CPLR § 3126 is a creeper

CPLR § 3126

Callaghan v Curtis, 82 AD3d 818 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

"[A] trial court is given broad discretion to oversee the discovery process" (Castillo v Henry Schein, Inc., 259 AD2d 651, 652 [1999]). Here, the plaintiff clearly violated a prior order of the Supreme Court by failing to bring certain documents to her deposition. Her attorney also made extensive "speaking objections" during the deposition, and the plaintiff herself repeatedly refused to answer clear questions. We conclude that the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion, upon the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike her reply to their counterclaims, by, inter alia, precluding the plaintiff from offering any documents at trial (see e.g. O'Neill v Ho, 28 AD3d 626, 627 [2006]).

Delarosa v Besser Co., 2011 NY Slip Op 06016 (2nd Dept., 2011)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the appellants' motion which was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3126(3), since there was no clear showing that the plaintiff's failure to comply with the appellants' discovery demand was willful and contumacious (see CPLR 3126; ACME ANC Corp. v Read, 55 AD3d 854, 855; Myung Sum Suh v Jung Ja Kim, 51 AD3d 883; Manko v Lenox Hill Hosp., 44 AD3d 1014; Resnick v Schwarzkopf, 41 AD3d 573). The plaintiff substantially, albeit tardily, complied with the discovery demand (see Mironer v City of New York, 79 AD3d 1106, 1108; ACME ANC Corp. v Read, 55 AD3d at 855; Resnick v Schwarzkopf, 41 AD3d 573).

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