22 NYCRR 130-1.1;

RKO Props. Ltd. v Boymelgreen, 2009 NY Slip Op 03709 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

"[W]hen parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete
document, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to its
terms'" (Reiss v Financial Performance Corp., 97 NY2d 195, 198, quoting W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77
NY2d 157, 162). Here, contrary to the appellants' contention, the
Supreme Court did not rewrite the parties' stipulation of settlement.
Rather, by directing the appellants to provide the general releases to
the respondents, the court properly enforced the stipulation according
to its terms. By agreeing to the subsequent stipulation and order dated
August 16, 2007, and accepting payment of the settlement amount, the
plaintiff waived any alleged breach of the stipulation of settlement.

The appeal from so much of the order entered January 28, 2008,
as, sua sponte, directed a hearing must be dismissed, as no appeal lies
as of right from an order entered sua sponte or from an order directing
a hearing, and leave to appeal from that portion of the order has not
been granted (see CPLR 5701[a][2], [c]; Shabtai v City of New York, 308 AD2d 532, 533; Matter of Kohn v Lawrence, 240 AD2d 496, 496-497).

Under the circumstances herein, the plaintiff did not engage in
sanctionable conduct by opposing the defendant's motion, inter alia, to
vacate a portion of a prior support order (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1; Rennie-Otote v Otote, 15 AD3d 380, 381; Hamilton v Cordero, 10 AD3d 702, 703; Stow v Stow, 262 AD2d 550, 551; see also Arciniega v Arciniega,
48 AD3d 607). Moreover, the Supreme Court did not follow the proper
procedure for imposing a sanction, since it failed to specify in a
written decision the conduct upon which the award was based, the
reasons why it found the conduct to be frivolous, and the reasons the
sanction was fixed in the sum indicated (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.2; Rennie-Otote v Otote, 15 AD3d at 381; Hamilton v Cordero, 10 AD3d at 703; Miller v DeCongilio, 269 AD2d 504; Gossett v Firestar Affiliates, 224 AD2d 487).
The plaintiff's contention that the Supreme Court improperly
denied her request for sanctions against the defendant is not properly
before this Court (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[d]; Kane v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 40 AD3d 1040, 1041-1042; Jandru Mats v Riteway AV Corp., 1 AD3d 565, 566; Telemark Constr. v Fleetwood & Assoc., 236 AD2d 462; see also Matter of Mercury Ins. Group v Ocana, 46 AD3d 561, 562).