Appellate Division

Forum Non Con requirments

Gorodetsky v Bridgewater Wholesalers, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 03122 [2d Dept. 2018]

A party moving for a change of venue pursuant to CPLR 510(3) has the burden of demonstrating that the convenience of material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted by the change (see CPLR 510[3]; Ambroise v United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 143 AD3d 927, 928; Lapidus v 1050 Tenants Corp., 94 AD3d 950, 950). In doing so, the moving party must set forth (1) the names, addresses, and occupations of the prospective witnesses, (2) the facts to which the witnesses will testify at trial, so that the court may assess whether the proposed evidence is necessary and material, (3) a statement that the witnesses are willing to testify, and (4) a statement that the witnesses would be greatly inconvenienced if the venue of the action was not changed (see Ambroise v United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 143 AD3d at 928; M.I. v Trinity-Pawling Sch., 125 AD3d 615, 615).

Here, the defendants failed to disclose the addresses of all but one of the prospective witnesses, made only conclusory statements that the prospective witnesses would be inconvenienced, and failed to establish the manner or extent to which those witnesses would be inconvenienced (see Ambroise v United Parcel Serv. of Am. Inc., 143 AD3d at 928; Matter of Supplier Distribution Concepts, Inc., 80 AD3d 869, 871). With regard to those witnesses who were New York State police officers, while "the convenience of local government officials, such as police officers, is of paramount importance because they should not be kept from their duties unnecessarily" (Lafferty v Eklecco, LLC, 34 AD3d 754, 755), here, only conclusory statements, without any details, were provided as to how those witnesses would be inconvenienced. As such, these statements were insufficient to establish that those witnesses would be inconvenienced if venue were not changed.

A party who is ignorant, in whole or in part, of the name or identity of a person who may properly be made a party, may proceed against such person as an unknown party by designating so much of his name and identity as is known. If the name or remainder of the name becomes known all subsequent proceedings shall be taken under the true name and all prior proceedings shall be deemed amended accordingly.

Markov v Stack's LLC (Delaware), 2018 NY Slip Op 03238 [1st Dept. 2018]

The motion court properly dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was served after the statutory limitations period had expired. Plaintiff's claims arose on January 14, 2008. The original complaint in this action, which was filed on January 6, 2014 (just days before the six-year statute of limitations expired), did not name Stack's LLC as a defendant, nor did it name defendant Stack's LLC (Delaware). The amended complaint, which for the first time named Stack's LLC (Delaware) as a defendant, was not filed until January 24, 2014 — more than a week after the statute had run. Plaintiff cannot properly rely on CPLR 1024 as a shield from the statute of limitations. Even assuming that the appellation "John Doe" referred to a corporation rather than a natural person, the complaint's description of the John Doe defendant was not described in such a way as to fairly apprise Stack's LLC (Delaware) that it was an intended defendant (see Bumpus v New York City Tr. Auth., 66 AD3d 26, 29—30 [2d Dept 2009]; see Tucker v Lorieo, 291 AD2d 261, 262 [1st Dept 2002]). Thus, the inadequate description rendered the action jurisdictionally defective (Thas v Dayrich Trading, Inc., 78 AD3d 1163, 1165 [2d Dept 2010]).

Can’t grant leave to renew, while denying a motion, all willy nilly like

Foo-Lu Co. v Rojas, 2018 NY Slip Op 02772 [2d Dept 2018]

The Supreme Court, upon denying the plaintiffs' and Chao's initial motion for summary judgment, improvidently exercised its discretion by, in effect, granting the moving parties leave to renew. The defect in the initial motion was not merely technical but substantive, inasmuch [*2]as the moving parties failed, without explanation, to submit evidence, in admissible form, establishing, inter alia, their ownership of the subject mortgage note or the existence of Rojas' default. Such evidence could, and should, have been submitted on the original summary judgment motion (see Vinar v Litman, 110 AD3d 867), and sufficient cause was not shown to warrant entertaining a second motion (cf. Varsity Tr. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 300 AD2d 38, 39). Therefore, the order dated April 7, 2015, must be modified accordingly, and the provision of the order dated November 23, 2015, upon renewal, granting the second summary judgment motion must be vacated. In light of our determination with respect to the order dated April 7, 2015, the appeal from that portion of the order dated November 23, 2015, must be dismissed.

The Supreme Court also erred in awarding summary judgment to Fong. It is undisputed that Fong's motion was untimely, having been made 309 days after the filing of the note of issue, or 189 days after the expiration of the 120-day statutory deadline (see CPLR 3212[a]; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d 866; Giambona v Hines, 104 AD3d 811). Even assuming that the court granted an oral application by Fong for leave to file the late motion, as Fong's counsel represented in his papers, such determination would have been an improvident exercise of discretion under the circumstances presented, since leave can be granted only upon a showing of good cause "for the delay in making the motion" (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652), and no such showing appears in the record (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d at 869; cf. Matter of Gilmore, 131 AD3d 1058). Fong's failure to establish good cause for his delay warranted denial of the motion, "without consideration of the merits thereof" (Jones v City of New York, 130 AD3d 686, 687; see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d at 869; Carrasco v Weissman, 120 AD3d 534, 536; Giambona v Hines, 104 AD3d at 812).

The bold is mine.

Overbroad Discovery

Doe v Bronx Preparatory Charter Sch., 2018 NY Slip Op 02898 [1st Dept. 2018]

The court providently exercised its discretion in declining to impose sanctions on plaintiffs or to compel further disclosure of the infant plaintiff's social media and cell phone history, since defendant failed to submit papers necessary to determine whether plaintiffs had not complied with a prior discovery order (see Nyadzi v Ki Chul Lee, 129 AD3d 645 [1st Dept 2015]; Ventura v Ozone Park Holding Corp., 84 AD3d 516, 517—518 [1st Dept 2011]). Further, there was no showing that plaintiffs wilfully failed to comply with any discovery order, since they provided access to the infant plaintiff's social media accounts and cell phone records for a period of two months before the date on which she was allegedly attacked on defendant's premises to the present, which was a reasonable period of time. Defendant's demands for access to social media accounts for five years prior to the incident, and to cell phone records for two years prior to the incident, were overbroad and not reasonably tailored to obtain discovery relevant to the issues in the case (see Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d 656, 665 [2018]).

Not an attorney

Lanzuter Benevolent Assn. v Altman, 2018 NY Slip Op 02880 [1st Dept. 2018]

Defendant Neil Ross, who is not an attorney, purports to represent Gertrude Ross, his mother, and at various times in this proceeding, all other defendants as well. This representation violates Judiciary Law § 478. Whether or not the issue was raised before the motion court, it cannot be waived (Salt Aire Trading LLC v Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, 93 AD3d 452, 453 [1st Dept 2012]). Neil Ross's submissions on his mother's behalf, as well as his submissions on behalf of all other defendants, must be stricken, without prejudice to the filing of answers by all defendants, properly represented (id.).

120 days, give or take

Foo-Lu Co. v Rojas, 2018 NY Slip Op 02772 [2d Dept. 2018]

The Supreme Court also erred in awarding summary judgment to Fong. It is undisputed that Fong's motion was untimely, having been made 309 days after the filing of the note of issue, or 189 days after the expiration of the 120-day statutory deadline (see CPLR 3212[a]; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d 866; Giambona v Hines, 104 AD3d 811). Even assuming that the court granted an oral application by Fong for leave to file the late motion, as Fong's counsel represented in his papers, such determination would have been an improvident exercise of discretion under the circumstances presented, since leave can be granted only upon a showing of good cause "for the delay in making the motion" (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652), and no such showing appears in the record (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d at 869; cf. Matter of Gilmore, 131 AD3d 1058). Fong's failure to establish good cause for his delay warranted denial of the motion, "without consideration of the merits thereof" (Jones v City of New York, 130 AD3d 686, 687; see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d at 869; Carrasco v Weissman, 120 AD3d 534, 536; Giambona v Hines, 104 AD3d at 812).

Reeps v BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02907 [1st Dept. 2018]

Prior court orders and stipulations between the parties show that the parties, with the court's consent, charted a procedural course that deviated from the path established by the CPLR and allowed for defendants' filing of this round of summary judgment motions more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue (see Corchado v City of New York, 64 AD3d 429 [1st Dept 2009]). Thus, the motions were timely, and we remand the matter to the motion court for a full consideration of their merits (see Fomina v DUB Realty, LLC, 156 AD3d 539 [1st Dept 2017]).

In considering the merits, the court should consider plaintiff's new and recast expert affidavits submitted in opposition to the motions, which were first filed in 2016 (see CPLR 3212[b]), after holding a hearing in accordance with Frye v United States (293 F 1013 [1923]) to determine whether the expert affidavits on exposure and general causation (see Parker v Mobil Oil Corp., 7 NY3d 434, 448 [2006]) are adequately supported in the medical and scientific literature.

Remittitur

Reilly v Achitoff, 2018 NY Slip Op 02818 [2d Dept. 2018]

" A trial court, upon remittitur, lacks the power to deviate from the mandate of the higher court'" (Berry v Williams, 106 AD3d 935, 937, quoting Matter of Trager v Kampe, 16 AD3d 426, 427; see Glassman v ProHealth Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., Inc., 96 AD3d 799, 800; Wiener v Wiener, 10 AD3d 362, 36). Accordingly, an order or judgment entered on remittitur " must conform strictly to the remittitur'" (Glassman v ProHealth Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., Inc., 96 AD3d at 800, quoting Matter of Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Protestant Dutch Church of City of N.Y. v Municipal Ct. of City of N.Y., Borough of Manhattan, 185 Misc 1003, 1007 [Sup Ct, NY County]; see Berry v Williams, 106 AD3d at 937). "If the remittitur is erroneous in any respect, or if there is any uncertainty as to the effect of the language employed, the appropriate remedy is an application to amend it" (Wiener v Wiener, 10 AD3d at 363; see CPLR 5524; Matter of Minister, Elders & Deacons of Refm. Protestant Dutch Church of City of N.Y. v Municipal Ct. of City of N.Y., Borough of Manhattan, 185 Misc at 1006).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court correctly adhered to the terms of this Court's remittitur in this matter (see Glassman v ProHealth Ambulatory Surgery Ctr., Inc., 96 AD3d at 800-801).

Documentary evidence

Sims v Prom Realty Co., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02822 [2d Dept. 2018]

"In order for evidence to qualify as documentary,' it must be unambiguous, authentic, and undeniable" (Granada Condominium III Assn. v Palomino, 78 AD3d 996, 996-997 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Neither affidavits, deposition testimony, nor letters are considered documentary evidence within the intendment of CPLR 3211(a)(1)" (Granada Condominium III Assn. v Palomino, 78 AD3d at 997 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Suchmacher v Manana Grocery, 73 AD3d 1017, 1017; Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73 AD3d at 86).

Consent to Change / Service

Sperry Assoc. Fed. Credit Union v John, 2018 NY Slip Op 02823 [2d Dept. 2018]

CPLR 321(b)(1) provides that an attorney of record may be changed by filing a consent to change attorney signed by the retiring attorney and the party. Notice must be given to adverse parties. In this case, it appears that at the time the defendant's motion for leave to renew and reargue was made, no consent to change attorney had been filed. A technical failure to comply with CPLR 321(b), however, does not render the acts of the new attorney a nullity (see Diamadopolis v Balfour, 152 AD2d 532; Imor v Imor, 119 AD2d 913). In this case, the plaintiff claims no prejudice, and the consent to change attorneys was filed while the motion was still pending (see Elite 29 Realty LLC v Pitt, 39 AD3d 264). Thus, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the belated compliance with CPLR 321(b) was not a basis to deny the defendant's motion (cf. Dobbins v County of Erie, 58 AD2d 733; Matter of Kitsch Riker Oil Co., 23 AD2d 502).

At a hearing on the validity of service of process, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v O'King, 148 AD3d 776). The plaintiff failed to meet that burden. Where a process server has no independent recollection of events, a process server's logbook may be admitted in evidence as a business record (see Gilmore v Tindel, 210 AD2d 1). Here, however, the logbook was not produced in court or introduced in evidence. Thus, there was no evidence—other than the process server's description of a business record not before the court, which the process server claimed he was unable to locate—to support the claim that service occurred at 7:05 p.m., when the person who allegedly received the papers was present to receive them.

Emphasis is mine.

4518

City Natl. Bank v Foundry Dev. Group, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02765 [2d Dept. 2018]

Contrary to the defendants' contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that certain exhibits presented at the inquest were admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule (see CPLR 4518[a]). " A proper foundation for the admission of a business record must be provided by someone with personal knowledge of the maker's business practices and procedures'" (Cadlerock Joint Venture, L.P. v Trombley, 150 AD3d 957, 959, quoting Citibank, N.A. v Cabrera, 130 AD3d 861, 861). Here, the plaintiff's witness testified that she was personally familiar with the record keeping practices and procedures of the plaintiff and Imperial, and, thus, the plaintiff laid a proper foundation for the admission of the records (see Yellow Book of N.Y., L.P. v Cataldo, 81 AD3d 638, 639-640).

Category: Appellate Division