CPLR R. 2215 Relief Demanded by other than moving party
CPLR § 2001 Mistakes, omissions, defects, and irregularities
Daramboukas v Samlidis, 2011 NY Slip Op 03796 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
Furthermore, the Supreme Court erred in denying Osdoby's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against her on the ground that it was incorrectly labeled a cross motion. Although "[a] cross motion is an improper vehicle for seeking affirmative relief from a nonmoving party" (Mango v Long Is. Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 123 AD2d 843, 844; see CPLR 2215; Kleeberg v City of New York, 305 AD2d 549, 550), a technical defect of this nature may be disregarded where, as here, there is no prejudice, and the opposing parties had ample opportunity to be heard on the merits of the relief sought (see CPLR 2001; Sheehan v Marshall, 9 AD3d 403, 404; Kleeberg v City of New York, 305 AD2d at 550; Volpe v Canfield, 237 AD2d 282, 283). While the Supreme Court also denied Osdoby's motion on the ground that it was not supported by pleadings and other available proof, Osdoby incorporated by reference the pleadings and exhibits submitted by Albert in support of his original motion, and those pleadings and exhibits were therefore properly before the court (see Carlson v Town of Mina, 31 AD3d 1176, 1177; Welch v Hauck, 18 AD3d 1096, 1098; Mahone v Washington, 17 AD3d 1059). On the merits, Osdoby made a prima facie showing, through her deposition testimony, that she could not be held liable for the plaintiffs' injuries. That testimony demonstrated that she was driving in a nonnegligent manner when her vehicle was struck in the rear by the white van driven by Manginaro, and that her vehicle did not come into contact with any of the vehicles involved in the second collision about 20 car lengths east of the location where she was struck (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a]; Savarese v Cerrachio, 79 AD3d 725). In opposition, the plaintiffs, Manginaro, and Langaman failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Supreme Court similarly erred in denying the Tam defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against them on the ground that it was incorrectly labeled a cross motion (see CPLR 2001; Sheehan v Marshall, 9 AD3d at 404; Kleeberg v City of New York, 305 AD2d at 550; Volpe v Canfield, 237 AD2d at 283). On the merits, the Tam defendants made a prima facie showing that Daniel Tam was lawfully stopped at a red light when his vehicle was struck in the rear, and that he had a nonnegligent explanation for coming into contact with other vehicles at the scene after his vehicle was struck in the rear (see Savarese v Cerrachio, 79 AD3d 725; Franco v Breceus, 70 AD3d at 769; Ortiz v Haidar, 68 AD3d 953; Malak v Wynder, 56 AD3d at 623; Katz v Masada II Car & Limo Serv., Inc., 43 AD3d at 877). In opposition, the plaintiffs, Manginaro, and Langaman failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
Fine v One Bryant Park, LLC, 2011 NY Slip Op 03659 (App. Div., 1st 2011)
It is undisputed that defendants failed to file the motion within the time period set by the assigned IAS judge. The motion court concluded that defendants failed to establish good cause for the delay in making the motion (see CPLR 3212[a]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 ). A motion court's exercise of its broad discretion in determining whether the moving party has established good cause for delay will not be overturned unless it was improvident (see Daley v M/S Capital NY LLC, 44 AD3d 313, 315 ; Pena v Women's Outreach Network, Inc., 35 AD3d 104, 108 ). Inasmuch as the record establishes that defendants could have easily determined which judge was assigned to the matter (see Giudice v Green 292 Madison, LLC, 50 AD3d 506 ), the court's exercise of its discretion was not improvident.
Homeland Ins. Co. of N.Y. v National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 NY Slip Op 03805 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying, as untimely, National Grange's cross motion for summary judgment. While the cross motion was made more than 120 days after the note of issue was filed and, therefore, was untimely (see Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648), "an untimely motion or cross motion for summary judgment may be considered by the court where, as here, a timely motion for summary judgment was made on nearly identical grounds" (Grande v Peteroy, 39 AD3d 590, 591-592; see Whitehead v City of New York, 79 AD3d 858, 860; Lennard v Khan, 69 AD3d 812, 814; Bressingham v Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 17 AD3d 496, 497). In such circumstances, the issues raised by the untimely cross motion are already properly before the motion court and, thus, the nearly identical nature of the grounds may provide the requisite good cause (see CPLR 3212[a]) to review the merits of the untimely cross motion (see Grande v Peteroy, 39 AD3d at 592). Notably, a court, in deciding the timely motion, may search the record and award summary judgment to a nonmoving party (see CPLR 3212[b]).
Lyebyedyev v Hoffman, 2011 NY Slip Op 03813 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
Pursuant to the Uniform Civil Term Rules of the Supreme Court, Kings County, the defendant was required to make his motion for summary judgment no later than 60 days after the filing of the note of issue, unless he obtained leave of the court on good cause shown (see Kings County Supreme Court Uniform Civil Term Rules, Part C, formerly Rule 13). Here, the defendant moved for summary judgment approximately 90 days after the note of issue was filed. Since the vague and conclusory assertions made by the defendant's attorney regarding the pendency of a motion to strike the note of issue and a delay in the defendant's signing and notarizing of his own deposition transcript were insufficient to constitute good cause, the Supreme Court erred in entertaining the summary judgment motion (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648; Cohen-Putnam Agency, Ltd. v Hudson Bldg. Maintenance, Inc., 55 AD3d 653; State Farm Fire & Casualty v Parking Sys. Valet Serv., 48 AD3d 550; Simpson v Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 48 AD3d 389, 392; Pierre v Feldman, 41 AD3d 454, 455).