CPLR 3025 [mere lateness not a bar]

CPLR 3025(b)

Ciminello v Sullivan, 2014 NY Slip Op 06048 [2nd Dept. 2014]

Although the plaintiff delayed in making the motion for leave to amend, mere lateness is not a barrier to the amendment—it must be lateness coupled with significant prejudice to the other side (see Henry v MTA, 106 AD3d 874, 875; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Dimura, 104 AD3d 796, 797; U.S. Bank, N.A. v Sharif, 89 AD3d 723, 724). Brian C. Sullivan and Hartford cannot claim significant prejudice, since the proposed amendment arises out of the same facts as those set forth in the first amended complaint (see Koenig v Action Target, Inc., 76 AD3d 997, 997-998; Maloney Carpentry, Inc. v Budnik, 37 AD3d 558, 558).

Schelchere v Halls, 2014 NY Slip Op 05970 [2nd Dept. 2014]

Here, given the plaintiffs' extensive and unexplained delay in seeking to amend their complaint based on facts that were known to them since the onset of the litigation (see Heller v Louis Provenzano, Inc., 303 AD2d 20, 24; Whalen v 50 Sutton Place S. Owners, 276 AD2d 356, 357; Caruso v Anpro, Ltd., 215 AD2d 713, 714), the prejudice to the defendant that would result from the amendment, and the plaintiffs' improper submission of a portion of their request for leave to amend and supporting evidence for the first time in their reply papers on the motion (see Bjorke v Rubenstein, 38 AD3d 580, 581; Drake v Drake, 296 AD2d 566; Wright v Cetek Technologies., 289 AD2d 569, 570), the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint.

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