120 days, give or take

Foo-Lu Co. v Rojas, 2018 NY Slip Op 02772 [2d Dept. 2018]

The Supreme Court also erred in awarding summary judgment to Fong. It is undisputed that Fong's motion was untimely, having been made 309 days after the filing of the note of issue, or 189 days after the expiration of the 120-day statutory deadline (see CPLR 3212[a]; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d 866Giambona v Hines, 104 AD3d 811). Even assuming that the court granted an oral application by Fong for leave to file the late motion, as Fong's counsel represented in his papers, such determination would have been an improvident exercise of discretion under the circumstances presented, since leave can be granted only upon a showing of good cause "for the delay in making the motion" (Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652), and no such showing appears in the record (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d at 869; cf. Matter of Gilmore, 131 AD3d 1058). Fong's failure to establish good cause for his delay warranted denial of the motion, "without consideration of the merits thereof" (Jones v City of New York, 130 AD3d 686, 687; see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Weisblum, 143 AD3d at 869; Carrasco v Weissman, 120 AD3d 534, 536; Giambona v Hines, 104 AD3d at 812).

Reeps v BMW of N. Am., LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02907 [1st Dept. 2018]

Prior court orders and stipulations between the parties show that the parties, with the court's consent, charted a procedural course that deviated from the path established by the CPLR and allowed for defendants' filing of this round of summary judgment motions more than 120 days after the filing of the note of issue (see Corchado v City of New York, 64 AD3d 429 [1st Dept 2009]). Thus, the motions were timely, and we remand the matter to the motion court for a full consideration of their merits (see Fomina v DUB Realty, LLC, 156 AD3d 539 [1st Dept 2017]).

In considering the merits, the court should consider plaintiff's new and recast expert affidavits submitted in opposition to the motions, which were first filed in 2016 (see CPLR 3212[b]), after holding a hearing in accordance with Frye v United States (293 F 1013 [1923]) to determine whether the expert affidavits on exposure and general causation (see Parker v Mobil Oil Corp., 7 NY3d 434, 448 [2006]) are adequately supported in the medical and scientific literature.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s

%d bloggers like this: