CPLR R. 2221(d)

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that
branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to reargue since
it admittedly did not consider the plaintiff's argument that the
defendants allegedly failed to provide Anthony with adequate safety
equipment. However, it should not have directed the parties to submit
any additional evidence (see CPLR 2221[d]). In any event, upon
reargument, the Supreme Court should have adhered to its original
determination granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The
defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law
by demonstrating that Anthony's injuries were caused by the other
student's accidental conduct in the course of the soccer game and,
given the attendant circumstances, that the incident occurred in such a
short span of time that it could not have been prevented by the most
intense supervision (see Paca v City of New York, 51 AD3d 991; Ronan v School Dist. of City of New Rochelle, 35 AD3d 429; Walker v Commack School Dist., 31 AD3d 752; Mayer v Mahopac Cent. School Dist., 29 AD3d 653; Hernandez v Board of Educ. of City of N. Y., 302 AD2d 493; Convey v City of Rye School Dist., 271
AD2d 154, 160). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable
issue of fact. In their original opposition papers, the plaintiff
submitted an expert affidavit to support their contention that the
defendants were negligent in failing to provide a shin guard during the
game. The plaintiff's expert, however, failed to cite to any statute,
regulations, or guidelines which stated that shin guards were
necessary, and his affidavit was insufficient to raise a triable issue
of fact (see Benson v Union Free School Dist. #23, 37 AD3d 748,
749). Additionally, there was no competent proof that there were any
FIFA regulations or United States Soccer Federation Laws regarding the
use of shin guards which were in effect at the time of the accident.
Assuming that such regulations or laws existed at the time of the
accident, there was no competent proof that they reflected a
generally-accepted standard or practice in middle school settings (see Walker v Commack School Dist., 31 AD3d 752, 753; Capotosto v Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Ctr., 2 AD3d 384).

Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court providently
exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the motion of the
defendant Reich Reich & Reich, P.C. (hereinafter Reich), which was
for leave to reargue. Reich's appeal from the Supreme Court's order
dated December 17, 2007, was pending and unperfected as of the time
that the motion for reargument was made. Under these circumstances, the
Supreme Court providently entertained that branch of Reich's motion
which was for leave to reargue notwithstanding that it was made beyond
the 30-day limit set forth in CPLR 2221(d)(3) (see Itzkowitz v King Kullen Grocery Co., Inc., 22 AD3d 636, 638; Leist v Goldstein, 305 AD2d 468, 469).