Category: [App Div 1st Dept]

CPLR R. 3118 Demand for address of aprty or of person who possessed an assigned cause of action or defense

Matter of Wright-Roberts v Roberts, 2011 NY Slip Op 01136 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

Pursuant to CPLR 3118, respondent, as a party in this action, is required to provide petitioner with a verified statement setting forth his post office address and residence. Moreover, respondent's counsel, who is currently representing respondent in the pending litigation, can also be compelled to disclose his client's address, if it is known by him, without implicating the attorney-client privilege, since "disclosure is necessary for the proper administration of justice" (see Matter of Jacqueline F., 47 NY2d 215, 221 [1979]). It may be unlikely that respondent will comply with an order directing him to disclose his address, given his history of willfully failing [*2]to comply with court orders. However, that does not justify denying petitioner the relief to which she is entitled in the first instance. Respondent should not be

CPLR R. 3212

CPLR R. 3211

11 Essex St. Corp. v Tower Ins. Co. of N.Y., 2011 NY Slip Op 01127 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

The court correctly denied DeSimone's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that it had denied a prior summary judgment motion by DeSimone and no new factual assertions and evidence were submitted or other sufficient cause shown for DeSimone's making the second motion (see Jones v 636 Holding Corp., 73 AD3d 409 [2010]; Forte v Weiner, 214 AD2d 397 [1995], lv dismissed 86 NY2d 885 [1995]).

Lau v 7th Precinct of the Police Dept. of the County of N.Y., 2011 NY Slip Op 01342 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

Although defendants stated in their notice of motion that they sought an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting summary judgment, in the supporting affirmation, they argued that the complaint failed to state a cause of action (CPLR 3211[a][7]), and the exhibits annexed to the affirmation consist solely of pleadings. Upon analyzing the pleadings, the motion court granted defendants' motion "for summary judgment . . . dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a cause of action."

Summary judgment was properly granted although the complaint could have been dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7). Also, plaintiff's argument that the court should have denied defendants summary judgment because the evidence raises issues of fact whether he had a special relationship with the police is unavailing. His General Municipal Law § 50-h hearing testimony is insufficient to establish the elements of such a relationship (see Luisa R. v City of New York, 253 AD2d 196, 203 [1999]; Artalyan, Inc. v Kitridge Realty Co., Inc., 52 AD3d 405, 407 [2008]). Among other things, the police advised plaintiff that they could not help him in this matter and that he would be arrested if he continued to call them. In the face of this evidence, plaintiff cannot establish reasonable reliance upon any purported promise of police protection.

Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint failed to remedy the factual deficiencies in his original complaint (Pacheco v Fifteen Twenty Seven Assoc., 275 AD2d 282, 284 [2000]; Schulte [*2]Roth & Zabel, LLP v Kassover, 28 AD3d 404 [2006]).

CPLR R. 2104

Genger v Genger, 2011 NY Slip Op 01357 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

While recognizing that, pursuant to the stipulation, plaintiff is entitled to further audits as to the completeness and accuracy of the marital assets and liabilities contained on the marital balance sheet as of January 31, 2002 and valued as of October 26, 2004, the court impermissibly restricted the scope of these audits, essentially rewriting the stipulation by imposing additional terms (see Matter of Salvano v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 85 NY2d 173, 182 [1995]). The stipulation is patently unambiguous and clearly evinces the parties' intent (see Chimart Assoc. v Paul, 66 NY2d 570, 574 [1986]). It contains no restriction or limitation on the scope of the audits. The court was not at liberty to alter or change any of the provisions of the stipulation without the consent of both parties (see Leffler v Leffler, 50 AD2d 93, 95 [1975], affd 40 NY2d 1036 [1976]).

Defendant is bound by the contents of the stipulation (see Da Silva v Musso, 53 NY2d 543, 550 [1981]). His assertions are insufficient to rebut "the heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instrument manifested the true intention of the parties" (Merrick v Merrick, 181 AD2d 503 [1992] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

CPLR R. 2221

Vazquez v JRG Realty Corp., 2011 NY Slip Op 01349 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

No appeal lies from the denial of a motion to reargue (DiPasquale v Gutfleish, 74 AD3d 471 [2010]). Supreme Court also properly denied the motion to renew, as the expert affidavit proffered on renewal was available to plaintiffs prior to the summary judgment motion being fully submitted (see e.g. Estate of Brown v Pullman Group, 60 AD3d 481 [2009], lv dismissed and denied 13 NY3d 789 [2009]). In any event, plaintiffs' expert affidavit was speculative, conclusory, and not based on foundational facts, i.e., an exact measurement of the purported defect, and thus was insufficient to create an issue of fact (Pappas v Cherry Cr., Inc., 66 AD3d 658 [2009]).

 

CPLR R. 3025 Amended and supplemental pleadings

Coles v Wu-Tang Prods., Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 00789 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

The record supports the trial court's determination that plaintiff, as a lyricist of the compositions, and defendant Diggs, as a producer of the music, regarded themselves as joint authors sharing equally in the ownership of a joint work (see Childress v Taylor, 945 F2d 500, 508 [2d Cir 1991]). The court properly granted plaintiff leave to conform the complaint to the evidence presented at trial by adding a claim against Diggs for his unauthorized receipt of a 50% producer's fee (see CPLR 3025[c]; Gonfiantini v Zino, 184 AD2d 368, 369-370 [1992]).

The bold is mine