CPLR § 321 Attorneys

In this matrimonial action, the contractual provision in the
retainer agreement that purports to authorize counsel to withdraw upon
nonpayment of fees does not vitiate the procedural requirements of CPLR
321(b), nor does it deprive the court of its traditional discretion in
regulating the legal profession by overseeing the charging of fees for
legal services (see e.g. Solow Mgt. Corp. v Tanger, 19 AD3d 225
[2005]). The motion court properly considered counsel's motion to
withdraw against the requirement that to be "entitled to terminate the
relationship with a client, an attorney must make a showing of good or
sufficient cause and reasonable notice" (George v George, 217 AD2d 913 [1995]).

There is no basis on this record to conclude that the court
engaged in an improvident exercise of its discretion in denying
counsel's motion (see e.g. Torres v Torres, 169 AD2d 829 [1991]). The mere fact that a client fails to pay an attorney for services rendered does not, [*2]without more, entitle the attorney to withdraw (Cashdan v Cashdan, 243 AD2d 598 [1997]; George v George, 217 AD2d 913, supra).