CPLR § 5511

Not Aggrieved (CPLR § 5511)

DKFT Pizza, Inc. v Riviera Plaza, LLC, 2010 NY Slip Op 02086 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)

Only "[a]n aggrieved party or a person substituted for him may appeal from any appealable . . . order" (CPLR 5511). "A party is aggrieved by an order when it directly affects that party's individual rights" (Berrechid v Shahin, 60 AD3d 884, 884; see Carollo v Northern Westchester Hosp. Ctr., 5 AD3d 715). Since the Supreme Court's order, which preliminarily enjoined the defendants DCB Food Services Corp., d/b/a Sandella's Cafe, and Danielle DiBenedetto from selling certain food and beverage items at their cafÉ, did not affect the rights of the defendants Riviera Plaza, LLC, and Riviera Plaza Associates, the latter two are not aggrieved by the order, and the appeal must be dismissed (see generally Matter of Commercial Bank of Informatics & Computing Technique Dev. Bank Informtechnika v Ostashko, 274 AD2d 516; Law v Benedict, 197 AD2d 808; see also Won's Cards v Samsondale/Haverstraw Equities, 165 AD2d 157, 162).

The bold is mine.

CPLR § 5511–only the aggrieved can appeal

CPLR § 5511 Permissible appellant and respondent

AMS Prods., LLC v Signorile, 2009 NY Slip Op 07776 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

Only an aggrieved party may appeal from an order or judgment pursuant to CPLR 5511 (see Unitrin Advantage Ins. Co. v Duclaire, 49 AD3d 863). Where a party obtains the relief it seeks from the Supreme Court, is not aggrieved by that order (id.; see DiMare v O'Rourke, 35 AD3d 346; Evans v Nab Constr. Corp., 80 AD2d 841).

Here, the plaintiff, by its motion, sought a preliminary
injunction enjoining the defendant from "engaging in any business,
trade or occupation" within the New York City metropolitan area that
was "similar to the one" he sold to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
granted all of the relief requested in the plaintiff's motion.
Consequently, the plaintiff is not an aggrieved party.

To the extent that the plaintiff requests relief on this appeal
which was not sought before the Supreme Court, that request is not
properly before this Court.

The bold is mine.

CPLR § 5511; CPLR § 5501

CPLR § 5511 Permissible appellant and respondent

CPLR § 5501 Scope of review

Geraci v Probst, 2009 NY Slip Op 02971 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

The defendants' contention that the trial court erred in allowing
testimony as to republication of Probst's defamatory statements by
Newsday is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPLR 5501; Firth v State of New York,
98 NY2d 365, 372). The defendants' contention that the trial court
erred in allowing testimony about an investigation of the plaintiff by
the District Attorney's office is without merit, as the evidence
demonstrated that the investigation was caused by Probst's own
defamatory statements (see Garrison v Sun Print & Publ. Assn.,
207 NY 1, 8). In addition, the trial court properly allowed testimony
about an out-of-court statement regarding the extent of the effect of
Probst's defamatory statements on the plaintiff's reputation, as the
testimony was not [*3]hearsay (see Gelpi v 37th Ave. Realty Corp., 281 AD2d 392).

A party who consents to a trial court's reduction of a damages
award is not aggrieved by the resulting judgment, and therefore is not
entitled to appeal from that judgment (see CPLR 5511; Zhagnay v Royal Realty Co.,
87 NY2d 954). Accordingly, the plaintiff's cross appeal must be
dismissed. However, the plaintiff may be afforded relief pursuant to
CPLR 5501(a)(5) (see Hecht v City of New York, 60 NY2d 57, 63, n; Papa v City of New York, 194 AD2d 527, 532; Donohoe v Foldner, 168 AD2d 412, 413).

In determining whether a jury's award of damages is excessive,
the court should consider whether the award "deviate[s] materially from
what would be reasonable compensation" (see CPLR 5501[c]; K. Capolino Constr. Corp. v White Plains Hous. Auth.,
275 AD2d 347, 349). Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that
the damage awards were excessive, and appropriately reduced the same to
the extent indicated.

The defendants' remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review (see CPLR 5501; Firth v State of New York, 98 NY2d at 372), waived (see Santiago v RodrÍguez, 38 AD3d 639, 640), or without merit.

The bold is mine.

CPLR § 5511 Permissible appellant and respondent

Debcon Fin. Servs., Inc. v 83-17 Broadway Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 02967 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

Finally, we do not address the arguments raised by the defendant
Demetra Sirica in her brief denominated as a "respondent's" brief.
Since her brief contests the Supreme Court's denial of her individual
motions, she cannot appear here as respondent (see CPLR 5511). If, as she claims, [*3]she was not served with a notice of entry of the orders at issue, she "may still timely file a notice of appeal" (Nagin v Long Is. Sav. Bank, 94 AD2d 710, 710).

The appeal from the first order entered November 22, 2006, must
be dismissed as abandoned, as the appellant did not raise any arguments
relating to that order in its brief (see Andre v City of New York, 47 AD3d 605, 606).

CPLR § 5511

CPLR § 5511 Permissible appellant and respondent

Berrechid v Shahin, 2009 NY Slip Op 02312 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

Only "[a]n aggrieved party or a person substituted for him may appeal
from any appealable . . . order" (CPLR 5511). A party is aggrieved by
an order when it directly affects that party's individual rights (see Scopelliti v Town of New Castle, 92 NY2d 944; D'Ambrosio v City of New York, 55
NY2d 454, 458-459). Since the Supreme Court's order affected only the
rights of the professional corporation M. Grunzweig & M.
Werzberger, M.D., P.C., and of Robert Tracer, and not the individual
rights of Charles Bigajer or Murray Werzberger, the latter two are not
aggrieved by the order, and the appeals must be dismissed (see Carollo v Northern Westchester Hosp. Ctr., 5 AD3d 715; Siegel v Long Is. Jewish Med. Ctr., 309 AD2d 916).

CPLR § 5511; § 3123

CPLR § 5511 Permissible appellant and respondent

CPLR § 3213 Motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint

D'Agostino Law Off., P.C. v Parlante, 2009 NY Slip Op 00331 (App. Div., 2nd)

The defendants failed to submit papers in opposition to the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint within the time
provided in the notice of motion (see CPLR 3213), and the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint was
granted on default. No appeal lies from an order or judgment granted
upon the default of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511; Sanchez v Village of Ossining, 271 AD2d 674; Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co.,
117 AD2d 588). Since the judgment was entered pursuant to an order
granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment upon the
defendants' default in appearing and opposing the motion, the appeal
must be dismissed (see Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co., 117 AD2d 588).

The bold is mine.