CPLR 3101 Scope of disclosure
Ford v Rector, Church-Wardens, Vestrymen of Trinity Church in the City of New York, 2011 NY Slip Op 01064 (App. Div., 1st 2011)
While defendants' discovery request for all plaintiff's home and cellular telephone records dating from six years before the sending of the anonymous faxes that purportedly led to her termination was overly broad and unnecessarily burdensome, the denial of the request in its entirety was inappropriate, given defendants' showing of the need for the discovery. Defendants allege that plaintiff was terminated not in retaliation for commencing a discrimination suit but because of her involvement in the sending of certain anonymous faxes and her dishonesty during the investigation into the sending of the faxes. Plaintiff asserts that she does not know the person who allegedly caused the faxes to be sent. However, there is documentary evidence suggesting that he is her brother-in-law. Thus, we conclude that plaintiff's telephone records, as circumscribed above, for the year preceding the sending of the faxes are "material and necessary" to the defense of this action (CPLR 3101[a]; see Anonymous v High School for Envtl. Studies, 32 AD3d 353, 358 [2006]).
Contrary to defendants' contention, production of the remainder of the information requested should not be compelled, despite plaintiff's untimely objection to the request (Lea v New York City Tr. Auth., 57 AD3d 269 [2008]; Haller v North Riverside Partners, 189 AD2d 615, 616 [1993]).
American Bank Note Corp. v Daniele, 2011 NY Slip Op 01063 (App. Div., 1st 2011)
Finally, there was no error in permitting defendants to testify at the hearing by means of a live video conference link from Argentina. First, the court quashed the subpoena plaintiffs had originally served on defendants and plaintiffs did not challenge this ruling on appeal. Thus, defendants' appearance via video conference was voluntary. Further, plaintiffs fully participated in that hearing.
Pursuant to CPLR 3103(a), the court may regulate "any disclosure device" in order to "prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage or other prejudice. . . " The decision to allow a party or witness to testify via video conference link is left to a trial court's discretion (People v Wrotten, 14 NY3d 33, 37-38 [2009] cert denied __ US __, 130 S Ct 2520 [2010]).
Here, defendant Daniele had not made travel arrangements to come to the United States. There was also a question of whether he could lawfully leave Argentina because of charges plaintiffs filed against him in that country. Thus, coming to New York to testify was "not feasible as a practical matter" (Matter of Singh, 22 Misc 3d 288, 290 (Sup Ct, Bronx County [*2]2008), and would have resulted in hardship (Rogovin v Rogovin, 3 AD3d 352, 353 [2004]). Accordingly it was proper to allow defendants to testify from Argentina via video conferencing.
Mt. McKinley Ins. Co. v Corning Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 01061 (App. Div., 1st 2011)
In this action seeking a declaratory judgment establishing entitlement to insurance coverage for defense and/or indemnification, the IAS court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the subject documents produced (see Ulico Cas. Co. v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, 1 AD3d 223, 224 [2003]). The motion court properly held that Corning failed to establish that the subject documents were protected by the common interest privilege. While Corning asserted that the documents were "generated in furtherance of a common legal interest" between itself and the committees in the bankruptcy action and that the documents included, communications evincing strategy and preparation for an upcoming confirmation hearing, it submitted no evidence in support of these assertions. Moreover, Corning never stated, let alone established, that it or the committees had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality with respect to these communications. Accordingly, Corning failed to establish that the relevant communications with the committees were in furtherance of a common legal interest and that with respect to these communications, Corning and the committees had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality (see United states v Schwimmer, 892 F2d 237, 243-244 [2d Cir 1989]; In re [*2]Quigley Company, Inc., 2009 Bankr LEXIS 1352, 8-9 [Bankr SD NY 2009].
Yu Hui Chen v Chen Li Zhi, 2011 NY Slip Op 01267 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)
While depositions of parties to an action are generally held in the county where the action is pending (see CPLR 3110[1]), if a party demonstrates that conducting his or her deposition in that county would cause undue hardship, the Supreme Court can order the deposition to be held elsewhere (see Gartner v Unified Windows, Doors & Siding, Inc., 68 AD3d 815; LaRusso v Brookstone, Inc., 52 AD3d 576, 577). Here, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's cross motion for a protective order pursuant to CPLR 3103(a) directing that his deposition be conducted by remote electronic means. The plaintiff demonstrated that traveling from China to the United States for his deposition would cause undue hardship (see Gartner v Unified Windows, Doors & Siding, Inc., 68 AD3d at 815-816; Wygocki v Milford Plaza Hotel, 38 AD3d 237; Rogovin v Rogovin, 3 AD3d 352, 353; Matter of Singh, 22 Misc 3d 288; see also Hoffman v Kraus, 260 AD2d 435, 437; cf. Matter of Albarino, 27 AD3d 556).
In light of our determination that the plaintiff's deposition may be conducted by remote electronic means, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in staying all proceedings in the action until the plaintiff could return to the United States for his deposition.
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