Harris v Kay, 2019 NY Slip Op 00044 [1st Dept. 2019]

The court did not abuse its discretion in striking the complaint, given plaintiff’s repeated, willful and contumacious refusals to provide discovery and to comply with court’s orders over an approximately eight-year period (see McHugh v City of New York, 150 AD3d 561, 562 [1st Dept 2017]; Fish & Richardson, P.C. v Schindler, 75 AD3d 219, 221-222 [1st Dept 2010]; see generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, Inc. v Global Strat Inc., 22 NY3d 877, 880 [2013]). Even if plaintiff’s response to defendants’ first set of interrogatories could be considered “timely” pursuant to the court’s August 28, 2013 order, despite that the interrogatories were served more than six years prior, the response certainly does not “evince[] a good-faith effort to address the requests meaningfully” (Kihl v Pfeffer, 94 NY2d 118, 123 [1999]).

Brown v Montefiore Med. Ctr., 2019 NY Slip Op 00226 [1st Dept. 2019]

The court’s September 28, 2015 order was predicated on the motion and cross motion by the defendants, the underlying issues of which had already been fully resolved by the parties’ so-ordered stipulation, dated August 4, 2015, issued after a preliminary conference. At the time of the court’s September 28th conditional preclusion order, there was no motion pending, and no request for any relief from the defendants. Given the circumstances, the court should have granted plaintiff’s motion to vacate the judgment. However, this in no way condones plaintiff’s counsel’s clearly dilatory behavior, which, based on the pattern evinced by the record, was willful.

The bold is mine.

Hopkins v City of New York, 2019 NY Slip Op 00388 [1st Dept. 2019]

The parties suspended scheduling of the deposition of the City’s witness on January 14, 2014 when plaintiff withdrew its request for an EBT while other discovery disputes were resolved. Thus, the court orders prior to January 14, 2014 do not support the imposition of sanctions. We agree with Supreme Court that the City’s noncompliance with subsequent disclosure orders did not give rise to an inference of willful and contumacious conduct. Given that there does not appear to be an actual prejudice to plaintiff, the court was within its discretion to provide defendant with one additional opportunity to submit to depositions before striking its answer (Figueroa v City of New York, 129 AD3d 596, 597 [1st Dept 2015]).

We further note that at the time this motion was pending, the City offered to produce the witness at issue.

Williams v Suttle, 2019 NY Slip Op 00163 [2d Dept. 2019]

The drastic remedy of dismissing a complaint for a plaintiff’s failure to comply with court-ordered discovery is warranted where a party’s conduct is shown to be willful and contumacious (see Harris v City of New York, 117 AD3d 790Almonte v Pichardo, 105 AD3d 687, 688; Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc., 102 AD3d 201, 210). The willful and contumacious character of a party’s conduct can be inferred from either (1) the repeated failure to respond to demands or comply with court-ordered discovery, without a reasonable excuse for these failures, or (2) the failure to comply with court-ordered discovery over an extended period of time (see Candela v Kantor, 154 AD3d 733, 734; Pesce v Fernandez, 144 AD3d 653, 654; Gutman v Cabrera, 121 AD3d 1042, 1043; Arpino v F.J.F. & Sons Elec. Co., Inc., 102 AD3d at 210).

Here, the willful and contumacious character of the plaintiffs’ actions can be inferred from their repeated failures to comply with the defendant’s notices to appear for depositions and the deadlines set forth in the compliance conference orders over an extended period of time (see Wolf v Flowers, 122 AD3d 728, 729; Matone v Sycamore Realty Corp., 87 AD3d 1113, 1114). Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to provide an adequate explanation for their repeated failures to comply with court-ordered discovery. While the plaintiffs established that the medical condition of Lawrey, who is a resident of the State of Georgia, required her to avoid travel and that her deposition could be conducted via live video conferencing (see Duncan v 605 Third Ave., LLC, 49 AD3d 494, 496), they did not provide any explanation for their failure to produce Williams, a resident of Westchester County, for a deposition.

Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the defendant, who had first noticed depositions after serving her answer, had priority of depositions (see CPLR 3106[a]; Scalone v Phelps Mem. Hosp. Ctr., 184 AD2d 65, 76-77), and the filing of an amended complaint did not automatically stay discovery.

In any event, when the plaintiffs failed to appear for depositions within the time specified in the conditional order of dismissal, the conditional order became absolute (see Corex-SPA v Janel Group of N.Y., Inc., 156 AD3d at 602; Wei Hong Hu v Sadiqi, 83 AD3d 820, 821; Matter of Denton v City of Mount Vernon, 30 AD3d 600). To be relieved of the adverse impact of the conditional order directing dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to appear for depositions and that their cause of action was potentially meritorious (see Gibbs v St. Barnabas Hosp., 16 NY3d 74, 80; Kirkland v Fayne, 78 AD3d 660, 661; Lerner v Ayervais, 16 AD3d 382Smith v Lefrak Org., 96 AD2d 859, affd 60 NY2d 828). The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for their failure to appear for depositions on or before February 29, 2016.

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