461, 462-463 [2007]). In view of the testimony of defendant's foreman that it was necessary to safeguard the tools from theft and that defendant's other employees had seen Williams hovering around them, talking and yelling, it cannot be found as a matter of law that Williams's criminal acts were unforeseeable and therefore a superseding cause of plaintiff's injuries (see Bell v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 90 NY2d 944 [1997])

Mallen v Farmingdale Lanes, LLC, 2011 NY Slip Op 08569 (2nd Dept., 2011)

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The plaintiff's expert affidavit was speculative and conclusory and, therefore, insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Fotiatis v Cambridge Hall Tenants Corp., 70 AD3d 631, 632; Pappas v Cherry Cr., Inc., 66 AD3d 658, 659; Rivas-Chirino v Wildlife Conservation Socy., 64 AD3d 556, 558). Further, the plaintiff's contention that incident reports regarding prior accidents raised a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a dangerous condition or whether the defendant had notice of any such condition is speculative, as there was no evidence that those accidents were similar in nature to the plaintiff's accident (see Hyde v County of Rensselaer, 51 NY2d 927, 929; Gjonaj v Otis El. Co., 38 AD3d 384, 385). The plaintiff's reliance upon a statement as to the cause of her accident contained in an incident report is also unavailing, as the report contained hearsay and the plaintiff failed to lay the proper foundation for its admission as a business record (see CPLR 4518[a]; Roldan v New York Univ., 81 AD3d 625, 627; Stock v Otis El. Co., 52 AD3d 816, 817; Daliendo v Johnson, 147 AD2d 312, 321). "Although hearsay evidence may be considered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, it is insufficient to bar summary judgment if it is the only evidence submitted" (Stock v Otis El. Co., 52 AD3d at 816-817 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, since the hearsay evidence, by itself, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact, and the other evidence submitted by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant's motion also failed to raise a triable issue of fact, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Yant v Mile Sq. Transp., Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 07913 (1st Dept., 2011)

Plaintiff established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by stating that he was injured when defendants' school bus hit the rear of the bus on which he was riding (see Johnson v Phillips, 261 AD2d 269, 271 [1999]). In opposition, defendants raised a triable issue of fact by attaching the complete police accident report, which listed all of the passengers on the buses and did not include plaintiff's name. This document, which was admissible as a business record (see Holliday v Hudson Armored Car & Courier Serv., 301 AD2d 392, 396 [2003], lv dismissed in part, denied in part 100 NY2d 636 [2003]), raised the question of whether plaintiff was actually a passenger on the bus (see Perry v City of New York, 44 AD3d 311 [2007]). Accordingly, plaintiff's motion should have been denied and defendants should have been permitted to conduct discovery to determine whether or not plaintiff was indeed a passenger (see CPLR 3212[f]; Bartee v D & S Fire Protection Corp., 79 AD3d 508 [2010]).

Expertly Fryed and a little precluded

Matter of Bausch & Lomb Contact Lens Solution Prod. Liab. Litig., 2011 NY Slip Op 06460 (1st Dept., 2011)

Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of showing at the Frye hearing (Frye v United States, 293 F 1013 [1923]) that their experts' opinions that defendant's soft contact lens solution ReNu with MoistureLoc (Renu ML) was causally related to a rise in non-Fusarium corneal infections were generally accepted by the relevant medical or scientific community (see Pauling v Orentreich Med. Group., 14 AD3d 357 [2005], lv denied 4 NY3d 710 [2005]; Lara v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 305 AD2d 106 [2003]; see also Marso v Novak, 42 AD3d 377 [2007], lv denied 12 NY3d 704 [2009]). They submitted no "controlled studies, clinical data, medical literature, peer review or supporting proof" of their theory (Saulpaugh v Krafte, 5 AD3d 934, 936 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 610 [2004]; Lara, 305 AD2d at 106).

Plaintiffs' experts contended that testing showed a reduced biocidal efficacy of ReNu ML under certain conditions. The experts then extrapolated from those results the conclusion that ReNu ML increased the risk of non-Fusarium infections. However, one of the experts stated in a published article that "contamination is not consistently correlated with a higher rate of microbial keratitis" (Levey and Cohen, Methods of Disinfecting Contact Lenses to Avoid Corneal Disorders, Survey of Ophthalmology, Vol. 41, No. 3, at 296 [1996]). In addition, from a certain study in which a film was found to protect Fusarium, plaintiffs' experts concluded that the film similarly would protect other microorganisms. However, plaintiffs' microbiologist conceded that different types of microorganisms have different needs and respond  differently to different conditions.

Moreover, despite four studies conducted on keratitis infections during the relevant period, plaintiffs introduced no epidemiological evidence of a rise in non-Fusarium infections. The court properly excluded plaintiffs' epidemiologist from explaining this lack of an epidemiological signal, because the testimony had not been previously disclosed by plaintiffs and would have surprised defendant. Additionally, plaintiffs failed to demonstrate good cause for their failure to disclose the testimony (see CPLR 3101[d]; LaFurge v Cohen, 61 AD3d 426 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 701 [2009]; Peguero v 601 Realty Corp., 58 AD3d 556, 564 [2009]).

The court properly quashed plaintiffs' subpoena of defendant's expert and former chief medical officer, because the expert had been deposed on three occasions, and plaintiffs failed to articulate any legitimate need for his live testimony (see Pena v New York City Tr. Auth., 48 AD3d 309 [2008]).

Nonnon v City of New York, 2011 NY Slip Op 06463 (1st Dept., 2011)

The Frye test is not concerned with the reliability of a particular expert's conclusions, but rather, with "whether the expert['s] deductions are based on principles that are sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance as reliable" (Nonnon I, 32 AD3d at 103 [internal quotation marks omitted]). General acceptance does not necessarily mean that a majority of the scientists involved subscribe to the conclusion, but that those espousing the theory or opinion have followed generally accepted scientific principles and methodology in reaching their conclusions.

***

Thus, so long as plaintiffs' experts have provided a "scientific expression" of plaintiff's exposure levels, they will have laid an adequate foundation for their opinions on specific causation (Jackson, 43 AD3d at 602 [internal quotation marks omitted]). For example, in Jackson, the court found that the plaintiffs' expert had laid a sufficient foundation for his opinion on causation where, inter alia, the expert was directly involved in the investigation of the potential health consequences of the underlying incident; co-authored a report based on the investigation and research that had been published in a peer-reviewed medical journal, comparing the facts of the incident to those recorded in other studies; and opined that the manner in which DEAE had been fed into the steam system prior to the leak caused concentrated levels of the toxin to be released and that plaintiffs' symptoms were caused by DEAE exposure in a building.

Salman v Rosario, 2011 NY Slip Op 06323 (1st Dept., 2011)

Most important, plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Ehrlich, who performed arthroscopic surgery on plaintiff's knee only four months after the accident, opined that "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the motor vehicle accident of 11/28/05 is the proximate cause of her condition, and not from a pre-existing or long standing degenerative process." Plaintiff's surgeon based this conclusion on his observations of plaintiff's knee during surgery (documented in the operative report plaintiff submitted on the original motion) and because plaintiff's MRI films (plaintiff submitted the MRI report on the original motion) did not depict the existence of osteophytes, show evidence of spondylosis or show other symptoms of degenerative processes. Thus, plaintiff's surgeon countered defendant's orthopedist's observation that plaintiff's injuries had no traumatic basis. Plaintiff's surgeon also documented range-of-motion limitations in the knee. Dr. Mian, who also conducted an orthopedic examination in 2008 and found deficits in plaintiff's range of motion, opined that the right knee tear was causally related to the accident. Thus, the evidence more than amply raised an issue of fact as to whether plaintiff had sustained a "serious injury" of a permanent nature to the right knee within the meaning of Insurance Law Section 5102(d).

Plaintiff's objective evidence of injury, four months post-accident, was sufficiently contemporaneous to establish that plaintiff had suffered a serious injury within the meaning of the statute. Dr. Ehrlich based his conclusions in large part on his actual observations of plaintiff's knee during the surgery he performed. This conclusion is significant because the doctor was able to see exactly what the injuries were. Moreover, in her affidavit, plaintiff stated that, prior to surgery, she had physical therapy five times a week for three months. It is not unreasonable to try to resolve an injury with physical therapy before resorting to surgery. The circumstances, i.e., plaintiff's initial medical exam that was close in time to the accident, her intensive physical therapy, her young age and eventual surgery, make the four months between the accident and plaintiff's objective medical evidence sufficiently contemporanous to withstand a motion for summary judgment (see Gonzalez v Vasquez, 301 AD2d 438 [2003] [examining physician's affirmation correlating motorist's neck and back pain two years after rear-end collision to quantified range of motion limitations found on physical examination and bulging and herniated discs described in MRI reports, and opining that motorist's symptoms were permanent, raised genuine issue of material fact as to whether motorist suffered serious injury]; see also Rosario v Universal Truck & Trailer Serv., 7 AD3d 306, 309 [2004]).

However, defendants did establish, prima facie, that plaintiff did not suffer a 90/180-day injury, and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact, given her testimony that she was out of work for only three days (see Pou v E & S Wholesale Meats, Inc., 68 AD3d 446, 447 [2009]).

All concur except Román, J. who dissents in a memorandum as follows:

ROMÁN, J. (dissenting)

To the extent that the majority concludes that renewal of the motion court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Kanate was warranted, and that upon renewal Garcia's evidence precluded summary judgment, I dissent. Here, renewal would only have been warranted in the interest of justice, and to the extent that Garcia's evidentiary submission on renewal failed to establish any injury contemporaneous with her accident, renewal should have been denied.

To the extent that Garcia submitted medical evidence failing to establish treatment earlier than January 25, 2006, two months after this accident, Garcia failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury because she failed to submit competent and admissible medical evidence of injury contemporaneous with her accident (see Ortega v Maldonado, 38 AD3d 388, 388 [2007]; Toulson v Young Han Pae, 13 AD3d 317, 319 [2004]; Alicea v Troy Trans, Inc., 60 AD3d 521, 522 [2009]; Migliaccio v Miruku, 56 AD3d 393, 394 [2008]). Accordingly, the motion court properly granted Kanate's initial motion for summary judgment with respect to all categories of injury under Insurance Law § 5102.

On her motion to renew, seeking to remedy shortcomings in her prior submission, Garcia tendered, inter alia, medical records, not previously submitted, purportedly evincing medical treatment contemporaneous with her accident. Specifically and to the extent relevant here, on renewal Garcia submitted records evincing a medical examination occurring a month after her accident. Nothing submitted competently evinced medical treatment at anytime prior thereto. A motion to renew "must be based upon additional material facts which existed at the time the prior motion was made, but were not then known to the party seeking leave to renew, and, therefore, not made known to the court" (Foley v Roche, 68 AD2d 558, 568 [1979]). However, when the proponent of renewal seeks to proffer new evidence of which he/she was previously aware but did not provide to the court on a prior motion, renewal may be granted if the interest of justice so dictate (Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y. v City of New York, 280 AD2d 374, 376-377 [2001]; Mejia v Nanni, 307 AD2d 870, 871 [2003]). Generally, the interest of justice require renewal when the newly submitted evidence changes the outcome of the prior motion. Here, Garcia sought renewal in order to have the motion court consider evidence previously known to her. Accordingly, renewal would have only been warranted if it served the interest of justice. At best, Garcia's medical evidence of injury on renewal established medical treatment beginning no sooner than a month after her accident. A medical examination occurring a month after an accident is not contemporaneous. Given its plain and ordinary meaning, contemporaneous means "existing, happening in the same period of time" (Webster's New World Dictionary 300 [3rd college ed 2004]). Accordingly, insofar as Garcia's evidence on renewal did not evince medical treatment contemporaneous with the accident, renewal in the interest of justice should have been denied.

The majority takes the untenable position that not only is Garcia's medical examination, occurring a month after the accident, contemporaneous with her accident, but paradoxically that the report of her surgeon, who did not see plaintiff for the first time until four months after her accident, is sufficient to establish the causal link between Garcia's knee injury and her accident such that she raised an issue of fact precluding summary judgment in Kanate's favor. First, if a medical examination occurring one month after an accident is not contemporaneous, then an examination occurring four months after an accident is certainly less so (Mancini v Lali NY, Inc., 77 AD3d 797, 798 [2010] [medical findings made by plaintiff's doctor four months after his accident not sufficiently contemporaneous with the accident to establish a serious injury]); Resek v Morreale, 74 AD3d 1043, 1044-145 [2010] [medical findings made by plaintiff's doctor five months after his accident not sufficiently contemporaneous with the accident to establish a serious injury]). Moreover, even if we assume that this report was temporally contemporaneous with her accident, it was nevertheless bereft of any objective, qualitative, or quantitative evidence of injury to her knee (Blackmon v Dinstuhl, 27 AD3d 241, 242 [2006]; Thompson v Abassi, 15 AD3d 95, 98 [2005]). Second, contrary to the majority's assertion, the report of Garcia's orthopedist might have been probative as to her knee injury on the date he performed surgery, but standing alone, his observations on that date could not have been probative as to whether that injury was caused by this accident (see Pommells v Perez, 4 AD3d 101, 101-102 [2004], affd 4 NY3d 566 [2005] [medical opinion as to causation is speculative when the record is bereft of any evidence establishing contemporaneous medical treatment and the doctor proffering opinion sees plaintiff for the first time after a substantial period of time since the accident]; Vaughan v Baez, 305 AD2d 101, 101 (2003); Shinn v Catanzaro, 1 AD3d 195, 198-199 [2003]; Komar v Showers, 227 AD2d 135, 136 [1996]).

The majority relies on two cases in support of its holding, Gonzalez v Vasquez (301 AD2d 438 [2003]) and Rosario v Universal Truck & Trailer Serv., Inc. (7 AD3d 306 [2004]), neither of which bears on the issue of contemporaneous medical treatment and both of which, to the extent that they allow a doctor to establish causation upon an initial examination conducted a substantial time after an accident, are at odds with Vaughan, Shinn, Komar and Pommells.

***

Footnote 1:Although the records from Dr. Cordaro's office are unsworn, it is of no moment. The documents are properly certified as business records (see Mayblum v Schwarzbaum, 253 AD2d 380 [1998]; CPLR 4518[a]), and are referenced only to show plaintiff's complaints and the doctor's referral rather than a medical opinion about a causal relation to the accident.

Matter of New York City 5201-Asbestos Litig., 2011 NY Slip Op 06296 (1st Dept., 2011)

Colgate seeks to question Dr. Sanborn about a hobby allegedly involving asbestos that she mentioned in her consultation note on Karen Tedrick. Dr. Sanborn wrote that "[Tedrick's] father had some sort of hobby activity or other project in the family basement as the patient was growing up, which the patient's brother reports did involve having asbestos in the basement." Tedrick's brother, Richard Konopka, has already been deposed, however, and testified that this hobby referred to a chemistry set that he owned as a teenager. Because the information sought from Dr. Sanborn is available from another source, we agree with the motion court that Dr. Sanborn's deposition should not be compelled (see Ramsey v New York Univ. Hosp. Ctr., 14 AD3d 349 [2005]; CPLR 3101[a][3]; 3101[a][4]).

Lugo v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 2011 NY Slip Op 06475 (2nd Dept., 2011)

A running theme throughout the Frye hearing was whether the experts considered the medical literature they had reviewed to be "authoritative." Although both Dr. Katz and Dr. Peyster testified that they did not consider any of the literature they had discussed to be "authoritative," Dr. Katz testified that the Volpe textbook and the articles he had addressed were the sources he would consult for the current science in the areas discussed at the hearing. Dr. Peyster testified that he did not consider any medical literature, including his own book, to be "authoritative" because that term implied that everything in the article or study was correct and was not subject to any further changes. Dr. Peyster's reluctance to apply this label to medical literature was echoed by the defendant's expert Dr. Jahre, who agreed that this term was not used frequently to describe medical literature and that doctors relied upon articles not considered to be "authoritative" to assess the state of the science.

***

In addition, we disagree with the Supreme Court's conclusion that the theory of causation espoused by the plaintiffs' experts lacked an adequate foundation for admissibility. "The Frye inquiry is separate and distinct from the admissibility question applied to all evidence—whether there is a proper foundation—to determine whether the accepted methods were appropriately employed in a particular case" (Parker v Mobil Oil Corp., 7 NY3d 434, 447; see People v Wesley, 83 NY2d at 428-429; Jackson v Nutmeg Tech., Inc., 43 AD3d 599, 601). "The focus moves from the general reliability concerns of Frye to the specific reliability of the procedures followed to generate the evidence proffered and whether they establish a foundation for the reception of the evidence at trial" (People v Wesley, 83 NY2d at 429). "The foundation . . . should not include a determination of the court that such evidence is true. That function should be left to the jury" (id. at 425).

****

The Supreme Court's conclusion that the opinion of the plaintiffs' experts lacked an adequate foundation rested largely on its findings that the evidence presented at the Frye hearing established that perinatal ischemia or hypoxia is the overwhelming cause of PVL and that the testimony of the plaintiffs' experts did not eliminate other "more likely possible causes" of Lugo's PVL. In relying upon such reasoning, the Supreme Court, in effect, rendered an assessment as to the ultimate merit of the opinion testimony of the plaintiffs' experts (see People v Wesley, 83 NY2d at 425). Clearly, numerous factual disagreements between the parties' experts were highlighted at the Frye hearing, including, but not limited to, the specific appearance of Lugo's brain MRI abnormalities and their cause. However, these factual disagreements go to the weight to be accorded to the testimony of the plaintiffs' experts by the trier of fact, and not the admissibility of such testimony (see Jackson v Nutmeg Tech., Inc., 43 AD3d at 602).

 

CPLR R. 4518(a)

CPLR R. 4518 Business records

CPLR § 2002 Error in ruling of court

Rodriguez v New York City Tr. Auth., 2011 NY Slip Op 01258 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly denied the admission of a certain photograph of the upper landing of the subject stairway taken some five years after the accident is without merit. The defendant failed to establish a proper foundation by showing that it was a fair and accurate representation of the condition of the landing on the date of the accident (see Moore v Leaseway Transp. Corp., 49 NY2d 720, 723; People v Byrnes, 33 NY2d 343, 347-349; Saporito v City of New York, 14 NY2d 474, 476-477; Leven v Tallis Dept. Store, 178 AD2d 466; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 4-212, at 149 [Farrell 11th ed]).

We agree with the defendant that the Supreme Court erred in precluding it from introducing into evidence two accident reports. The accident reports were made in the regular course of business and were admissible under CPLR 4518(a) (see Galanek v New York City Tr. Auth., 53 AD2d 586; Bracco v MABSTOA, 117 AD2d 273, 277; Klein v Benrubi, 60 AD2d 548, 548; Bishin v New York Cent. R.R. Co., 20 AD2d 921). A business record is admissible even though the person who prepared it is available to testify to the acts or transactions recorded (see Meiselman v Crown Hgts. Hosp., 285 NY 389, 397; Clarke v New York City Tr. Auth., 174 AD2d 268; Napolitano v Branks, 141 AD2d 705, 706). Accordingly, the accident reports should have been admitted (see Klein v Benrubi, 60 AD2d at 548). However, the error does not require reversal since the precluded evidence was cumulative of testimony already adduced before the jury during the defendant's case (see CPLR 2002; Woody v Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 79 AD3d 740; Sweeney v Peterson, 24 AD3d 984; Tannen v Long Is. R.R., 215 AD2d 745).

Exclusion of witnesses and CPLR 4518(a)

I probably would have stumbled across it eventually, but I found it by way of JT.

CPLR R. 4518 Business records

Yellow Book of N.Y., L.P. v Cataldo, 2011 NY Slip Op 00678 (App. Div., 2nd 2010)

Cataldo's contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying his request to exclude a witness from the courtroom is without merit. The record supports the Supreme Court's determination that the witness at issue was employed by the plaintiff's successor-in-interest and was, therefore, a party representative. As such, and in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the witness was entitled to remain in the courtroom throughout the trial (see Auger v State of New York, 263 AD2d 929, 932; Liquori v Barrow, 160 AD2d 843, 844; Carlisle v County of Nassau, 64 AD2d 15, 18). Further, Cataldo failed to establish that he suffered any prejudice due to the continued presence of the witness (see People v Scheck, 24 AD3d 574).

Additionally, Cataldo contends that the plaintiff's documents should not have been admitted into evidence pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule because the plaintiff's witness was employed by the plaintiff's successor-in-interest and because she lacked personal knowledge of the information contained in the documents. As the witness at issue was fully familiar with the plaintiff's record-keeping procedures and practices, this contention is without merit (see CPLR 4518[a]; General Bank v Mark II Imports, 290 AD2d 240, 241). Cataldo's remaining contentions regarding the court's evidentiary rulings are unpreserved for appellate review.

The bold is mine.

 

CPLR R. 4518

CPLR R. 4518 Business records

Kamolov v BIA Group, LLC2010 NY Slip Op 09890 (App. Div., 2nd 2010)

The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1). In opposition to the plaintiff's prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on that cause of action, the defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to the manner in which the accident occurred (see e.g. Kumar v Stahlunt Assoc., 3 AD3d 330Park v Ferragamo, 282 AD2d 588; Avendano v Sazerac, Inc., 248 AD2d 340, 341). In this regard, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that relevant portions of the medical records submitted by the defendants in opposition to his motion constituted inadmissible hearsay. The statements in the records regarding the manner in which the accident occurred were germane to the diagnosis and/or treatment of the plaintiff, and were properly considered as business records (see Harrison v Bailey,AD3d, 2010 NY Slip Op 09221 [2d Dept 2010];see also Rodriguez v Piccone, 5 AD3d 757, 758; Wright v New York City Hous. Auth., 273 AD2d 378, 379; Eitner v 119 W. 71st St. Owners Corp., 253 AD2d 641, 641-642). The plaintiff's remaining challenges to the defendants' reliance on the business records exception to the hearsay rule were not raised in the Supreme Court (see Buckley v J.A. Jones/GMO, 38 AD3d 461, 463) and, in any event, are without merit. Furthermore, the challenged statements set forth in the ambulance report also were admissible on the independent ground that they constituted admissions by the plaintiff, since they are inconsistent with his current account of the accident and the statements were satisfactorily connected to him (see generally Preldakaj v Alps Realty of NY Corp., 69 AD3d 455, 456-457).

Matter of Carothers v GEICO Indem. Co., 2010 NY Slip Op 09256 (App. Div., 2nd 2010)

The testimony of an employee of the company that handled the plaintiff's medical billing was insufficient to lay a foundation for the admission of the claim forms under the business records exception of the hearsay rule (see Art of Healing Medicine, P.C. v Travelers Home & Mar. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 644). Such records were inadmissible because the billing company did not create the records and there was no showing that its employee was familiar with the particular record- keeping procedures of the plaintiff (see West Val. Fire Dist. No. 1 v Village of Springville, 294 AD2d 949, 950). Further, although a proper foundation can be established by a recipient of records who does not have personal knowledge of the maker's business practices and procedures, there must still be a showing that the recipient either incorporated the records into its own records or relied upon the records in its day-to-day operations (see People v A & S DiSalvo, Co., 284 AD2d 547, 548; Plymouth Rock Fuel Corp. v Leucadia, Inc., 117 AD2d 727). Here, the billing company's mere printing and mailing of the documents to the insurer did not establish that the documents were incorporated into its records or that it relied upon the records in its regular course of business (see Lodato v Greyhawk N. Am., LLC, 39 AD3d 494,495). Since the subject documents were inadmissible, the plaintiff failed to establish its prima facie case, and the Appellate Term properly reversed the judgment in the plaintiff's favor

Harrison v Bailey2010 NY Slip Op 09221 (App. Div., 2nd 2010)

The Supreme Court erred in granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. While the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability (see generally Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,64 NY2d 851, 852; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562), the defendants' proffered accident report, which contained a statement from Bailey that the plaintiff had crossed into Bailey's lane, causing the accident, raised a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324; Bradley v Ibex Constr., LLC, 54 AD3d 626, 627). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the accident report was admissible evidence under the business record exception to the rule against hearsay. While an unsworn accident report, by itself, does not constitute evidence in admissible form sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment (see Morgan v Hachmann, 9 AD3d 400, 401; Hegy v Coller, 262 AD2d 606), it may be admissible in evidence if it qualifies as a business record (see Bradley v IBEX Constr., LLC, 54 AD3d at 627; cf. Bendik v Dybowski, 227 AD2d 228, 229). Here, the affidavit of Atlantic's Safety Manager established the elements required for the admissibility of the accident report as a business record pursuant to CPLR 4518(a), namely, that the report (1) was required of Bailey as a condition of his employment, (2) was made at or about the time of the accident, and (3) was maintained by Atlantic in the regular course of its business (see Bradley v IBEX Constr., LLC, 54 AD3d at 627; Galanek v New York City Tr. Auth., 53 AD2d 586;Bishin v New York Cent. R.R. Co., 20 AD2d 921). Once admissible, any challenges to the report extend only to the weight it will be given (see CPLR 4518[a]). Here, the order dated August 1, 2008, only precluded Bailey from "testifying at the trial of the action." Such language cannot be read as precluding Bailey from opposing a motion for summary judgment through the submission of documentary evidence. Moreover, the language of the order of preclusion does not prohibit Atlantic, as Bailey's former employer, from proffering any form of evidence at any time in the action. Indeed, the nature and degree of the penalty to be imposed pursuant to CPLR 3126 is a matter within the discretion of the court (see Jaffe v Hubbard, 299 AD2d 395, 396). Had the Supreme Court intended to preclude Bailey from proffering any forms of evidence, as the plaintiff maintains, it could have done so in the order dated August 1, 2008, by specifically precluding all forms of evidence or by striking Bailey's answer outright under CPLR 3126(3).

J.D.M. Imports Co., Inc. v Hartstein, 2010 NY Slip Op 09186 (App. Div., 1st 2010)

The court correctly found that plaintiff's computer database was a business record (see Ed Guth Realty v Gingold, 34 NY2d 440, 451 [1974]), and then properly admitted a print-out from the database (see People v Weinberg, 183 AD2d 932, 933 [1992], lv denied 80 NY2d 977 [1992]; see also Guth, 34 NY2d at 452).