NTA (CPLR § 3123) and Formal Judicial Admissions

Formal Judicial Admission

CPLR § 3123(a) Notice to admit; admission unless denied or denial excused

Zegarowicz v Ripatti, 2009 NY Slip Op 08004 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

Facts admitted by a party's pleadings constitute formal judicial admissions (see Falkowski v 81 & 3 of Watertown, 288
AD2d 890, 891; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 8-215, at 523-524
[Farrell 11th ed]). Formal judicial admissions are conclusive of the
facts admitted in the action in which they are made (see Coffin v Grand Rapids Hydraulic Co., 136 NY 655).

Here, HVT made a formal judicial admission that it was listed as
owner on the certificate of title. A certificate of title is prima
facie evidence of ownership (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 2108[c]; Switzer v Aldrich, 307 NY 56; Corrigan v DiGuardia, 166 AD2d 408; Salisbury v Smith, 115
AD2d 840). Although this presumption of ownership is not conclusive,
and may be rebutted by evidence which demonstrates that another
individual owned the vehicle in question
(see Aronov v Bruins Transp., 294 AD2d 523; Dorizas v Island Insulation Corp., 254
AD2d 246), there was no evidence in the record to rebut that
presumption. "In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial,
the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and
this Court may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts,'
bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage
of seeing the witnesses"
(Stevens v State of New York, 47 AD3d 624, 624-625, quoting Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v Town of Bedford, 60
NY2d 492, 499). Based on our review of the evidence, judgment in favor
of the plaintiff and against HVT on the issue of liability is
warranted.

Morreale v Serrano, 2009 NY Slip Op 07992 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

The Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on the complaint, inasmuch as the plaintiff failed to meet his
initial burden of establishing, by admissible evidence, his prima facie
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp.,
68 NY2d 320, 324). To the extent that the plaintiff relied on the
defendant's response to his notice to admit, that notice improperly
sought the defendant's admissions to facts that went to "the heart of
the matter"
(Lolly v Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 45 AD3d 537, 537; see Glasser v City of New York,
265 AD2d 526). In light of our determination, we need not examine the
sufficiency of the papers submitted by the defendant in opposition to
the motion (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).

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