In the meantime, here are the recent no-fault decisions.
Appellate Term 1st
Natural Acupuncture Health, P.C. v Praetorian Ins. Co., 2011 NY Slip Op 50040(U) (App. Term, 1st Dept)
Defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing plaintiff Spring Medical, P.C.'s claims for assigned first-party no-fault benefits. Defendant established through the affidavit of its claims examiner and excerpts from the Workers' Compensation Medical Fee Schedule, which may be judicially noticed by this Court (see Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 61 AD3d 13, 21 ), that the fees Spring charged for the medical services it rendered to the assignor exceeded the relevant rates set forth in the fee schedule. In opposition, Spring failed to raise a triable issue regarding [*2]defendant's interpretation of the fee schedule or calculation of the applicable fees. Therefore, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing Spring's claims — which sought the difference between the amount Spring charged for the services and payments defendant made to Spring pursuant to the fee schedule — should have been granted (see Cornell Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 24 Misc 3d 58 ).
Defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim of plaintiff Right Aid Diagnostic Medicine, P.C. based on lack of medical necessity was properly denied, since defendant did not demonstrate as a matter of law that it timely denied the claim within the statutory 30-day period (see Country-Wide Ins. Co. v Zablozki, 257 AD2d 506 , lv denied 93 NY2d 809 ) or that the 30-day period was tolled by a proper verification request (see Nyack Hosp. v Encompass Ins. Co., 23 AD3d 535 ). We note in this connection that the reply affirmation submitted by Right Aid could not be considered for the purpose of showing a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment (see Batista v Santiago, 25 AD3d 326 ).
Pomona Med. Diagnostic v MVAIC, 2011 NY Slip Op 50042(U) (App. Term, 1st Dept.)
Defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was properly denied, albeit for reasons other than those stated by Civil Court. In support of its contention that plaintiff's assignor was not a "qualified" person entitled to payment of first-party no-fault benefits by defendant (see Insurance Law § 5221[b]), defendant relied on inadmissible hearsay — an uncertified computer printout of an "insurance activity expansion" (see Progressive Classic Ins. Co. v Kitchen, 46 AD3d 333 ). In any event, the expansion does not establish that there was a policy of insurance in effect at the time of the accident (see generally id.; cf. Matter of Commercial Union Ins. Co. (Kim), 268 AD2d 296 , lv denied 95 NY2d 762 ). Defendant's submissions are also insufficient to establish as a matter of law that plaintiff's assignor did not comply with the notice of claim requirements (see Insurance Law § 5208).
Appellate Term 2nd
Allstate Social Work & Psychological Servs., PLLC v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 NY Slip Op 21010 (App. Term, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2011)
It is uncontested that defendant established that the IME requests were timely mailed in accordance with HVMC's standard office practices and procedures and that the assignors failed to appear for the IMEs (see St. Vincent's Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 ; Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C. v Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 35 AD3d 720 ; Residential Holding Corp. v Scottsdale Ins. Co., 286 AD2d 679 ; Delta Diagnostic Radiology, P.C. v Chubb Group of Ins., 17 Misc 3d 16 [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]). However, plaintiff contends that defendant's insurance policy, which incorporates the language of the mandatory personal injury protection endorsement (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1), requires that IMEs of eligible injured persons (EIPs) be conducted only by physicians, to the exclusion of other healthcare providers, even when the health services for which first-party no-fault benefits are sought were provided by non-physicians. In rejecting [*2]plaintiff's contention, the Civil Court relied on an opinion letter of the State Insurance Department, dated March 12, 2004 (see 2004 Ops Ins Dept No. 04-03-10). We find that the Insurance Department Regulations (11 NYCRR part 65), read as a whole, in accordance with the rules of construction, and the State Insurance Department's opinion letter, to which we accord great deference, lead to the conclusion that the requirement that an EIP submit to medical examinations, as set forth in the mandatory personal injury protection endorsement (Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-1.1), should not be limited strictly to examinations by physicians. Thus, in the instant matter, we find that the psychologist retained by defendant could properly have conducted the IMEs of plaintiff's assignors, who had received psychological treatment (see generally Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722; Meridian Acupuncture Care v Geico Ins. Co., 31 AD3d 509 ). A contrary conclusion would frustrate the core objective of the no-fault scheme by limiting the universe of healthcare providers who can perform IMEs to physicians, thereby delaying the processing of no-fault claims (see also Stephen Fogel Psychological, P.C., 35 AD3d at 722). Therefore, we find that defendant properly denied plaintiff's claims based on its assignors' failure to satisfy a condition precedent to coverage.
Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v Alev Med. Supply, Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 21012 (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2011)
With very limited exceptions, an insurer's failure to pay or deny a claim within the 30-day claim determination period (see Insurance Law § 5106) precludes the insurer from interposing most defenses to payment of no-fault benefits, including the fact that medical services or medical [*2]equipment billed for were never actually provided (see Fair Price Med. Supply Corp. v Travelers Indem. Co., 10 NY3d 556). If an insurer is precluded from asserting a defense due to its failure to pay or deny a claim within the 30-day claim determination period, it may not later seek to recover amounts it paid on the claim based on a theory of unjust enrichment (see e.g. Cornell Med., P.C. v Mercury Cas. Co., 24 Misc 3d 58 [App Term, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]). However, where, as here, an insurer timely pays a claim within the 30-day claim determination period, the insurer is not foreclosed from affirmatively commencing an action to recover the amounts paid on the claim when the insurer later discovers that the claim is fraudulent (see State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v Grafman, 655 F Supp 2d 212, 223-224 [ED NY 2009]; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v James M. Liguori, M.D., P.C., 589 F Supp 2d 221 [ED NY 2008]; see also Carnegie Hill Orthopedic Servs. P.C. v GEICO Ins. Co., 19 Misc 3d 1111[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50639[U] [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2008, Austin, J.]; Progressive Northeastern Ins. Co. v Advanced Diagnostic & Treatment Med., NYLJ, Aug. 2, 2001, at 18, col 2 [Sup Ct, NY County, Gammerman, J.]). The fact that the insurer chose to pay first-party no-fault benefits within the 30-day claim determination period, at a point when the insurer had no reason to deny the claim, "cannot in any sense be taken as a concession that the claim is legitimate" (Dermatossian v New York City Tr. Auth., 67 NY2d 219, 224 ). Indeed, an opinion letter issued by the New York State Department of Insurance specifically states that the No-Fault Law "is in no way intended and should not serve as a bar to subsequent actions by an insurer for the recovery of fraudulently obtained benefits from a claimant, where such action is authorized under the auspices of any statute or under common law" (Ops Gen Counsel NY Ins Dept [Nov. 29, 2000]). The rationale behind this interpretation is that "payment of fraudulently obtained No-Fault benefits, without available recourse, serves to undermine and damage the integrity of the No-Fault system, which was created as a social reparations system for the benefit of consumers. To conclude that the No-Fault statute bars the availability of other legal remedies, where the payment of benefits [was] secured through fraudulent means, renders the public as the ultimate victim of such fraud, in the form of higher premiums based upon the resultant increased costs arising from the fraudulent actions" (id.). Moreover, "[t]here is nothing in the legislative history or case law interpretations of the statute or in Insurance Department regulations, opinions or interpretations of the statute that supports the argument that the statute bars such actions" (id.).
Accordingly, contrary to the conclusion of the District Court, plaintiff is not barred from bringing this action seeking recovery of the amount it paid to defendant. As plaintiff demonstrated its compliance with CPLR 3215 (f) and CPLR 3215 (g) (4) (i), the District Court should have granted plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment.
62-41 Woodhaven Med., P.C. v Adirondack Ins. Exch., 2011 NY Slip Op 50026(U) (App. Term, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2011)
Defendant's cross motion papers set forth detailed and specific reasons for believing that plaintiff is ineligible to recover no-fault benefits because plaintiff fails to meet applicable state and local licensing requirements (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.16 [a] ; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Mallela, 4 NY3d 313 ). As defendant's cross motion papers were sufficient to establish that special circumstances exist which warrant [*2]disclosure of plaintiff's corporate tax returns and its professional employees' tax records (see CPLR 3101; One Beacon Ins. Group, LLC v Midland Med. Care, P.C., 54 AD3d 738 ; Great Wall Acupuncture v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 136[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51529[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Statewide Med. Servs., P.C. v Travelers Ins. Co., 13 Misc 3d 134[A], 2006 NY Slip Op 52014[U] [App Term, 1st Dept 2006], revg 9 Misc 3d 1124[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51773[U] [Civ Ct, Bronx County 2005]; see also Dore v Allstate Indem. Co., 264 AD2d 804 ; cf. Benfeld v Fleming Props., LLC, 44 AD3d 599, 600 ; Altidor v State-Wide Ins. Co., 22 AD3d 435 ), the order, insofar as appealed from, is affirmed.
South Nassau Orthopedic Surgery & Sports Medicine, P.C. v MVAIC, 2011 NY Slip Op 50028(U) (App. Term, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2011)
Plaintiff, as assignee, is required to exhaust its remedies against the owner of the vehicle in which plaintiff's assignor was riding before seeking relief from MVAIC (Hauswirth v American Home Assur. Co., 244 AD2d 528 ; Modern Art Med., P.C. v MVAIC, 22 Misc 3d 126[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52586[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Doctor Liliya Med., P.C. v MVAIC, 21 Misc 3d 143[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52453[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Dr. Abakin, D.C., P.C. v MVAIC, 21 Misc 3d 134[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52186[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]; Complete Med. Servs. of NY, P.C. v MVAIC, 20 Misc 3d 137[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51541[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Dists 2008]; see also Knight v Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp., 62 AD3d 665, 666 ; cf. Matter of MVAIC v Interboro Med. Care & Diagnostic PC, 73 AD3d 667 ). Until plaintiff [*2]exhausts its remedies, its claim against MVAIC is premature (Complete Med. Servs. of NY, P.C. v MVAIC, 20 Misc 3d 137[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51541[U]). Accordingly, the order is reversed and MVAIC's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2011 NY Slip Op 50033(U) (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2011)
In support of its cross motion and in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did not assert that it had never received the initial and follow-up verification requests nor did it assert that it had fully complied with these requests. Plaintiff's attorney merely argued that since the affidavit of the hospital biller, taken together with the copy of the certified return receipt card, established that defendant had received the bill on December 22, 2008, defendant's initial verification request, sent on November 26, 2008, pre-dated defendant's receipt of the bill and was therefore a nullity. However, the record establishes that defendant's initial verification request was sent to plaintiff after plaintiff had sent, and defendant had received, a UB-04 form, which specified the treatment rendered. The UB-04 form is the successor to the UB-92 form and the functional equivalent of the NF-5 form (see Insurance Department Regulations [11 NYCRR] § 65-3.5 [a], [f]). Accordingly, defendant's initial verification request was not untimely (cf. Mount Sinai Hosp. v Triboro Coach, 263 AD2d 11 ).
Since plaintiff has not rebutted defendant's prima facie showing that defendant's initial request and follow-up request for verification were timely and that plaintiff failed to respond to same, defendant established that its time to pay or deny the claim was tolled. Consequently, defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, on the ground that the action was premature, should have been granted (see Hospital for Joint Diseases v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 903 ; Central Suffolk Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 24 AD3d 492 ; Mary Immaculate Hosp. v New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 21 Misc 3d 130[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 52046[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2008]). Accordingly, the order is reversed, defendant's motion is granted and plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment is denied.
Radiology Today, P.C. v GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 2011 NY Slip Op 50035(U) (App. Term, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2011)
In light of the subsequent order granting defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint (Rudolph Greco, J.) and the judgment entered thereon on November 16, 2009, the right of direct appeal from the order entered September 25, 2009 terminated (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 ).
B.Y., M.D., P.C. v GEICO Indem. Co., 2011 NY Slip Op 50036(U) (App. Term, 9th & 10th Jud. Dists. 2011)
Thereafter, the parties participated in mandatory arbitration (see Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] part 28) and, after the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator found in favor of plaintiffs. Defendant served and filed a demand for a trial de novo (seeRules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.12), and plaintiffs moved to strike defendant's demand. In support of plaintiffs' motion, plaintiffs' attorney asserted that, while defendant had appeared at the arbitration by its attorney, defendant's attorney's participation had been minimal, and, thus, defendant should have been deemed to be in default. As a result, plaintiffs contended, defendant was not entitled to demand a trial de novo (see Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.12 [a]). Defendant submitted opposition papers, and the District Court denied plaintiffs' motion. The instant appeal ensued.
The Rules of the Chief Judge (22 NYCRR) § 28.12 (a) provides that a demand for a trial de novo "may be made by any party not in default." A party's failure to appear at an arbitration hearing constitutes a default (see Rules of the Chief Judge [22 NYCRR] § 28.7 [a]). Even where a defendant has appeared by counsel at an arbitration hearing, if such appearance is "without his client" and the defendant's counsel "refus[es] to participate in the hearing," the defendant is [*2]similarly deemed to have defaulted (Bitzko v Gamache, 168 AD2d 888, 888 ; see also Finamore v Huntington Cardiac Rehabilitation Assn., 150 AD2d 426 ). However, where, as here, a defendant's attorney appears on behalf of his client at the arbitration hearing without any witnesses, but otherwise participates in the hearing by attempting to refute the plaintiff's case, the defendant has not defaulted (see e.g. Tripp v Reitman Blacktop, 188 Misc 2d 317 [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2001]; San-Dar Assoc. v Adams, 167 Misc 2d 727 [App Term, 1st Dept 1996]). Accordingly, the District Court properly denied plaintiffs' motion to strike defendant's demand for a trial de novo.
Westchester Med. Ctr. v Allstate Ins. Co., 2011 NY Slip Op 00377 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
The order entered December 21, 2009, did not decide the plaintiff's motion to hold the defendant in contempt for failure to comply with an information subpoena dated March 30, 2009, or the defendant's cross motion to quash the information subpoena, but instead, held that motion and cross motion in abeyance and referred them for a hearing. Accordingly, no appeal lies as of right from that portion of the order (see CPLR 5701[a][v]; Evan S. v Joseph R., 70 AD3d 668; Quigley v Coco's Water Café, Inc., 43 AD3d 1132), and we decline to grant leave.
A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment entered on default must demonstrate a [*2]reasonable excuse for its delay in appearing or answering the complaint and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015[a]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141; Taddeo-Amendola v 970 Assets, LLC, 72 AD3d 677). The defendant established through an employee's affidavit, which attested to a clerical oversight regarding the delay in forwarding the summons and complaint to its attorney, a reasonable excuse for the short period of time following service of the complaint in which it failed either to appear or answer the complaint (see Perez v Travco Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 738; Sound Shore Med. Ctr. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 31 AD3d 743). Furthermore, the defendant demonstrated that it has a potentially meritorious defense to the action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to vacate its default and to compel acceptance of its answer in light of the strong public policy that actions be resolved on their merits, the brief delay involved, the defendant's lack of willfulness, and the absence of prejudice to the plaintiff (see Perez v Travco Ins. Co., 44 AD3d 738; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v American Home Assur. Co., 28 AD3d 442).
Almost related to no-fault.
Quinones v Ksieniewicz, 2011 NY Slip Op 00270 (App. Div., 1st 2011)
However, defendants failed to establish prima facie that plaintiff did not sustain a medically determined injury "of a non-permanent nature" that prevented him from performing substantially all of his customary and daily activities for 90 of the 180 days immediately following the accident (see Toussaint v Claudio, 23 AD3d 268 ; Feaster v Boulabat, 77 AD3d 440, 441 ). The reports of defendants' medical experts were based on examinations of plaintiff conducted nearly two years after the subject accident, and addressed plaintiff's condition as of the time of the examination, not during the six months immediately after the accident. The MRI studies that the defense experts reviewed were performed 10 months after the accident.