CPLR – Page 25

CPLR 2309(c)

CPLR 2309

Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Toro, 2014 NY Slip Op 00479 [2nd Dept. 2014]

It appears from this record that the plaintiff was the holder of the mortgage and note. In any event, by failing to appear in the action, the debtor waived the defense of lack of standing (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Taher, 104 AD3d 815, 817). However, the affidavit attesting to the debtor's default in repaying the mortgage loan did not comply with CPLR 2309(c). Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying relief to the movant without prejudice.

Bold is mine.

CPLR § 6201

Crescentini v Slate Hill Biomass Energy, LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 00475 [2nd Dept. 2014]

In determining the motion for a preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown that she would suffer irreparable injury absent the granting of a preliminary injunction. Upon making this determination, it was error to deny the preliminary injunction motion on the condition that additional security be provided, and to continue the temporary restraining order pending approval of the additional security. Pursuant to CPLR 6301, a temporary restraining order may be granted pending a hearing for a preliminary injunction where it appears that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result unless the defendant is restrained before the hearing can be held. Once the court determined that the plaintiff had not shown that she would suffer irreparable injury, there was no basis to continue the temporary restraining order.

We reject the Supreme Court's reasoning that, since the plaintiff might have been entitled to an order of attachment pursuant to CPLR 6201(3), it was therefore proper to direct Oliva to offer the plaintiff additional security. The plaintiff did not move for an order of attachment and, even had she done so, she would not have been entitled to one, as she did not establish that the Slate Hill defendants, with intent to defraud her or frustrate the enforcement of a judgment that might be rendered in her favor, had assigned, disposed of, encumbered, or secreted property, or removed it from the state, or were about to do any of those acts (see CPLR 6201[3]; Benedict v Browne, 289 AD2d 433). Accordingly, the possibility that the plaintiff might have sought the provisional remedy of attachment did not provide a basis for the court to direct Oliva to pay additional security to the plaintiff.

We note that the temporary restraining order was set forth in an order to show cause that provided that the temporary restraining order would only remain in effect pending the hearing and determination of the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Since the preliminary injunction motion has been decided, and we have deleted the provision of the order appealed from extending the effective dates of the temporary restraining order, the temporary restraining order is no longer in effect. In light of our determination, we discern no basis on which to disturb the Supreme Court's determination to deny, as academic, the Slate Hill defendants' separate motion to vacate the temporary restraining order, since our determination has caused the temporary restraining order to expire.

Emphasis mine

CPLR 3212(f)

Castagna v Almaghrabi, 2014 NY Slip Op 00474 [2nd Dept. 2014]

"CPLR 3212(f) permits a court to deny a motion for summary judgment where it appears that the facts essential to oppose the motion exist but cannot then be stated'" (Wesolowski v St. Francis Hosp., 108 AD3d 525, 526, quoting CPLR 3212[f]), especially where, as here, the plaintiff has not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery, and has no personal knowledge of the relevant facts (see Wesolowski v St. Francis Hosp., 108 AD3d at 526; Jones v American Commerce Ins. Co., 92 AD3d 844, 845). Under the circumstances of this case, the motion for summary judgment should have been denied, with leave to renew after the completion of discovery.

Bold is mine.

CPLR 321

CPLR 321(a)

Boente v Peter C. Kurth Off. of Architecture & Planning, P.C., 2014 NY Slip Op 00473 [2nd Dept. 2014]

As the plaintiff correctly contends, the Supreme Court erred in accepting an untimely, pro se answer from the defendant corporation, and in thereby denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment on the complaint. The proffered answer was a nullity, since a corporation must be represented by an attorney and cannot proceed pro se (see CPLR 321[a]; Pisciotta v Lifestyle Designs, Inc., 62 AD3d 850, 853; Bilello v Genesis Seafood, Inc., 12 AD3d 474; World On Columbus v L.C.K. Rest. Group, 260 AD2d 323, 324).

Emphasis mine

CPLR 1015; 3212(a)

CPLR 1015(a)
CPLE 3212(a)

Torres v Zara Realty Holding Corp., 2014 NY Slip Op 00442 [1st Dept. 2014]

In this action for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff's decedent while he was working at defendant's premises as an assistant elevator mechanic, the note of issue was filed on March 3, 2009, and the decedent died of unrelated causes on June 13, 2009, resulting in an automatic stay of all proceedings until a proper substitution was made (see CPLR 1015[a]; Noriega v Presbyterian Hosp. in City of N.Y., 305 AD2d 220, 221 [1st Dept 2003]). Defendant moved for summary judgment on June 24, 2009, within 120 days after the note of issue was filed, but while the action was stayed. Thus, the order granting the motion on default was properly vacated as a nullity (see Silvagnoli v Consolidated Edison Empls. Mut. Aid Socy., 112 AD2d 819, 820 [1st 1985]).

Decedent's daughter was substituted as party plaintiff on May 10, 2010, and defendant concededly had notice of the substitution as of August 17, 2010. Defendant did not attempt to renew its motion for summary judgment until October 28, 2010, more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue, excluding the tolling period. Moreover, after the motion was automatically denied without prejudice due to defendant's failure to comply with the court rules of the trial part, defendant waited until May 3, 2011 to make the motion in accordance with the applicable rules. By that time, the motion was untimely under any view of the facts (see CPLR 3212[a]).

Defendant's proffered excuses for the delay in moving following substitution are insufficient to excuse its failure to remain apprised of the status of the case and comply with the applicable deadlines (see Miceli v State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 3 NY3d 725 [2004]; Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648 [2004]).

Bold is mine.

3211(a)(1)(7)

3211(a)(1)
3211(a)(7)

Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 2014 NY Slip Op 00587 [1st Dept. 2014]

Since the record does not affirmatively establish a valid obligation to arbitrate the issues raised herein, we must examine Goldman's alternative argument seeking dismissal of the action. With regard to the fraud allegations, Goldman argues that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action because the element of reasonable reliance is precluded as a matter of law by the disclaimer and disclosure in the offering circulars. We do not find that such argument is procedurally precluded by the fact that "Goldman's motion was made under CPLR 3211(a)(7)." The concurring opinion incorrectly maintains that Goldman cannot rely on documentary evidence (the disclaimer and disclosure in the offering circulars) because a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion is limited to a review of the pleadings.

The motion court examined the purported documentary evidence, albeit over plaintiff's objections, but concluded that it did not bar the fraud claims. Plaintiff, however, has abandoned such procedural argument by failing to raise it on appeal (see Matter of Raqiyb v Fischer, 82 AD3d 1432, 1433, n [3rd Dept 2011], citing Matter of Ifill v Fischer, 72 AD3d 1367, n [3rd Dept 2010]). Instead, in its opening paragraph of the argument section opposing Goldman's motion to dismiss the fraud claims, plaintiff simply comments:

"Goldman's argument on appeal strays far beyond addressing the sufficiency of the allegations. Instead, Goldman seeks to play on a field of disputed issues of fact. But this provides no basis for dismissing this Complaint. That is particularly the case here when this Complaint is based not just on well-pleaded allegations, but on inculpatory Goldman documents disclosed in prior proceedings [emphasis added]."

Thus, on this appeal, plaintiff does not claim that this Court is "procedurally" precluded from examining the documentary evidence at issue because Goldman moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7). Rather, plaintiff appears to be arguing that the documentary evidence simply raises "disputed issues of fact," which, as plaintiff correctly asserts, is not enough for a dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(7).

In any event, the concurrence's contention that this Court is limited to the pleadings, when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), is not a completely accurate statement of the law. What the Court of Appeals has consistently said is that evidence in an affidavit used by a defendant to attack the sufficiency of a pleading "will seldom if ever warrant the relief [the defendant] seeks unless [such evidence] conclusively establishes that plaintiff has no cause of action" (Rovello v Orofino Realty Co, Inc, 40 NY2d 633, 636 [1976] [emphasis added]; see also Guggenheim v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268 [1977]).

A CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion may be used by a defendant to test the facial sufficiency of a pleading in two different ways. On the one hand, the motion may be used to dispose of an action in which the plaintiff has not stated a claim cognizable at law. On the other hand, the motion may be used to dispose of an action in which the plaintiff identified a cognizable cause of action but failed to assert a material allegation necessary to support the cause of action. As to the latter, the Court of Appeals has made clear that a defendant can submit evidence in support of the motion attacking a well-pleaded cognizable claim (see Rovello, 40 NY2d 633; Guggenheim, 43 NY2d 268; see also Board of Managers of Fairways at N. Hills Condominiums v Fairways at N. Hills, 150 AD2d 32 [2d Dept 1989]).^[FN4]

When documentary evidence is submitted by a defendant "the standard morphs from whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action to whether it has one" (John R. Higgitt, CPLR 3211[A][7]: Demurrer or Merits-Testing Device?, 73 Albany Law Review 99, 110 [2009]). As alleged here, if the defendant's evidence establishes that the plaintiff has no cause of action (i.e., that a well-pleaded cognizable claim is flatly rejected by the documentary evidence), dismissal would be appropriate (see e.g. Constructamax, Inc. v Dodge Chamberlin Luzine Weber, Assoc. Architects, LLP, 109 AD3d 574 [2d Dept 2013]; Rabos v R & R Bagels & Bakery, Inc., 100 AD3d 849, 851—852 [2d Dept 2012]; Skillgames, LLC v Brody, 1 AD3d 247, 250 [1st Dept 2003]; Kliebert v McKoan, 228 AD2d 232 [1st Dept 1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 802 [1996]; Board of Managers of Fairways at N. Hills Condominiums, 150 AD2d 32).

Note the concurring opinion.

Bold is mine. Everything else is in original.

CPLR 2221(e)(2)

Fernandez v Moskowitz, 2014 NY Slip Op 00583 [1st Dept. 2014]

Plaintiff contends that our dismissal of the complaint was a "new fact" as considered in CPLR 2221(e)(2), and that he should have been allowed to renew the summary judgment motion to proffer the results of a new diagnostic test and expert's affidavit which, he believes, would probably have persuaded this Court to affirm Supreme Court's denial of summary judgment (CPLR 2221[e][2]). Plaintiff misconstrues the posture of the case. Because the motion court had denied defendants' summary judgment motion, plaintiff as the prevailing party was never entitled to seek renewal of that motion (see e.g. Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, 545 [1983] [where the successful party obtained the full relief sought, it has no ground for appeal [or renewal], even if that party disagrees with the particular findings, rationale or the opinion supporting the order below in its favor]). Moreover, judgment was entered on July 1, 2011, dismissing the complaint, and plaintiff's recourse was to seek to vacate our decision and judgment based on the existence of the new diagnostic test and expert's affidavit (CPLR 5015[a][2]).

The motion court properly denied plaintiff's motion to renew the earlier motion seeking renewal of the motion for summary judgment. There are no new facts submitted that would entitle him to renew a motion in which he had prevailed.

Emphasis mine.

CPLR 3217(a)(1) untimely unilateral voluntary discontinuance

CPLR 3217(a)(1)

BDO USA, LLP v Phoenix Four, Inc., 2014 NY Slip Op 00410 [1st Dept. 2014]

The motion court erred in deeming defendants' motions withdrawn. Indeed, the parties never "stipulated" to discontinue BDO's action. Rather, BDO unilaterally filed a notice of voluntary discontinuance. This notice was untimely because BDO served it after defendants filed their motions to dismiss (see CPLR 3217[a][1]; Polgar v Focacci, 2 Misc 3d 836, 839-840 [Sup Ct, NY County 2003]; David D. Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C3217:8 ["[t]he defendant who has moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211 has already done as much in the litigation (and more) than if she had merely answered the complaint"]). Indeed, if a motion to dismiss is not a "responsive pleading" within the meaning of CPLR 3217(a)(1), a plaintiff would be able to freely discontinue its action without prejudice solely to avoid a potentially adverse decision on a pending dismissal motion. This Court has made clear that such conduct is improper (see Rosenfeld v Renika Pty. Ltd., 84 AD3d 703 [1st Dept 2011]; McMahan v McMahan, 62 AD3d 619, 620 [1st Dept 2009]). Thus, BDO's notice was ineffective and a nullity, and the motion court should not have deemed defendants' motions withdrawn (see Citidress II Corp. v Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, 59 AD3d 210, 211 [1st Dept 2009]; Tutt v Tutt, 61 AD3d 967 [2d Dept 2009]).

That BDO served its notice of discontinuance in an attempt to circumvent the Administrative Judge's order denying its request to have its action assigned to the Commercial Division may be a valid basis for granting a discontinuance with prejudice (see e.g. Rosenfeld, 84 AD3d at 703; McMahan, 62 AD3d at 619; NBN Broadcasting v Sheridan Broadcasting Networks, 240 AD2d 319 [1st Dept 1997]; Hirschfeld v Stahl, 242 AD2d 214 [1st Dept 1997]). However, given the unusual procedural history that led to the commencement of this action, we decline to discontinue the action with prejudice. Specifically, this action arose from defendant SRC's failure to properly notify this Court of the settlement the parties had reached in the contribution action before the mediator. Indeed, although the parties had reached a settlement, and the mediator specifically directed the parties to inform this Court of the settlement, SRC unilaterally took the position that the settlement was not effective and that the appeal should continue. As a result, this Court dismissed the contribution action before the parties finalized a [*5]written agreement, thus precluding BDO from enforcing the oral agreement (see BDO Seidman LLP, 92 AD3d 426; BDO Seidman LLP, 70 AD3d 556).

Because the motion court deemed Phoenix's motion to dismiss withdrawn without having considered its merit, we remand the action for further proceedings, including consideration of the motion.

Empahsis is mine.

3025

CPLR 3025

United Fairness, Inc. v Town of Woodbury, 2014 NY Slip Op 00343 [2nd Dept. 2014]

Under the circumstances presented herein, the Supreme Court should have decided, on the merits, that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to amend the complaint before the court decided the motions of the Town and the Village to dismiss the complaint (see generally Cooke-Garrett v Hoque, 109 AD3d 457). Leave to amend a pleading should be freely given absent prejudice or surprise to the opposing party, unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see CPLR 3025[b]; Carroll v Motola, 109 AD3d 629; Finkelstein v Lincoln Natl. Corp., 107 AD3d 759, 761; Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d 220, 227). Moreover, a court shall not examine the legal sufficiency or merits of a pleading unless such insufficiency or lack of merit is clear and free from doubt (see Lucido v Mancuso, 49 AD3d at 227). Here, the proposed amended complaint, which principally sought to shift the claims from the plaintiff to a party who could have asserted those claims in the first instance, is proper, since "such an amendment, by its nature, did not result in surprise or prejudice to the [defendants], who had prior knowledge of the claim[s] and an opportunity to prepare a proper defense" (Fulgum v Town of Cortlandt Manor, 19 AD3d 444, 446; see JCD Farms v Juul—Nielsen, 300 AD2d 446; New York State Thruway Auth. v CBE Contr. Corp., 280 AD2d 390). In addition, the proposed amended complaint was not palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit.

Accordingly, that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to serve an amended complaint should have been granted. Additionally, since the proposed amended complaint rectified the plaintiff's lack of standing, the Supreme Court should not have granted the motions to dismiss the complaint on the basis of lack of standing.

Emphasis mine.

CPLR 2001 procedural irregularities and CPLR 3101 overbroad discovery

CPLR 2001

CPLR 3101

Lawrence v Kennedy, 2014 NY Slip Op 00329 [2nd Dept. 2014]

Contrary to the plaintiff's contentions, the Supreme Court properly considered the firm's motion for leave to reargue that branch of its prior motion which was to compel the production of certain documents despite certain procedural irregularities, as those irregularities did not prejudice the decedent (see CPLR 2001; Jones v LeFrance Leasing L.P., 81 AD3d 900, 903; Piquette v City of New York, 4 AD3d 402, 403). Further, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting leave to reargue (see CPLR 2221[d][2]; Singleton v Lenox Hill Hosp., 61 AD3d 956, 957; Marini v Lombardo, 17 AD3d 545, 546; Carrillo v PM Realty Group, 16 AD3d 611, 611).

Upon reargument, however, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the firm's motion which was to compel the production of the documents, including certain documents removed from the firm's offices by the plaintiff. In this regard, the firm's document requests, many of which sought the decedent's personal financial information, were overly broad, and sought irrelevant or confidential information (see Conte v County of Nassau, 87 AD3d 559, 560; Board of Mgrs. of the Park Regent Condominium v Park Regent Assoc., 78 AD3d 752, 753; Pugliese v Mondello, 57 AD3d 637, 640; Benfeld v Fleming Props., LLC, 44 AD3d 599, 600; Bell v Cobble Hill Health Ctr., Inc., 22 AD3d 620, 621; Latture v Smith, 304 AD2d 534, 536).

Emphasis is mine.