Thankfully, these are short decisions.
22 NYCRR 130-1.1 Costs; sanctions
Singer v New York City Tr. Auth., 2009 NY Slip Op 07956 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying
plaintiff's motion for sanctions, which was brought eight months after
the trial had concluded with a verdict in plaintiff's favor. While the
trial court had stated that plaintiff could move for sanctions
"whenever [she] wish[ed] to," this remark did not provide plaintiff
with an unlimited period of time to bring the motion, and as the court
found, the eight-month delay was unreasonable.
Ficus Invs., Inc. v Private Capital Mgt., L.L.C., 2009 NY Slip Op 07493 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Bernard J. Fried, J.), entered
September 10, 2008, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by
the brief, granted plaintiffs' motion to hold defendant Christopher
Chalavoutis in civil contempt, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
The record demonstrates that in February 2008 defendant was
instrumental in negotiating the conveyance of certain mortgages without
providing notice to plaintiffs, thereby disobeying an order of the
court, entered December 21, 2007, that prohibited defendant from taking
any action with respect to the subject mortgages "without first
providing 48 hour written notice" to counsel for plaintiffs. The
record further demonstrates that defendant's actions were calculated to
impair, impede or prejudice plaintiffs' rights (see Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, 583 ).
Joan 2000, Ltd. v Deco Constr. Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 07593 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, sanctions may be imposed against a party or the attorney for a party for frivolous conduct (see
22 NYCRR 130-1.1[b]). Conduct is frivolous if it is completely without
merit in law or fact and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; it is
taken to primarily delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation,
or harass or maliciously injure another; or it asserts material factual
statements that are false (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]; Mascia v Maresco, 39 AD3d 504; Greene v Doral Conference Ctr. Assoc.,
18 AD3d 429, 431). Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its
discretion in imposing a sanction upon Eric W. Berry, the attorney for
the defendant WBP Central Associates, LLC, as his conduct was not
frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (see Wagner v Goldberg, 293 AD2d 527; Matter of Gavilanes v Dilan, 281 AD2d 546).
Additionally, the Supreme Court had no authority to impose a sanction
upon Anthony Piazza pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, since he is neither a
party to this action nor an attorney (see Brock v Wagner, 283 AD2d 535; Saastomoinen v Pagano, 278 AD2d 218).
G&T Term. Packaging Co. Inc. v Western Growers Assn., 2009 NY Slip Op 07503 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)
The IAS court did not abuse its discretion by determining that
plaintiffs' conduct was frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR
130-1.1(c)(2) (see Pickens v Castro, 55 AD3d 443,
444 ). Contrary to plaintiffs' claim, courts take into
consideration the entire dispute between the parties, not just the
lawsuit in which sanctions are imposed (see Murray v National Broadcasting Co., 217 AD2d 651, 653 ; Matter of Jemzura v Mugglin, 207 AD2d 645 , appeal dismissed
84 NY2d 977 ). If plaintiffs wished to litigate the underlying
merits of the parties' dispute, e.g., the quality of the produce sold
by one of the defendants to one of the plaintiffs (see 56 AD3d 266 , appeal dismissed 12 NY3d 729 ), they should have
pursued their federal appeals (see generally Jason v Chusid, 172 AD2d 172, 173 , lv dismissed 78 NY2d 1008 ).
The bold is mine.