CPLR R. 3025 Amended and supplemental pleadings
(b) Amendments and supplemental pleadings by leave
Schuyler v Perry, 2009 NY Slip Op 06825 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting Perry’s motion for leave to serve an amended answer, as the first proposed amended answer was palpably insufficient and patently devoid of merit, insofar as the counterclaim contained therein was based on allegations of the plaintiff’s active or primary negligence or the plaintiff’s vicarious liability for DiMicco’s conduct, and the second proposed amended answer was palpably insufficient and patently devoid of merit, insofar as the counterclaim contained therein was based on allegations of the plaintiff’s vicarious liability for DiMicco’s conduct.
Moyse v Wagner, 2009 NY Slip Op 07808 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
Leave to amend a pleading “shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just” (CPLR 3025[b]; see Edenwald Contr. Co. v City of New York, 60 NY2d 957, 959) as long as the proposed amendment is not palpably insufficient or devoid of merit (see Bolanowski v Trustees of Columbia Univ. In City of N.Y., 21 AD3d 340, 341; Glaser v County of Orange, 20 AD3d 506; Ortega v Bisogno & Meyerson, 2 AD3d 607, 609). Accordingly, in considering a motion for leave to amend, it is incumbent upon the court to examine the sufficiency and merits of the proposed amendment (see Hill v 2016 Realty Assoc., 42 AD3d 432, 433; see e.g. Abrahamian v Tak Chan, 33 AD3d 947, 949; Fisher v Braun, 227 AD2d 586, 587).
Matter of Simonds v Kirkland, 2009 NY Slip Op 08662 (App. Div., 4th, 2009)
The mother also will not be heard to contend that the court erred in permitting the amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence presented at the hearing on the petition, inasmuch as the record establishes that the mother’s attorney consented to that amendment (see McLaughlin v City of New York, 294 AD2d 136; see also Atweh v Hashem, 284 AD2d 216, 217). In any event, “[t]he court has discretion to permit an amendment to conform the pleadings to the proof . . . [and i]t is an abuse of discretion to [withhold such permission] unless the opposing party can allege demonstrable and real surprise or prejudice” (General Elec. Co. v A. C. Towne Corp., 144 AD2d 1003, 1004, lv dismissed 73 NY2d 994; see CPLR 3025 [c]). Even assuming, arguendo, that the mother was in fact “an opposing party,” we conclude that she failed to demonstrate that she sustained any “real surprise or prejudice” arising from the amendment (General Elec. Co., 144 AD2d at 1004).
The bold is mine.