Clark v Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co., 2020 NY Slip Op 02456 [2d Dept. 2020]
As a threshold matter, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in finding that the plaintiff had waived her contention that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was untimely made (see Rozz v Law Offs. of Saul Kobrick, P.C., 134 AD3d 920, 921-922; Spagnoletti v Chalfin, 131 AD3d 901, 901-902; Glass v Captain Hulbert House, 103 AD3d 607, 608). Accordingly, we agree with the court’s denial of that branch of the plaintiff’s cross motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment against Deutsche Bank.
Hui-Lin Wu v City of New York, 2020 NY Slip Op 02721 [1st Dept. 2020]
The trial court properly denied plaintiff’s motion to strike defendants’ pleadings or preclude defendants from calling witnesses on the ground of their alleged failure to provide discovery, since, by filing a note of issue, plaintiff waived her entitlement to any further discovery (see 22 NYCRR 202.21; Escourse v City of New York, 27 AD3d 319 [1st Dept 2006]; Abbott v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 295 AD2d 136 [1st Dept 2002]). The court properly rejected plaintiff’s attempt to authenticate her medical records through the testimony of someone who merely became the records’ physical custodian after the sale of the surgical center at which they were created (see Irizarry v Lindor, 110 AD3d 846 [2d Dept 2013]). The court correctly declined to admit the officers’ disciplinary files, since plaintiff had never requested the requisite in camera review (see Civil Rights Law § 50-a, ; see also People v Gissendanner, 48 NY2d 543, 551 ; Telesford v Patterson, 27 AD3d 328 [1st Dept 2006]). Nor could plaintiff show that the records were relevant, particularly since the City admitted that the officers were acting in the scope of their employment during the incident (see Cheng Feng Fong v New York City Tr. Auth., 83 AD3d 642 [2d Dept 2011]; Weinberg v Guttman Breast & Diagnostic Inst., 254 AD2d 213 [1st Dept 1998]). There is no indication in the record that plaintiff [*2]requested and was denied interested witness charges. The court properly determined that any explanation as to missing witnesses was better addressed by counsel in their summations than by a jury charge.
Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Chishty, 2020 NYSlipOp 00641 [2d Dept. 2020]
The defendant also waived her right to seek dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against her pursuant to CPLR 3215 (c) by filing two notices of appearance (see Bank of Am., N.A. v Rice, 155 AD3d 593 ; Myers v Slutsky, 139 AD2d 709, 710 )
Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Abrahim, 2020 NY Slip Op 02764 [2d Dept. 2020]
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, she waived the right to seek a dismissal pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) by appearing in the action and, inter alia, engaging in motion practice as early as 2012 (see HSBC Bank USA v Lugo, 127 AD3d 502, 503; Myers v Slutsky, 139 AD2d 709, 710-711).
And, not a waiver
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Martinez, 2020 NYSlipOp 01693 [1st Dept 2020]
Plaintiff’s argument that defendant waived his right to seek dismissal pursuant to section 3215 (c) because he participated in the settlement conferences is equally unavailing. Although a party may waive it rights under CPLR 3215 (c) “by serving an answer or taking any other steps which may be viewed as a formal or informal appearance” (Private Capital Group, LLC v Hosseinipour, 170 AD3d 909, 910 [2d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]), defendant’s participation in settlement conferences did not constitute either a formal or an informal appearance “since [he] did not actively litigate the action before the Supreme Court or participate in the action on the merits” (Slone, 174 AD3d at 867).
The above bold is mine.