SLAPP

Most people don't know or care about SLAPP. It's interesting stuff and there is a wealth of information    about in on the internets.  Along with SLAPP, note that plaintiff, in opposing defendant's summary judgment motion, only attached an attorney affirmation.  No affidavit was attached.  And note the rare reference to 3212(h).

Novosiadlyi v James, 2010 NY Slip Op 00938 (App. Div., 2nd, 2010)

The plaintiffs commenced this action alleging, inter alia, that the
defendants defamed them during public hearings on their application for a
permit allowing them to use their house in Lindenhurst as an
owner-occupied two-family home. The defendant Joseph Ippolito moved for
summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against
him pursuant to CPLR 3212 and Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a and 76-a, and for
recovery on his counterclaim for an award of an attorney's fee,
contending that this action was an improper strategic lawsuit against
public participation (hereinafter SLAPP action) (see 600 W. 115th St.
Corp. v Von Gutfeld, 80 NY2d 130, 137 n 1, cert denied 508
US 910).

In the order granting Ippolito's motion, the Supreme Court
determined that he established his prima facie entitlement to the
protections of Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a and 76-a. Moreover, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' opposition, which consisted of only an
affirmation of counsel, as being without probative value and
insufficient to oppose the summary judgment motion. Consequently, the
Supreme Court granted Ippolito's motion for summary judgment dismissing
the complaint insofar as asserted against him and awarded him summary
judgment on his counterclaim for an award of an attorney's fee to the
extent of scheduling an inquest.

Thereafter, the plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, moved pursuant to
CPLR 2005 and 2221 for leave to renew their opposition to Ippolito's
motion. In an order dated July 3, 2008, the Supreme Court denied the
plaintiffs' motion for leave to renew, finding that no new facts were
offered and that the new arguments offered as new facts would not have
changed the prior result. The plaintiff Roman Novosiadlyi appeals from
that order. We affirm.
[*2]

A motion for leave to renew must
be (1) based upon new facts not offered on the prior motion that would
change the prior determination, and (2) set forth a reasonable
justification for the failure to present such facts on the prior motion (see
CPLR 2221[e][2], [3]; Caraballo v Kim, 63 AD3d 976, 978; Jackson
Hgts. Care Ctr., LLC v Bloch, 39 AD3d 477, 480). Here, the
plaintiffs failed to submit new facts sufficient to change the court's
prior determination granting Ippolito's summary judgment motion. Civil
Rights Law § 76-a was enacted to provide special protection for
defendants in actions arising from the exercise of their rights of
public petition and participation by deterring SLAPP actions (see 600
W. 115th St. Corp. v Von Gutfeld, 80 NY2d at 137 n 1; Singh v
Sukhram, 56 AD3d 187, 194). Where, as here, the defendant
established that the action involves the rights of public petition and
participation (see Civil Rights Law § 76-a[1][a]), "damages may
only be recovered if the plaintiff, in addition to all other necessary
elements, shall have established by clear and convincing evidence that
any communication which gives rise to the action was made with knowledge
of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false"
(Civil Rights Law § 76-a[2]; see T.S. Haulers v Kaplan, 295 AD2d
595, 598). In addition, summary judgment must be awarded to the
defendant unless the plaintiff demonstrates, in opposition, that the
action has "a substantial basis in fact and law or is supported by a
substantial argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law" (CPLR 3212[h]). The plaintiffs' submissions in support of
their renewal motion failed to meet this burden or otherwise raise a
triable issue of fact as to whether Ippolito knew that his statements
were false or that he made them with reckless disregard of whether they
were true. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the
plaintiffs' motion for leave to renew (see T.S. Haulers v Kaplan,
295 AD2d at 598).

The bold is mine.