Author: DMG

Intergalactic Bugs and CPLR R. 3212 and CPLR R. 2221. Happy 4th of July.

Normally, I don’t write anything
special for the 4th of July. 
I’m going to continue that tradition.  I will, however, be doing my civic and patriotic duty:
watching Starship Troopers.  The
number one threat facing the country today is intergalactic bugs.  I, for one, will be prepared.

In the past few days, decisions
have come out from every court but the Appellate Term, Second Department.  Creating a decision that allows an
expert to base her testimony on hypotheticals alone[1]
probably took a lot out of them, so they get a pass for their inactivity.

Today's post will cover the recent
3212 decisions.  I was going to put all of the recent decisions in one
post, but decided that it would take up too much time and space.  And,
nobody would read anything that long.

The last decision also discusses relaxing CPLR R.
2221(e)(2)'s evidence available at the time the original motion was made, requirement, in the interest of justice.  CPLR R.  2221(e) provides:

(e) A motion for leave to renew:

1. shall be identified specifically as such;

2. shall be based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would change the prior determination or shall demonstrate that there has been a change in the law that would change the prior determination; and

3. shall contain reasonable justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion.

I'm testing out writing my posts in word, so bear with me while I try to figure out the formatting.  From the looks of it, this will be a short lived experiment.

CPLR R. 3212 Summary Judgment

Estate of Marie Merna v Simuro, 2010 NY Slip Op 05725 (App. Div., 2nd,
2010)

As the proponent of the motion for
summary judgment, the bank was required to make a prima facie showing of
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to
eliminate any material issues of fact from the case (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853; Matin v Chase
Manhattan Bank, 10 AD3d 447, 448). The bank failed to meet
this burden, as the evidence it submitted was insufficient to eliminate any triable
issues of fact as to whether the relevant account statements were "made
available" to the plaintiff before January 5, 2005, the date on which she
discovered the forgeries (UCC 4-406[4]; see
Matin v Chase Manhattan Bank, 10 AD3d at 448-449; Robinson Motor Xpress,
Inc. v HSBC Bank, USA, 37 AD3d 117).

***

However, the Supreme Court
improperly denied that branch of the bank's motion which was to strike the
plaintiff's demand for a jury trial[2]
(see generally Brian Wallach Agency v
Bank of N.Y., 75 AD2d 878; Massry
Importing Co. v Security Natl. Bank, 49 AD2d 750; David v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 59 Misc 2d 248).

Espada v City of New York, 2010 NY Slip Op 05724 (App. Div., 2nd,
2010)

Contrary to the plaintiff's
contention, the defendants' motion was not premature, as the plaintiff failed
to offer an evidentiary basis to suggest that discovery may lead to relevant
evidence or that facts essential to opposing the motion were exclusively within
the defendants' knowledge and control (see
CPLR 3212[f]; Hill v Ackall, 71
AD3d 829; Kimyagarov v Nixon
Taxi Corp., 45 AD3d 736, 737).

Evangelista v Kambanis, 2010 NY Slip Op 05726 (App. Div., 2nd,
2010)

"A party opposing summary
judgment is entitled to obtain further discovery when it appears that facts
supporting the opposing party's position may exist but cannot then be
stated" (Matter of Fasciglione,
73 AD3d 769, 769; see CPLR 3212[f]; Rodriguez v DeStefano, 72 AD3d 926).
Here, at the time the defendant landowners moved for summary judgment, they had
not been deposed. Moreover, it appears that information concerning whether they
created the alleged dangerous condition on the sidewalk abutting their property
which caused the plaintiff's accident, or enjoyed a special use of the sidewalk
which gave rise to the dangerous condition, may be within their exclusive
knowledge (see Adler v City of New York,
52 AD3d 549, 549-550). Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court did not
improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, as premature, the defendants'
motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see Matter of Fasciglione, 73 AD3d at 769; Gruenfeld v City of New Rochelle, 72 AD3d 1025; Rodriguez v DeStefano, 72 AD3d at 926; Harvey v Nealis, 61 AD3d 935, 936).

Atiencia v Mbbco Ii, LLC, 2010 NY Slip Op 05872 (App. Div., 1st,
2010)

A court, in the course of deciding
a motion, is empowered to search the record and award summary judgment to a
nonmoving party (see CPLR 3212(b); Lennard v Khan, 69
AD3d 812, 814 [2010]). However, with respect to the June 2009
order, the motion court erred in dismissing the Labor Law § 241(6) claim
against Farrell, as that claim was not placed before the court on plaintiffs'
summary judgment motion (see Dunham v
Hilco Constr. Co., 89 NY2d 425, 429-430 [1996]).

Regarding the October 2009 order,
the motion court should have granted the motions to renew. Although the newly
submitted evidence was available at the time of the prior motion, the court
"ha[d] discretion to relax this requirement and to grant such a motion in
the interest of justice" (Mejia v
Nanni, 307 AD2d 870, 871 [2003]). Not only did plaintiffs and MBBCO offer
reasonable justification for failing to submit the evidence submitted on the motion,
but the new facts submitted do, in fact, change the prior determination (CPLR
2221[e][2]).

[1] I'm referring to Urban
Radiology, P.C. v Tri-State Consumer Ins. Co., 2010 NY Slip Op 50987(U)
(App. Term, 2nd, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2010).  I have a long
post about it over at the No-Fault blog.  Here is a snippet of the
decision.

 

Defendant
was not attempting to prove that Rafailova was injured as documented in her
medical records, or that she was treated as set forth in those records.
Instead, defendant’s peer review doctor simply opined that, assuming the facts set forth in Rafailova’s records
were true, the treatment allegedly provided was not medically necessary.
Therefore, as defendant was not using the underlying medical records for their
truth, such records were not being
used for a hearsay purpose (see e.g. Dawson v Raimon Realty Corp., 303
AD2d 708 [2003]; Splawn v Lextaj Corp., 197 AD2d 479 [1993]). This is
distinguishable from a situation in which a medical expert relies upon medical
records to establish the fact of an injury (see e.g. Hambsch v New York City
Tr. Auth., 63 NY2d 723 [1984]; Wagman v Bradshaw, 292 AD2d 84 [2002]).
Consequently, plaintiff’s argument that defendant failed to establish the
reliability of the underlying medical records in support of its claim that the
treatment provided was not medically necessary is irrelevant.  (Emphasis Added)

 

[2] This
footnote is mine. In the cases the Appellate Division cites, there was a prior agreement/contract waiving the right to a jury.  Compare,
just for fun, Haber v Cohen, 2010 NY Slip Op 05730 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)(“Contrary
to the defendants' contention, the amendment of their counterclaims to withdraw
their requests for equitable relief did not revive their right to a trial by
jury”)(Citations omitted).

CPLR § 3123 (NTA)

Easy to ignore and easy to screw up.  Do either and the consequences can be surprising and severe.  This is a big deal.

CPLR § 3123 Admissions as to matters
of fact, papers, documents and photographs

New Image Constr., Inc. v TDR Enters. Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 05681 (App. Div., 1st, 2010)

Plaintiff, a contractor, brought this action to recover money due for
the build out of a restaurant pursuant to a contract entered into by
TDR and Green. In support of its motion, plaintiff submitted two notices
to admit the genuineness of documents and a notice to admit purported
facts. Although served with the notices to admit, defendants did not
respond to any of them. Among the documents covered by the first two
notices to admit was a June 2006 construction agreement executed by
plaintiff, and by Green, individually and on behalf of TDR. The
agreement provided for the payment of $200,000 for plaintiff's work.
Payments were to be made in five equal installments of $40,000 beginning
on the signing of the contract. The agreement set forth in detail the
scope of the work, and required that any changes to the agreement be in
writing.

Other documents covered by the notices to admit reflected a loan
to defendants by PNC Bank, for the payment of plaintiff's fee, among
other things. These documents show defendants' representation to the
bank that plaintiff had completed its work, a requirement for the
disbursement of the loan funds. The documents also included cancelled
checks made payable to plaintiff that were apparently endorsed and
cashed by defendants instead. Defendants are deemed to have admitted the
genuineness of the said documents because they did not timely respond
to plaintiff's notice (see CPLR 3123; Kowalski v Knox, 293
AD2d 892 [2002]). Hence, plaintiff's prima facie entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law is established. We note, however, that
plaintiff's third notice to admit was improper, since it impermissibly
"compell[ed] admission of fundamental and material issues or ultimate
facts that can only be resolved after a full trial" (Hawthorne Group v RRE Ventures, 7 AD3d 320,
324 [2004]).

Since defendants are deemed to have admitted the genuineness of
the construction [*2]agreement, their
attempts to disaffirm it are unavailing. We also reject defendants'
claim that they terminated the contract due to plaintiff's failure to
diligently complete the work. Defendants do not claim to have served
plaintiff with a 14-day notice to cure and written notice of termination
which were contractual prerequisites to termination. Defendants'
purported termination of the contract was, therefore, ineffective (see
e.g. MCK Bldg. Assoc. v St. Lawrence Univ., 301 AD2d 726, 728
[2003], lv dismissed 99 NY2d 651 [2003]). The court properly
denied the motion for summary judgment as against defendant Terrance
Davis as it has not been shown that he dealt with plaintiff in an
individual capacity (see Kibler v Gilliard Constr., Inc., 53 AD3d 1040,
1042 [2008]).

The bold is mine.

Aggrieved

Mixon v TBV, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 05521 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)

The threshold issue raised by these facts is whether the limousine defendants are aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint against the van defendants. The requirement that an appellant be aggrieved by a judgment or order appealed from is contained in CPLR 5511, which states:

"§ 5511. Permissible appellant and respondent. An aggrieved party or a person substituted for him may appeal from any appealable judgment or order except one entered upon the default of the aggrieved party. He shall be designated as the appellant and the adverse party as the respondent" (emphasis added).

When the revisers of the laws on civil practice were in the process of creating the CPLR, they were unable to formulate a definition for the word "aggrievement" and they determined to leave that definition to case law (see Revisers' Notes in McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR 5511, at 129). At that time, the classic attempt at a broad definition of aggrievement was found in the case of Matter of Richmond County Socy. for Prevention of Cruelty to Children (11 AD2d 236, affd 9 NY2d 913, cert denied sub nom. Staten Island Mental Health Soc., Inc. v Richmond County Soc. For Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 368 US 290), in which it was said that "the test [of aggrievement] is whether the person seeking to appeal has a direct interest in the controversy which is affected by the result and whether the adjudication has a binding force against the rights, person or property of the party or person seeking to appeal" (id. at 239). Experience with that definition has shown that while legally correct, it does not provide a clear test which is relatively easy to apply with consistency.

 

For an analysis of the decision, head over to Full Court Pass.  I'm too busy winning awards and shit.

Just a reminder

Goldstein v Guida, 2010 NY Slip Op 05513 (App. Div, 2nd, 2010)(Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court
properly held Guida liable for the damages incurred by the plaintiff as a
result of the conversion of the chairs (see Ingram v Michael and Jr.
Auto Repair, 148 AD2d 324, 325)).

Haracz v Cee Jay, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 05514 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)(Where, as here, the movant fails to sustain its initial burden of making
a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law,
summary judgment should be denied regardless of the sufficiency of the
opposing papers (see Ayotte v Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062, 1063; Alvarez
v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d at 324)).

No Unfettered Disclosure; CPLR § 3101

CPLR § 3101 Scope of disclosure

Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp., 2010 NY Slip Op 05509 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)

CPLR 3101(a) requires "full disclosure of all matter material and
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." "The phrase
material and necessary' should be interpreted liberally to require
disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which
will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing
delay and prolixity. The test is one of usefulness and reason'" (Friel
v Papa, 56 AD3d 607, 608, quoting Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ.
Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406). A party, however, does not have the right to
"uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure" (Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v
Walsh, 45 AD3d 531, 531; see Barouh Eaton Allen Corp. v
International Bus. Machs. Corp., 76 AD2d 873). " It is incumbent on
the party seeking disclosure to demonstrate that the method of discovery
sought will result in the disclosure of relevant evidence or is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of information bearing on
the claims'" (Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d 417, 418, quoting Crazytown
Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150 AD2d 420, 421).

"The Supreme Court has broad discretion in the supervision of
discovery, and its determinations should not be disturbed on appeal
unless improvidently made" (Casabona v Huntington Union Free School
Dist., 29 AD3d 723, 723; see Andon v 302-304 Mott St. Assoc., 94
NY2d 740, 746; Milbrandt & Co., Inc. v Griffin, 19 AD3d 663;
Provident Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v Brittenham, 284 AD2d 518).
Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in
concluding, inter alia, that the additional discovery sought by the
appellants was neither material nor necessary to the prosecution or
defense of any claim (see CPLR 3101[a]; Casabona v Huntington
Union Free School Dist., 29 AD3d 723; Vyas v Campbell, 4 AD3d
417; Palermo Mason Constr. v Aark Holding Corp., 300 AD2d 460).

The bold is mine.

[updated 6/27/10:  I added links to Vyas and Crazytown].

BP CPLR R. 3043 (use it right)

CPLR R. 3043 Bill of particulars in personal injury actions

Mahr v Perry, 2010 NY Slip Op 05369 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)

The appellants' objections to the plaintiffs' responses to demands number 4, 14, 18, and 19 are without merit, since none of the information sought in those demands is expressly authorized under CPLR 3043 (see Feraco v Long Is. Jewish-Hillside Med. Ctr., 97 AD2d 498; Williams v Shapiro, 67 AD2d 706; Johnson v Charow, 63 AD2d 668).

The appellants' objections to the plaintiffs' responses to demands number 3, 8, and 10 are also without merit. The plaintiffs properly objected to each of these demands, as they improperly sought evidentiary material (see Toth v Bloshinsky, 39 AD3d 848, 849; Benn v O'Daly, 202 AD2d at 465). Demand 8 also was improper on the ground that it sought to compel the plaintiffs to "set forth the manner in which the physician failed to act in accordance with good and accepted medical practice," which is knowledge "a physician is chargeable with knowing" (Toth v Bloshinsky, 39 AD3d at 849; see Dellaglio v Paul, 250 AD2d 806).

The bold is mine.

Fish Frye

Nothing to do with fish. I just like the way the title sounds.  Sorry.

Fontana v LaRosa, 2010 NY Slip Op 05357 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)

The order appealed from, which denied the appellant's motion to preclude certain testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witness or to direct that witness to submit to a hearing pursuant to Frye v United States (293 F 1013), was, in effect, an evidentiary ruling. Such a ruling, "even when made in advance of trial on motion papers, constitutes, at best, an advisory opinion which is neither appealable as of right nor by permission" (Savarese v City of N.Y. Hous. Auth., 172 AD2d 506, 509; see Hering v Lighthouse 2001, LLC, 21 AD3d 449, 451-452).

Parol Evidence

Matthius v Platinum Estates, Inc., 2010 NY Slip Op 04965 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)

JAC's contention that it was not obligated to indemnify Grymes Hill,
Cullota, Ricca, and Platinum because pursuant to the merger clause in
the January 17th agreement, that agreement superseded the prior
indemnification agreement, is without merit. The purpose of a merger
clause is to require full application of the parol evidence rule in
order to bar the introduction of extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or
contradict the terms of a written agreement (see Jarecki v Shung Moo
Louie, 95 NY2d 665, 669; Matter of Primex Intl. Corp. v Wal-Mart
Stores, 89 NY2d 594, 599). Where a valid contract is incomplete,
extrinsic evidence is admissible to complete the writing if it is
apparent from an inspection of the writing that all the particulars of
the agreement are not present, and that evidence does not vary or
contradict the writing (see Valente v Allen Shuman & Irwin Richt,
D.P.M., P.C., 137 AD2d 678).

Here, the January 17th agreement was incomplete and ambiguous. It
contained a general provision requiring JAC to provide insurance, but
did not state the amount of insurance coverage or the parties to be
named as insureds. Therefore, evidence of the indemnification agreement,
which contained specific provisions regarding the amount of insurance
to be provided and the parties to be insured, was admissible to resolve
these ambiguities. The indemnification agreement however, did not vary,
alter, or contradict any terms in the January 17th agreement and, thus,
remained enforceable (see Matter of Primex Intl. Corp. v Wal-Mart
Stores, 89 NY2d 594).

Furthermore, the January 17th agreement set forth the work to be
performed by JAC, but did not specifically address the issue of
indemnification. Therefore, Grymes Hill and Platinum could present
evidence to prove the existence of the agreement in which JAC agreed to
indemnify them (see Elbroji v 22 E. 54th St. Rest. Corp., 67 AD3d
957). Since the indemnification agreement and the January 17th
agreement dealt with different subject matter, the merger clause did not
extinguish the indemnification agreement (see Gordon v Patchogue
Surgical Co., 222 AD2d 651).

By obtaining insurance and naming Grymes Hill as an insured
pursuant to the indemnification agreement, JAC demonstrated its intent
to be held to that agreement.

The bold is mine.