CPLR 2001
CPLR 3101
Lawrence v Kennedy, 2014 NY Slip Op 00329 [2nd Dept. 2014]
Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the Supreme Court properly considered the firm's motion for leave to reargue that branch of its prior motion which was to compel the production of certain documents despite certain procedural irregularities, as those irregularities did not prejudice the decedent (see CPLR 2001; Jones v LeFrance Leasing L.P., 81 AD3d 900, 903; Piquette v City of New York, 4 AD3d 402, 403). Further, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting leave to reargue (see CPLR 2221[d][2]; Singleton v Lenox Hill Hosp., 61 AD3d 956, 957; Marini v Lombardo, 17 AD3d 545, 546; Carrillo v PM Realty Group, 16 AD3d 611, 611).
Upon reargument, however, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the firm's motion which was to compel the production of the documents, including certain documents removed from the firm's offices by the plaintiff. In this regard, the firm's document requests, many of which sought the decedent's personal financial information, were overly broad, and sought irrelevant or confidential information (see Conte v County of Nassau, 87 AD3d 559, 560; Board of Mgrs. of the Park Regent Condominium v Park Regent Assoc., 78 AD3d 752, 753; Pugliese v Mondello, 57 AD3d 637, 640; Benfeld v Fleming Props., LLC, 44 AD3d 599, 600; Bell v Cobble Hill Health Ctr., Inc., 22 AD3d 620, 621; Latture v Smith, 304 AD2d 534, 536).
Emphasis is mine.
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