CPLR 7511

Matter of NRT N.Y. LLC v Spell, 2018 NY Slip Op 07664 [1st Dept. 2018]

CPLR 7511 provides just four grounds for vacating an arbitration award, including that the arbitrator “exceeded his power” (CPLR 7511[b][1][iii]), which “occurs only where the arbitrator’s award violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power” (Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers’ Union of Am., Local 100, AFL-CIO, 6 NY3d 332, 336 [2005]). Mere errors of fact or law are insufficient to vacate an arbitral award (Matter of Kowaleski, 16 NY3d 85, 90-91 [2010]). “[C]ourts are obligated to give deference to the decision of the arbitrator, … even if the arbitrator misapplied the substantive law in the area of the contract” (id.).

Here, the arbitrator’s conclusion that a sales commission was not due under the precise terms of the Agreement because the lease was not extended is neither wholly irrational nor contrary to any strong public policy. Accordingly, the motion to vacate should have been denied and the award confirmed (see Ingham v Thompson, 113 AD3d 534 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 22 NY3d 866 [2014]; CPLR 7511[e]).

Matter of Miller Tabak & Co., LLC v Coppedge, 2018 NY Slip Op 07656 [1st Dept. 2018]

Petitioners waived any claim of arbitrator bias based on one arbitrator’s participation in a previous arbitration, which had been disclosed to the parties, by failing to raise any such claim or objection until the hearing was in progress (see Matter of Atlantic Purch., Inc. v Airport Props. II, LLC, 77 AD3d 824, 825 [2d Dept 2010]). In any event, there is no evidence to support any such claim (id.).

Matter of Progressive Advanced Ins. Co. v New York City Tr. Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 07432 [2d Dept. 2018]

To be upheld, an award in a compulsory arbitration proceeding such as this one (see Insurance Law § 5105[b]) “must have evidentiary support and cannot be arbitrary and capricious” (Matter of Motor Veh. Acc. Indem. Corp. v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 89 NY2d 214, 223; see Matter of Fiduciary Ins. Co. v American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 132 AD3d 40, 45-46). “Moreover, with respect to determinations of law, the applicable standard in mandatory no-fault arbitrations is whetherany reasonable hypothesis can be found to support the questioned interpretation'” (Matter of Fiduciary Ins. Co. v American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 132 AD3d at 46, quoting Matter of Shand [Aetna Ins. Co.], 74 AD2d 442, 454 [emphasis in original]; see Matter of Furstenberg [Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.—Allstate Ins. Co.], 49 NY2d 757, 758).

Here, the arbitrator’s determination was supported by a “reasonable hypothesis” and cannot be said to be arbitrary or capricious (Matter of Fiduciary Ins. Co. v American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, 132 AD3d at 46; see Matter of Furstenberg [Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.—Allstate Ins. Co.], 49 NY2d at 758-759).

Matter of Johnson v Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist., 2018 NY Slip Op 08021 [2d Dept. 2018]

When reviewing compulsory arbitrations in education proceedings such as this, the court should accept the hearing officer’s credibility determinations, even where there is conflicting evidence and room for choice exists (see Matter of Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436, 443-444; Matter of Powell v. Board of Educ. of Westbury Union Free School Dist., 91 AD3d 955, 955; Matter of Saunders v Rockland Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 62 AD3d at 1013).

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