Category: CPLR R. 5015

CPLR § 105(u) Use of a verified pleading as an affidavit — Didn’t work this time

CPLR § 105 Definitions

(u) Verified pleading. A “verified pleading” may be utilized as an affidavit whenever the latter is required.

Griffin v 1869 Utica Ave. Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 51585(U) (App. Term, 2nd, 2009)

CPLR 5015 (a) (1) provides that a court which rendered a judgment
may, upon motion, relieve a party from such judgment upon the ground of
excusable default. In order to obtain such relief, however, the movant
must establish that the default was excusable and that there is a
meritorious defense to the action (see e.g. Kaplinsky v Mazor,
307 AD2d 916 [2003]). In the instant case, defendant failed to
establish by competent evidence a reasonable excuse for defendant's
default in appearing. The affidavit of Mr. Greenbaum's daughter
consisted of conclusory allegations regarding the state of her father's
health, which were insufficient to constitute a reasonable excuse for
the default, particularly in light of the fact that the record
demonstrates that defendant was properly served at Mr. Greenbaum's
address, the corporate address, as directed by the court.

In view of our determination, we need not address the question
of whether defendant established the existence of a meritorious
defense. However, we note that although a verified pleading may be
accepted in lieu of an affidavit of merit (CPLR 105 [u]), it must
contain evidentiary facts from a person with knowledge in order to
establish the merits of the defense (see Juseinoski v Board of Educ. of City of NY, 15 AD3d 353 [2005]). The verified answer in the instant case was insufficient as an affidavit of merit.

Finally, we reject defendant's argument that it was improper for
the court to deem defendant to be self-represented if it did not secure
counsel. A corporate defendant may not obstruct or impede the progress
of litigation by refusing to retain counsel (see e.g. Valisa MFG, LLC v 54 Group, Ltd., 19 Misc 3d 1136[A],
2008 NY Slip Op 51017[U] [2008]), and, where a corporate defendant
fails to appear by attorney, it is proper for a court to hold said
defendant in default (id.; see also World on Columbus, Inc. v L.C.K. Rest. Group, Inc., 260 AD2d 323 [1999]).

The bold is mine.  Most people are unaware of 105(u).  While the provision offered no benefit here, it will in countless cases, should people take advantage of it.  In vacating defaults, CPLR § 317 is another underutilized rule.

CPLR R. 5015(a)(4) Bad Faith Removal Doesn’t Divest NY Court of Jurisdiction

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order
(a) On motion
(4) lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order

Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Association/Fidelity N.Y. FSB v Lane, 2009 NY Slip Op 05685 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

Now, more than 10 years after the properties were sold and without
giving any excuse for her extraordinary delay, Lane seeks to undo the
foreclosures, oust the current owners from their homes, and vacate the
judgments. Lane's motions, presumably brought pursuant to CPLR
5015(a)(4), allege that Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction during the
limited time period in 1997 between the filing of the removal petition
and the federal court remand. Notably, Lane does not claim, nor could
she, that Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over the matter at
any other time during the long history of this case. Lane offers no
reason why her removal attempt was proper, nor does she present any
viable defense on the merits of the foreclosure actions. And it is
undisputed that at the time the properties were sold, the federal court
had already remanded the matter to state court.

As a general rule, removal of an action divests the state court of its
jurisdiction over the dispute while the removal petition is pending in
federal court (Matter of Artists' Representatives Assn. [Haley],
26 AD2d 918 [1966]). While no New York case has addressed the specific
issue presented here, a number of other courts have carved out
exceptions to the general rule focusing on situations where removal
petitions were frivolous, duplicative or abusive. For example, in Motton v Lockheed Martin Corp.
(692 So 2d 6 [La App 1997]), after the defendant filed an improper
removal petition but before the federal court remanded, the plaintiff
filed a notice of appeal. The court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss the appeal, finding that the defendant's removal attempt was
made to delay the plaintiff's right to move forward in the case.

…

We find that under the unique circumstances of this case, where the
federal court found the removal petition to be frivolous on its face
and where it was made in bad faith at the eleventh hour, following an
unsuccessful appeal, the motion court was not required, more than a
decade later, to vacate the judgments based on a claimed lack of
jurisdiction. There is no question that Lane's removal petition was
frivolous. In the order summarily remanding the matter to state court,
the federal court concluded that the petition showed "no non-frivolous
basis for jurisdiction" and that "it clearly appears on the face of the
papers submitted that removal should not be permitted."
[*3]

Moreover, Lane's removal
petition was undeniably untimely. A notice of removal of a civil action
must be filed within 30 days after receipt of a copy of the initial
pleading (28 USC
§ 1446[b]). Here, the foreclosure actions were commenced in
December 1994 and Lane's answers were struck in February 1996, yet the
removal petition was not filed until May 1997. Therefore, in addition
to asserting frivolous grounds for removal, the petition was
time-barred and could not have caused the state court to lose
jurisdiction (see Booth v Stenshoel, 96 Wash App 1019, 1999 WL
438888 [state court had jurisdiction to enter judgment after removal
petition was filed on the day of trial and 16 months after the action
was commenced]; Miller Block Co. v United States Natl. Bank, 389 Pa Super 461, 567 A2d 695 [1989], lv denied
525 Pa 658, 582 A2d 324 91990] [state court not divested of
jurisdiction upon filing of the removal petition where petition was
undisputedly untimely]; Ramsey v A.I.U. Ins. Co., 1985 Ohio App
LEXIS 8157, 1985 WL 10329 [an untimely removal petition is a nullity
and does not divest the state of jurisdiction]).

Lane's bad faith in filing her removal petition is apparent.
After an unsuccessful appeal and the lifting of an appellate stay, Lane
filed for bankruptcy and, as a result, obtained yet another stay of the
foreclosure action, which already had been pending for several years.
After the bankruptcy stay was lifted, plaintiff submitted proposed
judgments of foreclosure. A week later, instead of taking any action in
state court, Lane filed her frivolous removal petition. The only fair
reading of the record is that Lane's actions in attempting removal were
made in bad faith for the purpose of delaying the imminent
foreclosures. Lane's bad faith litigation conduct persists to this day,
as evidenced by her inexcusable delay in waiting more than 10 years to
challenge the judgments despite being aware of their existence within
weeks of their entry.

We recognize that some courts have concluded no exceptions
should be created to the general rule and thus have invalidated state
court action taken after removal but before remand (see e.g. South Carolina v Moore, 447 F2d 1067 [4th Cir 1971]; State ex rel. Morrison v Price, 285 Kan 389, 172 P3d 561 [2007]; People v Martin-Trigona,
28 Ill App 3d 605, 328 NE2d 362 [1975]). These cases are not binding on
us, and in any event, we decline to follow them under the egregious
circumstances presented here. With no good reason, Lane waited over a
decade before deciding to come back to court to challenge the
foreclosures. Her abuse of the legal process, both in filing a bad
faith petition and in failing to move to vacate the judgments she
unquestionably knew about, cannot be countenanced, particularly in
light of the harm that could befall the innocent purchasers of the
properties. To hold otherwise would reward Lane for her inexcusable
delaying tactics and would be entirely "inconsistent with any notion of
fairness and justice" (Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v Rub, supra, 481 NW2d at 457).

The bold is mine.

22 NYCRR 202.27 requires CPLR R. 5015 analysis.

22 NYCRR 202.27 Defaults

At any
scheduled call of a calendar or at any conference, if all parties do
not appear and proceed or announce their readiness to proceed
immediately or subject to the engagement of counsel, the judge may note
the default on the record and enter an order as follows:

(b) If the defendant appears but the plaintiff does
not, the judge may dismiss the action and may order a severance of
counterclaims or cross-claims.

Brown v Vanchieri, 2009 NY Slip Op 05942 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

Where, as here, an action on the trial calendar is dismissed pursuant
to 22 NYCRR 202.27(b), the dismissal of the action may be vacated, and
the action restored to the trial calendar, only if the plaintiff can
demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious
cause of action (see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Santiago v Santana, 54 AD3d 929, 930; Cazeau v Paul, 2 AD3d 477).
Under all of the circumstances, including the plaintiff's failure to
provide a reasonable excuse for his lengthy delay in moving for that
relief, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in
denying the plaintiff's motion (see Seven Acre Wood St. Assoc. v Wood, 286 AD2d 432; Piacentini v Mineola Union Free School Dist., 267 AD2d 290, 291; cf. Matter of Putnam County Natl. Bank v JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 57 AD3d 677, 678; Malik v Noe, 54 AD3d 733, 734).

The bold is mine.


CPLR R. 5015(a); 22 NYCRR 202.48; Stipulatons

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order
(a) On motion
(1) excusable default…

22 NYCRR 202.48 Submission of orders, judgments and decrees for signature

Klughaupt v Hi-Tower Contrs., Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 05750 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the
plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the
defendant Lynch Park, LLC (hereinafter Lynch Park), and in granting
Lynch Park's cross motion to vacate its default in answering and for
leave to serve a late answer (see CPLR 5015). Considering the
lack of any prejudice to the plaintiff as a result of the relatively
short three-week delay in serving an answer, the existence of a
potentially meritorious defense, and the public policy favoring the
resolution of cases on the merits, the Supreme Court properly excused
the de minimis delay in answering (see Schonfeld v Blue & White Food Prods. Corp., 29 AD3d 673; Yonkers Rib House, Inc. v 1789 Cent. Park Corp., 19 AD3d 687; Trimble v SAS Taxi Co., Inc., 8 AD3d 557; see e.g. Perez v Linshar Realty Corp., 259 AD2d 532; Swidler v World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 85 AD2d 239, cf. Leifer v Pilgreen Corp.,AD3d,
2009 NY Slip Op 03872 [2d Dept 2009] [10-month delay in moving to
vacate default in answering or appearing, with no meritorious defense,
does not warrant vacatur of default]).

Diane v Ricale Taxi, Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 05680 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

Plaintiff fails to show that a judgment was ever issued, much
less served on appellant. The only exhibits attached to plaintiff's
opposition are an order granting a default judgment and directing an
inquest, with no notice of entry or affidavit of service, and a copy of
this Court's subsequent order (291 AD2d 320) involving another
defendant and containing no references to any judgment in any amount
against appellant. Accordingly, it does not appear that appellant's
one-year time limit under CPLR 5015(a)(1) to move for relief from a
judgment or order ever began to run, and appellant's motion should not
have been denied as untimely. For present purposes, appellant, who was
named a defendant only because he was one of two employees who
regularly drove the taxi involved in the accident, comes forward with
sufficient evidence that he could not have been the driver since the
accident occurred at night while he worked only days. Indeed, the
possibility that appellant had nothing to do with the accident would,
given a reasonable excuse, warrant vacatur of the default judgment in
the interest of justice even if the one-year time limit had run (see Johnson v Minskoff & Sons, 287 AD2d 233, 236 [2001]). We accept appellant's excuse that he did not understand the import of the legal documents he was [*2]receiving and trusted his employer's assurances that it would take care of the matter for him.

Another rare, "in the interests of justice" vacatur.

Rowley v Amrhein, 2009 NY Slip Op 05834 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

Defendant's challenge to the judgment on the ground that it
inaccurately reflects the stipulation of settlement by including terms
that are inconsistent therewith is not preserved for appellate review
since there is no record that defendant raised
any objection to plaintiff's proposed judgment, as required by 22 NYCRR 202.48(c)(2) (see Salamone v Wincaf Props., 9 AD3d 127, 140 [2004], lv dismissed
4 NY3d 794 [2005]). Defendant's claim that he had no opportunity to
object to plaintiff's proposed judgment because he was not properly
served with a copy thereof is properly directed to Supreme Court in a
motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), not to this
Court on appeal (see McCue v McCue, 225 AD2d 975, 976 [1996]; Levy v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 124 AD2d 900, 901 [1986]).

Defendant's challenges to the judgment on the bases that it
grants plaintiff a divorce on a ground that he contests and fails to
adjudicate his counterclaim allege substantive errors in the judgment
that affect his substantial rights and not mere inconsistencies with
the intentions of the court and the parties as demonstrated by the
record. Thus, review may be obtained either through an appeal from the
judgment or through a motion to vacate pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) (Salamone,
9 AD3d at 133-134). The record reveals that Supreme Court did not
address the grounds for divorce or defendant's counterclaim.
Accordingly, we remand the matter for further proceedings to determine
these issues.

Defendant's contention that the stipulation disposing of the
parties' economic issues is unenforceable against him is not properly
before us, since defendant never moved in Supreme Court to set aside
the stipulation (see Garrison v Garrison, 52 AD3d 927, 928 [2008]; Hopkins v Hopkins, 97 AD2d 457 [1983]). In any event, the terms of the stipulation were memorialized in [*2]a
proposed preliminary conference order that the court reviewed during
the October 30, 2007 proceedings, the stipulation was signed and
initialed by both parties, and the court expressly informed the parties
on the record that it was a binding contract. The stipulation contained
no express reservation of the right not to be bound until the execution
of a more formal agreement. To the contrary, all the essential terms
and conditions of an agreement were set forth in the stipulation, and
all that remained was their translation into a more formal document (see Brause v Goldman, 10 AD2d 328, 332 [1960], affd 9 NY2d 620 [1961]).

The bold is mine.

CPLR R. 5015(a)(1)&(4); CPLR § 308(2)&(4); CPLR § 317

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order
(a) On motion
(1) excusable default…
(2) newly-discovered evidence…
(3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party
(4) lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order
(5) reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior judgment or order upon which it is based

CPLR § 308 Personal service upon a natural person
(2)  by delivering the summons within the state to a person of suitable age and discretion...
(4) where service under paragraphs one and two cannot be made with due diligence, by affixing the summons to the door

CPLR § 317 Defense by person to whom summons not personally delivered

CPLR R. 320 Defendant's appearance
(a) Requirement of appearance

Caba v Rai, 2009 NY Slip Op 05252 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

CPLR 317 and 5015(a)(1) allow a defendant against whom a default
judgment has been rendered to move to vacate that default. CPLR 317
provides that

"[a] person served with a summons other than by personal delivery
to him or to his agent for service designated under rule 318 . . . who
does not appear may be allowed to defend the action within one year
after he obtains knowledge of entry of the judgment, but in no event
more than five years after such entry, upon a finding of the court that
he did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend
and has a meritorious defense."

Thus, this statute is available only to a defendant who (1) was
served by a method other than personal delivery, (2) moves to vacate
the judgment within one year of learning of it (but not more than five
years after entry), and (3) demonstrates a potentially meritorious
defense to the action. By contrast, CPLR 5015(a)(1) is available to any
defendant against whom a default judgment was entered, provided that
the defendant can demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default
and a potentially meritorious defense. A defendant seeking relief under
5015(a)(1) must move to vacate the default judgment within one year of
service on defendant of the default judgment with notice of entry. Both
provisions assume personal jurisdiction exists over the defaulting
defendant and provide that party with an opportunity to open the
default and contest the merits of the plaintiff's claim (see Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C317:1, at 249-250 [main vol]; see also
Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B,
CPLR C5015:6, at 210). If the defaulting defendant asserts that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction over him or her, the defendant
should seek dismissal of the action under CPLR 5015(a)(4) (see Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C317:1, at 250 [main vol]), a
motion that has no stated time limit and can be made at any time
(Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws, Book 7B, CPLR
C5015:3, at 205-206 [main vol]).

In moving to vacate the default judgment, defendant argued that
she was entitled to relief under CPLR 317 or 5015(a)(1) and sought to
vacate the judgment and for an extension of time to interpose an
answer; she did not seek relief under 5015(a)(4) or request that the
complaint be dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction. To be sure,
in her notice of cross motion, defendant requested an order "vacating
and setting aside the defendant's [default] pursuant to CPLR 5015
and/or CPLR 317, extending the defendant's time to answer and
compelling plaintiff to accept defendant's answer pursuant to CPLR
2004." Nowhere in her motion papers, however, did defendant suggest
that the action should be dismissed because the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over her. Although defendant did argue that she had not
received the summons and complaint (or the default judgment), that
argument was asserted by defendant in an effort to establish that she
had a reasonable excuse for her default. What the concurring Justice
considers to be part of the "crux" of defendant's motion, "the absence
of any personal jurisdiction," was never stated in the motion.
Accordingly, since defendant sought to vacate the judgment and defend
the action on the merits, Supreme Court erred in ordering a traverse
hearing; defendant charted a specific procedural course that Supreme
Court improperly altered (see Mitchell v New [*3]York Hosp., 61 NY2d 208, 214 [1984]).[FN1]

With respect to her contention that she was entitled to relief
under CPLR 317, defendant obtained knowledge of the judgment in January
2004 when she received a credit report listing the judgment, and did
not move to vacate the default until August 2007. Thus, that portion of
defendant's cross motion seeking relief under CPLR 317 was untimely.

Regarding that portion of the cross motion that sought relief
under CPLR 5015(a)(1), there is no indication when the default judgment
with notice of entry was served on defendant. Thus, assuming without
deciding that defendant properly could seek relief under 5015(a)(1),[FN2]
the motion appears timely and plaintiff does not argue to the contrary.
Nonetheless, defendant is not entitled to relief under 5015(a)(1).
Although defendant denied receiving the summons and complaint or any
other papers in this matter until she was served with plaintiff's
motion to compel the sheriff to seize and sell her property, defendant
learned of the judgment in January 2004. She did not move to vacate the
default, however, until August 2007 and only did so in response to
plaintiff's motion to seize and sell her property. Moreover,
plaintiff's counsel [*4]averred that both
defendant and her attorney contacted plaintiff's counsel on May 11,
2005 about vacating the judgment, an averment that is corroborated by
phone message slips generated by plaintiff's counsel's secretary and
which defendant does not dispute. Thus, defendant failed to proffer a
reasonable excuse for her substantial delay in moving to vacate the
judgment (see Bekker v Fleischman, 35 AD3d 334 [2006]; Robinson v 1068 Flatbush Realty, Inc., 10 AD3d 716 [2004]; Duran v Edderson,
259 AD2d 728 [1999]). In light of our conclusion that defendant failed
to proffer a reasonable excuse, we need not determine whether she
offered a potentially meritorious defense to the action.

To read the concurring opinion, click the link for the decision above.

Kalamadeen v Singh, 2009 NY Slip Op 05296 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

The plaintiff and the defendant allegedly were involved in an
automobile accident on February 26, 2001. The police accident report
lists two different addresses for the defendant, one from his driver's
license and a different one from his vehicle registration. The
plaintiff commenced this action in February 2004, and contends that he
served the defendant pursuant to CPLR 308(4) at the defendant's address
then on record at the Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter the
DMV). This address was different from the two addresses on the police
accident report. The defendant did not appear in the action and a
judgment was entered against him on August 18, 2004, upon his default.

Upon discovering the judgment against him, the defendant moved
to vacate it, contending that at the time service allegedly was made he
did not live at the address where process was affixed and mailed, he
did not receive process, and that the subject accident was the
plaintiff's fault. A hearing to determine the validity of service of
process was ordered. At the hearing, the process server admitted that
on the fourth occasion that he attempted to personally deliver the
summons and complaint to the defendant at the defendant's address then
on record with the DMV, he was told by the owner of the premises that
the defendant had moved from that address several months earlier.
Nevertheless, the process server affixed the summons and complaint to
the door at that address and mailed process to that address, [*2]purportedly
in compliance with CPLR 308(4). The Civil Court of the City of New
York, Queens County, granted the defendant's motion to vacate the
default, and the Appellate Term for the Second, Eleventh, and
Thirteenth Judicial Districts affirmed, with one Justice dissenting. We
granted leave to appeal and now reverse and deny the defendant's motion
to vacate the default judgment.

CPLR 308(4) requires that the summons be affixed to the door of
the defendant's "actual place of business, dwelling place or usual
place of abode." Although the required subsequent mailing to the
defendant's last known residence will suffice for the second element of
service under CPLR 308(4), affixing process to the door of the
defendant's last known residence will not be sufficient to meet the
first element of the statute (see Feinstein v Bergner, 48 NY2d
234). The issue here is whether there is sufficient evidence, including
the defendant's failure to notify the Commissioner of the DMV of his
change of address, as required by Vehicle and Traffic Law § 505(5), to
estop the defendant from obtaining vacatur of the default judgment on
the ground that service of process was not made in strict compliance
with CPLR 308(4) (see Cruz v Narisi, 32 AD3d 981).

To the extent that the defendant's motion to vacate his default
was made pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), based upon excusable default, it
should have been denied, as the defendant's change of address is not a
reasonable excuse because he failed to comply with Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 505(5) (see Candela v Johnson, 48 AD3d 502; Labozzetta v Fabbro, 22 AD3d 644; Traore v Nelson, 277
AD2d 443). Likewise, to the extent that the motion was made pursuant to
CPLR 5015(a)(4), based on lack of personal jurisdiction, it should have
been denied, as the defendant is estopped from challenging the
propriety of service due to his failure to comply with Vehicle and
Traffic Law § 505(5) (see Labozzetta v Fabbro, 22 AD3d 644; Kandov v Gondal, 11 AD3d 516).

A default judgment may be vacated pursuant to CPLR 317 where the
defendant was served by a method other than personal delivery and did
not actually receive notice of the summons in time to defend, provided
that the defendant has a meritorious defense (see Thakurdyal v 341 Scholes St., LLC, 50
AD3d 889). However, "denial of relief under CPLR 317 might be
appropriate where . . . a defendant's failure to personally receive
notice of the summons was a deliberate attempt to avoid such notice" (Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A. C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67
NY2d 138, 143). Here, considering that the defendant supplied the
police officer with two different addresses at the time of the
officer's investigation, and that there was yet another address on
record for the defendant at the DMV, his failure to comply with Vehicle
and Traffic Law § 505(5) raised an inference that the defendant
deliberately attempted to avoid notice of the action (see Cruz v Narisi, 32
AD3d 981). The defendant failed to rebut that inference. Accordingly,
the defendant was not entitled to relief under CPLR 317 (see Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A. C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 143; Paul Conte Cadillac v C.A.R.S. Purch. Serv., 126 AD2d 621, 622.

That's one harsh inference.

Weiqin Wu v Guo Dong Chen, 2009 NY Slip Op 51142(U) (App. Term, 2nd, 2009)

The decision of a fact-finding court should not be disturbed upon
appeal unless it is obvious that the court's conclusions could not have
been reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544 [1990]). This standard applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v Roper,
269 AD2d 125, 126 [2000]). Furthermore, the determination of the trier
of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference as
the court has the opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and
demeanor of the witnesses, thereby affording the trial court a better [*2]perspective from which to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses (see Vizzari v State of New York, 184 AD2d 564 [1992]; Kincade v Kincade, 178 AD2d 510, 511 [1991]).

In its decision after trial, the Civil Court explicitly stated
that it credited plaintiff's testimony, but not defendant's. The Civil
Court also implicitly found that plaintiff had established that there
was an agreement between plaintiff and defendant, acting in his
individual capacity, and that defendant had breached that agreement.
That finding is supported by the record and will not be disturbed on
appeal.

The Civil Court properly denied defendant's posttrial motion,
as defendant failed to establish that he had discovered any evidence
that he could not have discovered prior to trial or prior to the time
for making a timely CPLR 4404 motion (CPLR 5015 [a] [2]), or that
plaintiff had made any misrepresentations (CPLR 5015 [a] [3]). We note
that defendant also failed to establish that the agreement was void
pursuant to the statute of frauds (see e.g. Taranto v Fritz, 83 AD2d 864 [1981]; 61 NY Jur 2d, Statute of Frauds § 39).

Accordingly, the Civil Court's judgment and order provided the
parties with substantial justice according to the rules and principles
of substantive law (CCA 1807; see Ross v Friedman, 269 AD2d 584 [2000]; Williams, 269 AD2d at 126), and we affirm.

Saxon Mtge. Servs., Inc. v Bell, 2009 NY Slip Op 05312 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

Where, as here, the appellant submitted a detailed affidavit stating
that he was home on each of the occasions when the process server
purportedly attempted to serve process pursuant to CPLR 308(2), he
rebutted the allegations contained in the process server's affidavit
and was entitled to a hearing to determine whether personal
jurisdiction was acquired over him (see Bankers Trust Co. of Cal. v Tsoukas, 303 AD2d 343).

While the appellant eventually acquired actual notice of the
action, actual notice alone will not sustain the service or subject a
person to the court's jurisdiction when there has not been compliance
with prescribed conditions of service (see Frankel v Schilling, 149 AD2d 657; Skyline Agency v Coppotelli, Inc., 117 AD2d 135).

The bold is mine.

CPLR § 311(a)(1); CPLR R. 5015(a)(1)(4)

CPLR § 311 Personal service upon a corporation or governmental subdivision

(a)(1)

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order

(a) On motion

CPLR R. 5015(a)(4) lack of jurisdiction to render the judgment or order

CPLR R. 5015(a)(1) excusable default

Aguilera v Pistilli Constr. & Dev. Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 04844 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

The affidavit of the plaintiff's process server showed that on July
25, 2005, Pistilli was served with a summons and complaint by delivery
to its general agent at its office located in Astoria. Since no answer
was served by Pistilli, the plaintiff sought and obtained leave to
enter a default judgment against it.

Pistilli sought to vacate the default pursuant to, inter alia,
CPLR 5015(a)(4), claiming that service of process was improper under
CPLR 311(a)(1), and/or pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) on the ground that
its default was excusable. By order dated October 2, 2007, the Supreme
Court, inter alia, directed a hearing to determine whether service of
process was effected. Contrary to Pistilli's position, the Supreme
Court properly ordered the hearing (see CLE Assoc., Inc. v Greene, 43 AD3d 382, 384; Skyline Agency v Ambrose Coppotelli, Inc., 117 AD2d 135, 139).

Pursuant to CPLR 311(a)(1), service upon a corporation shall be
made by delivering the summons to an officer, director, managing agent,
general agent, cashier, or assistant cashier, or to any other agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service. In addition,
service may be made upon someone whom the corporation cloaks with
authority (see Fashion Page v Zurich Ins. Co., 50 NY2d 265; Rokicki v 24 Hour Courier Serv., 282 AD2d 664, 665; Eastman Kodak Co. v Miller & Miller Consulting Actuaries, 195 AD2d 591; Seda v Armory Estates, 138 AD2d 362, 363-364).

The Supreme Court correctly determined that it acquired
jurisdiction over Pistilli through proper service of process. The
evidence adduced at the hearing established that Angela Rodriguez, to
whom the summons and complaint was delivered, was seated behind the
cashier/reception desk when the process server entered Pistilli's
office, that the process server, who had served Pistilli in the same
office and the same manner on at least three prior occasions, read the
summons and complaint out loud to Rodriguez, and that Rodriguez
informed the process server that she could accept service on behalf of
Pistilli. While Rodriguez claimed that she was not employed by
Pistilli, the record demonstrates that the company by which she was
employed shared offices with Pistilli and was owned by the same
principals. She also testified that service of process was regularly
made by delivering documents to the reception desk for the various
entities that operated out of the same office. Under these
circumstances, "the plaintiff's process server acted reasonably and
with due diligence" and it was reasonable for the process server to
believe that Rodriguez was authorized to accept service on behalf of
Pistilli (Rokicki v 24 Hour Courier Serv., 282 AD2d at 664; see Fashion Page v Zurich Ins. Co., 50 NY2d 265; Eastman Kodak Co. v Miller & Miller Consulting Actuaries, 195 AD2d at 591; Seda v Armory Estates, 138
AD2d at 363-364). Furthermore, we decline to disturb any credibility
determination made by the hearing court, as its determination is amply
supported by the record (see Lattingtown Harbor Prop. Owners Assn., Inc. v Agostino, 34 AD3d 536, 538).

The Supreme Court also properly denied that branch of Pistilli's
renewed motion which was to vacate the default pursuant to CPLR
5015(a)(1). "A party seeking to vacate a default pursuant to CPLR 5015
(a)(1) must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its delay in appearing
and answering the complaint and a meritorious defense to the action'" (New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v American Home Assur. Co., 28 AD3d 442, quoting Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141; see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Koyenov v Twin-D Transp., Inc., 33 AD3d 967).
"The decision as to the setting aside of a default in answering is
generally left to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court, the
exercise of which will generally not be disturbed if there is support
in the record therefor" (Mjahdi v Maguire, 21 AD3d 1067, 1068, quoting MacMarty, Inc. v Scheller, 201 AD2d 706, 707).

Pistilli failed to offer a reasonable excuse for its failure to answer or appear in this action (see Eastman Kodak Co. v Miller & Miller Consulting Actuaries, 195 AD2d at 592). Contrary [*3]to
Pistilli's position, its default was not attributable to its insurance
carrier's assertion that it would represent it in this matter, as it
was served with the summons and complaint approximately five months
prior to any communication that it received from its insurance carrier
regarding representation (cf. Perez v Linshar Realty Corp., 259
AD2d 532, 533). In view of the lack of a reasonable excuse, it is
unnecessary to consider whether Pistilli sufficiently demonstrated the
existence of a meritorious defense (see Mjahdi v Maguire, 21 AD3d at 1068; Krieger v Cohan, 18 AD3d 823).

The bold is mine.


CPLR R. 5015(a)(2)

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order

(a) On motion.
The court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from
it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person
with such notice as the court may direct, upon the ground of:

2.
newly-discovered evidence which, if introduced at the trial, would
probably have produced a different result and which could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under section 4404

Woori Am. Bank v Winopa Intl. Ltd., 2009 NY Slip Op 04734 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

Defendants were properly denied relief under CPLR 5015 (a)(2) since
they did not show that their new evidence refuted the essential
findings underlying the order and would probably have resulted in a
different outcome (see Bongiasca v Bongiasca, 289 AD2d 121, 122 [2001]). The evidence submitted did not establish that the statements in question were fabricated (cf. McCarthy v Port of N.Y. Auth.,
21 AD2d 125, 127 [1964]). In any event, Justice Heitler's determination
did not rest solely on those statements, but also on defendants'
initial failure to deny their indebtedness and their inability to offer
any other evidence that they had made the payments as they claimed.

The bold is mine.

22 NYCRR 202.21(d); CPLR § 3126; CPLR 5015; Presumption of receipt

CPLR § 3126 Penalties for refusal to comply with order or to disclose

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order

22 NYCRR 202.21 Note of issue and certificate of readiness
(d) Pretrial proceedings
Where a party is prevented from filing a note of issue and certificate
of readiness because a pretrial proceeding has not been completed for
any reason beyond the control of the party, the court, upon motion
supported by affidavit, may permit the party to file a note of issue
upon such conditions as the court deems appropriate. Where unusual or
unanticipated circumstances develop subsequent to the filing of a note
of issue and certificate of readiness which require additional pretrial
proceedings to prevent substantial prejudice, the court, upon motion
supported by affidavit, may grant permission to conduct such necessary
proceedings.

Redmond v Jamaica Hosp. Med. Ctr., 2009 NY Slip Op 04042 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice and wrongful
death, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens
County (O'Donoghue, J.), entered September 16, 2008, which denied her
motion to vacate an order of the same court dated April 10, 2008, sua
sponte, precluding her from conducting examinations before trial of the
defendants Kenneth Fretwell and Jeffrey Chan pursuant to CPLR 3126.

ORDERED that the order entered September 16, 2008, is reversed,
on the law and in the exercise of discretion, without costs or
disbursements, and the motion to vacate the order dated April 10, 2008,
is granted.

The record does not demonstrate that the plaintiff's counsel
willfully and contumaciously obstructed the progress of disclosure with
respect to the examinations before trial of the defendants Kenneth
Fretwell and Jeffrey Chan (hereinafter the defendant doctors) (see Maceno v Franklin Hosp. Med. Ctr., 14 AD3d 663, 664; Santigate v Linsalata, 304 AD2d 639, 641; Gorokhova v Belulovich,
267 AD2d 202, 203). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently
exercised its discretion in, sua sponte, imposing the sanction of
preclusion with respect to the examination before trial of the
defendant doctors (see CPLR 3126; cf., Mahopac Ophthalmology, P.C. v Tarasevich, 21 AD3d 351, 352), and in denying the plaintiff's motion to vacate the order imposing that sanction.
[*2]

Meadow Lane Equities Corp. v Hill, 2009 NY Slip Op 04396 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

In an action, inter alia, for a permanent injunction, the defendants
appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County
(Phelan, J.), entered June 11, 2008, as denied their motion, inter
alia, to direct nonparty First New York Partners to preserve certain
evidence contained on electronic databases and to permit the
examination thereof.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in
determining that the defendants did not demonstrate unusual or
unanticipated circumstances warranting the discovery requested through
their motion (see 22 NYCRR 202.21[d]; Gomez v New York City Tr. Auth., 19 AD3d 366, 366-367; cf. Scanga v Family Practice Assoc. of Rockland, P.C., 41 AD3d 576, 576-577).

Caprio v 1025 Manhattan Ave. Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 04367 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

In order to vacate their default in opposing the plaintiffs' motion
pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike their answers, the defendants were
required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their default and a
meritorious defense to both the motion and the action (see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Nowell v NYU Med. Ctr., 55 AD3d 573; Raciti v Sands Point Nursing Home, 54 AD3d 1014; Simpson v Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 48 AD3d 389, 392; Diamond v Vitucci, 36 AD3d 650).
The defendants failed to set forth a reasonable excuse for their
default in opposing the plaintiffs' motion. Although the defendants'
attorney claimed that he did not receive the plaintiffs' motion papers,
his mere denial of receipt was insufficient to rebut the proof that the
motions papers were properly mailed and the presumption of receipt
arising from that proof (see Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 122; [*2]Diamond v Vitucci, 36 AD3d 650; Philippi v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 16 AD3d 654, 655; Sarva v Chakravorty, 14 AD3d 689; Platonov v Sciabarra, 305
AD2d 651). The defendants also failed to demonstrate a meritorious
defense to the motion to strike their answers by offering an adequate
explanation for their failure to fully and timely respond to the
plaintiffs' discovery demands and court directives requiring compliance
with such demands (see Howe v Jeremiah, 51 AD3d 975; Watson v Hall, 43 AD3d 435, 436; Devito v J & J Towing, Inc., 17
AD3d 624). Under these circumstances, the defendants' motion to vacate
the order dated February 7, 2008, should have been denied.

The bold is mine.

CPLR R. 5015 Plaintiff not required to reject late answer where it moved to enter a default instead

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order

CPLR R. 2101 Form of papers
(f) Defects in form; waiver

CPLR § 3012 Service of pleadings and demand for complaint
(d) Extension of time to appear or plead

CPLR § 2005 Excusable delay or default

J.O. Dedicated Med., P.C. v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2009 NY Slip Op 51089(U) (App. Term, 2nd, 2009)

Defendant's
contention that plaintiff should be compelled to accept its answer
because plaintiff did not reject the answer within two days of its
receipt, as mandated by CPLR 2101 (f), is without merit. Although a
plaintiff's retention of an answer without a timely objection
constitutes a waiver of objection as to untimeliness, precluding entry
of a default judgment (see e.g. AVA Acupuncture P.C. v Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 14 Misc 3d 138[A],
2007 NY Slip Op 50263[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2007]), a
review of the record in the instant case demonstrates that plaintiff
made its application for leave to enter a default judgment long before
it was in receipt of the answer. Once plaintiff made said application,
it thereby objected to defendant's failure to serve a timely answer,
brought that objection to the attention of defendant and the court, and
therefore cannot be deemed to have waived any objection to untimeliness
(see [*2]Katz v Perl, 22 AD3d 806 [2005]).

We
note that a default judgment had already been entered against defendant
when it moved to compel the acceptance of its answer or, in the
alternative, to extend its time to serve the answer pursuant to CPLR
3012 (d). Accordingly, defendant should have instead moved to vacate
the default judgment, pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a). In either situation,
however, a defendant is required to establish both a reasonable excuse
for the default and a meritorious defense (see Juseinoski v Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 15 AD3d 353 [2005]) and, in the case at bar, defendant failed to do so.

While a court may, in the exercise of its discretion, accept a claim of law office failure as a reasonable excuse (see CPLR 2005), defense counsel was required to "submit supporting facts in evidentiary form sufficient to justify the default" (Incorporated Vil. of Hempstead v Jablonsky, 283 AD2d 553, 554 [2001]), and include "a detailed explanation of [the] oversights" (Hospital for Joint Diseases v ELRAC, Inc., 11 AD3d 432,
433 [2004]). The mere statement in defense counsel's affirmation in
support of the motion that his office failed to timely process the
summons and complaint "due to clerical inadvertence," and that law
office failure was excusable, did not establish a reasonable excuse for
the default (see Ave T MPC Corp. v Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 20 Misc 3d 142[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 51681[U] [App Term, 2d & 11th Jud Dists 2008]).

Because we find that defendant did not establish a reasonable excuse
for the default, it is unnecessary for us to address whether defendant
demonstrated a meritorious defense.

Leifer v Pilgreen Corp., 2009 NY Slip Op 03872 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

It is uncontested that the defendant failed to timely serve its
answer. The stipulation extending its time to do so expired in October
2006 and no extension thereof was granted or even sought. Thus, in
order to successfully oppose the plaintiffs' motion for leave to enter
a default judgment against it, the defendant was required to
demonstrate a justifiable excuse for its default and the existence of a
meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Kouzios v Dery, 57 AD3d 949; Mjahdi v Maguire, 21 AD3d 1067, 1068; cf. Giovanelli v Rivera, 23 AD3d 616). The defendant failed to do so.

The defendant's insurance carrier's long delay before defending
this action, without more, was insufficient to establish a reasonable
excuse for the default (see Martinez v D'Alessandro [*2]Custom Bldrs. & Demolition, Inc., 52 AD3d 786, 787; Segovia v Delcon Constr. Corp., 43 AD3d 1143; Lemberger v Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 33 AD3d 671,
672). Additionally, the defendant failed to demonstrate the existence
of a meritorious defense. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' motion for leave
to enter a default judgment and to set the matter down for an inquest
should have been granted and the defendant's cross motion for leave to
serve a late answer nunc pro tunc should have been denied (see CPLR 3012[d]).

Furthermore, the court erred in deeming the issue of timeliness
of the answer waived by the plaintiffs' withdrawal of their prior
motion for a default judgment. After the defendant served a late
answer, the plaintiffs promptly moved for the same relief, bringing
their objection to the attention of the defendant and the court (see Katz v Perl, 22 AD3d 806, 807).

CPLR R. 5015; “Interest of justice” and a Footnote (FN 1)

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order

Kostun v Gower, 2009 NY Slip Op 03430 (App. Div., 3rd, 2009)

Plaintiff was the victim of a brutal attack in August 2002 which
rendered him a quadriplegic. He commenced this action in 2003 against
the two individuals who personally caused his injuries, as well as
several other individuals who were present and allegedly conspired in
the assault. One such defendant, defendant Jennifer M. Cimaomo
(hereinafter defendant), failed to timely answer and, in 2007,
plaintiff moved for a default judgment as to liability against her.
Over defendant's opposition, Supreme Court found defendant in default.
Defendant now appeals.[FN1]
[*2]

In considering an application
for a default judgment, a court must ascertain whether "the defendant
demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious
defense" (Drucker v Ward, 293 AD2d 891, 891-892 [2002]). In
addition, courts have the inherent power to forgive even an unexplained
default "in the interest of justice" (B.U.D. Sheetmetal v Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 248 AD2d 856, 856 [1998]; see Wade v Village of Whitehall, 46 AD3d 1302,
1303 [2007]). Here, defendant admits accompanying a group of
individuals to confront plaintiff, but alleges that she did not take
any part in the planning or execution of the assault. After reviewing
the record, we find that defendant has met her burden of demonstrating
viable questions of fact as to whether she conspired or otherwise
participated in the assault. Hence, she demonstrated a potentially
meritorious defense (see Cippitelli v Town of Niskayuna, 277 AD2d 540, 542 [2000]; Cerrone v Fasulo, 245 AD2d 793, 794 [1997]; see also Poree v Bynum, 56 AD3d 261, 262 [2008]).

Turning to the issue of excuse, it is conceded that defendant's
answer was untimely; although she was obligated to answer within 20
days of personal service, which occurred on September 15, 2003 (see
CPLR 320 [a]), she did not serve her answer until October 27, 2003.
However on October 8, 2003, at which point defendant's answer was late
by three days, she was again served with the same summons and complaint
by mail. Acting pro se, rather than seek an extension of her time to
answer, defendant simply answered as if her time to answer began to run
anew from the second service. We find this situation akin to those
where we have held that "defendant['s] default may be permissibly
attributed to excusable 'law office failure'" (Cerrone v Fasulo,
245 AD2d at 794 [1997]). Further, although defendant failed to take any
immediate action after plaintiff returned her answer as untimely, when
notified of the impending default she promptly obtained counsel who
appeared pro bono to oppose entry of the default judgment.

On this record, moreover, it appears that defendant's default
was not willful and that plaintiff was not prejudiced by her delay in
answering (see Drucker v Ward, 293 AD2d at 892)[FN2]. Indeed, "it is readily apparent that defendant[] did not intend to abandon [her] defense in this action" (Rickert v Chestara, 56 AD3d 941,
942 [2008]). "Thus, given the questions of fact as to merit, the brief
delay, the lack of intention on defendant['s] part to default, the
failure of plaintiff to demonstrate any prejudice attributable to the
delay and the policy preference in favor of resolving disputes on the
merits, we conclude that defendant['s] untimeliness should have been
excused in this instance" (Cerrone v Fasulo, 245 AD2d at 794 [citation omitted]; see Rickert v Chestara, 56 AD3d at 942; Wade v Village of Whitehall, 46 AD3d at 1303; Harcztark v Drive Variety, Inc., 21 AD3d 876, 876-877 [2005]).

Footnote 1: While no appeal generally lies from an order entered upon default (see
CPLR 5511), that prohibition does not apply where, as here, the
defaulting party appears and contests the application for a default
judgment (see ABS 1200, LLC v Kudriashova, 60 AD3d 1164, ___, 874 NYS2d 336, 338 n 3 [2009]; Robert Marini Bldr. v Rao, 263 AD2d 846, 848 [1999]).

Footnote 2:Notably, plaintiff's motion for a default judgment against defendant was not made until August 16, 2007, more than
3½ years after rejecting defendant's answer.

The bold is mine