CPLR R. 3211 is a curious rule. I wrote three paragraphs, but after I read them, I realized that I was only complicating things. Besides being a quirky rule, it is an extremely complicated rule.
Now consider Herrnsdorf v Bernard Janowitz Constr. Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 07984 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009).
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Utica First’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the third-party complaint. “[I]n order for a complaint to be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1), the evidence submitted must resolve [ ] all factual issues as a matter of law, and conclusively dispose of the plaintiff’s claim'” (Del Pozo v Impressive Homes, Inc., 29 AD3d 621, 622, quoting Berger v Temple Beth-El of Great Neck, 303 AD2d 346, 347). Utica First failed to conclusively demonstrate that Janowitz was not an additional insured to the [*3]insurance policy. Additionally, Utica First could not rely on affidavits in support of its motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) because they do not constitute documentary evidence (see Berger v Temple Beth-El of Great Neck, 303 AD2d at 347).