CPLR R. 5015(a); 22 NYCRR 202.48; Stipulatons

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or order
(a) On motion
(1) excusable default…

22 NYCRR 202.48 Submission of orders, judgments and decrees for signature

Klughaupt v Hi-Tower Contrs., Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 05750 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the
plaintiff's motion for leave to enter a default judgment against the
defendant Lynch Park, LLC (hereinafter Lynch Park), and in granting
Lynch Park's cross motion to vacate its default in answering and for
leave to serve a late answer (see CPLR 5015). Considering the
lack of any prejudice to the plaintiff as a result of the relatively
short three-week delay in serving an answer, the existence of a
potentially meritorious defense, and the public policy favoring the
resolution of cases on the merits, the Supreme Court properly excused
the de minimis delay in answering (see Schonfeld v Blue & White Food Prods. Corp., 29 AD3d 673; Yonkers Rib House, Inc. v 1789 Cent. Park Corp., 19 AD3d 687; Trimble v SAS Taxi Co., Inc., 8 AD3d 557; see e.g. Perez v Linshar Realty Corp., 259 AD2d 532; Swidler v World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 85 AD2d 239, cf. Leifer v Pilgreen Corp.,AD3d,
2009 NY Slip Op 03872 [2d Dept 2009] [10-month delay in moving to
vacate default in answering or appearing, with no meritorious defense,
does not warrant vacatur of default]).

Diane v Ricale Taxi, Inc., 2009 NY Slip Op 05680 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

Plaintiff fails to show that a judgment was ever issued, much
less served on appellant. The only exhibits attached to plaintiff's
opposition are an order granting a default judgment and directing an
inquest, with no notice of entry or affidavit of service, and a copy of
this Court's subsequent order (291 AD2d 320) involving another
defendant and containing no references to any judgment in any amount
against appellant. Accordingly, it does not appear that appellant's
one-year time limit under CPLR 5015(a)(1) to move for relief from a
judgment or order ever began to run, and appellant's motion should not
have been denied as untimely. For present purposes, appellant, who was
named a defendant only because he was one of two employees who
regularly drove the taxi involved in the accident, comes forward with
sufficient evidence that he could not have been the driver since the
accident occurred at night while he worked only days. Indeed, the
possibility that appellant had nothing to do with the accident would,
given a reasonable excuse, warrant vacatur of the default judgment in
the interest of justice even if the one-year time limit had run (see Johnson v Minskoff & Sons, 287 AD2d 233, 236 [2001]). We accept appellant's excuse that he did not understand the import of the legal documents he was [*2]receiving and trusted his employer's assurances that it would take care of the matter for him.

Another rare, "in the interests of justice" vacatur.

Rowley v Amrhein, 2009 NY Slip Op 05834 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

Defendant's challenge to the judgment on the ground that it
inaccurately reflects the stipulation of settlement by including terms
that are inconsistent therewith is not preserved for appellate review
since there is no record that defendant raised
any objection to plaintiff's proposed judgment, as required by 22 NYCRR 202.48(c)(2) (see Salamone v Wincaf Props., 9 AD3d 127, 140 [2004], lv dismissed
4 NY3d 794 [2005]). Defendant's claim that he had no opportunity to
object to plaintiff's proposed judgment because he was not properly
served with a copy thereof is properly directed to Supreme Court in a
motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), not to this
Court on appeal (see McCue v McCue, 225 AD2d 975, 976 [1996]; Levy v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Greater N.Y., 124 AD2d 900, 901 [1986]).

Defendant's challenges to the judgment on the bases that it
grants plaintiff a divorce on a ground that he contests and fails to
adjudicate his counterclaim allege substantive errors in the judgment
that affect his substantial rights and not mere inconsistencies with
the intentions of the court and the parties as demonstrated by the
record. Thus, review may be obtained either through an appeal from the
judgment or through a motion to vacate pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) (Salamone,
9 AD3d at 133-134). The record reveals that Supreme Court did not
address the grounds for divorce or defendant's counterclaim.
Accordingly, we remand the matter for further proceedings to determine
these issues.

Defendant's contention that the stipulation disposing of the
parties' economic issues is unenforceable against him is not properly
before us, since defendant never moved in Supreme Court to set aside
the stipulation (see Garrison v Garrison, 52 AD3d 927, 928 [2008]; Hopkins v Hopkins, 97 AD2d 457 [1983]). In any event, the terms of the stipulation were memorialized in [*2]a
proposed preliminary conference order that the court reviewed during
the October 30, 2007 proceedings, the stipulation was signed and
initialed by both parties, and the court expressly informed the parties
on the record that it was a binding contract. The stipulation contained
no express reservation of the right not to be bound until the execution
of a more formal agreement. To the contrary, all the essential terms
and conditions of an agreement were set forth in the stipulation, and
all that remained was their translation into a more formal document (see Brause v Goldman, 10 AD2d 328, 332 [1960], affd 9 NY2d 620 [1961]).

The bold is mine.