CPLR § 3213; CPLR § 1001

CPLR § 3213 Motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint

CPLR § 1001 Necessary joinder of parties

Ro & Ke, Inc. v Stevens, 2009 NY Slip Op 03501 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

"[A] document comes within CPLR 3213 if a prima facie case would be
made out by the instrument and a failure to make the payments called
for by its terms . . . . The instrument does not qualify if outside
proof is needed, other than simple proof of nonpayment or a similar de
minimis deviation from the face of the document"
(Weissman v Sinorm Deli, 88 NY2d 437, 444 [internal quotation marks [*2]omitted]; see Stallone v Rostek,
27 AD3d 449, 450). Here, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by proving the existence of
the subject note and nonpayment according to its terms
(see Black Rock, Inc. v Z Best Car Wash, Inc., 27 AD3d 409, 409; James DeLuca, M.D., P.C. v North Shore Med. Imaging, 287 AD2d 488, 488; A. Bella Food Corp. v Luigi's Italian Deli,
243 AD2d 592, 592). In response to the plaintiff's prima facie showing,
the defendant raised a triable issue of fact regarding the validity of
the assignment under which the defendant allegedly assumed the
obligations of Hyunik Seo, a nonparty to this action, who was the
original borrower on the note. Therefore, the motion for summary
judgment in lieu of complaint should have been denied
(see Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 NY2d 395, 402-403; Comforce Telecom, Inc. v Spears Holding Co. Inc., 42 AD3d 557; cf. Millenium Falcon Corp. v WRD Sales, Inc., 46 AD3d 862, 863).

Under the circumstances presented, Hyunik Seo, the original
borrower on the note, should have been joined as a party to this action
(see CPLR 1001[a]; cf. Friedman v Friedman, 125 AD2d 539, 540-541; Matter of Brener, 12 AD2d 452).

The bold is mine.

Halliwell v Gordon, 2009 NY Slip Op 03481 (App. Div., 2nd, 2009)

Finally, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the
defendant's motion which was to dismiss the complaint, with prejudice,
on the alternative ground that the plaintiff failed to join Bumble as a
necessary party. The defendant failed to demonstrate that Bumble needed
to be a party if complete relief was to be accorded between the parties
or that Bumble would be inequitably affected by a judgment in this
action if it were not joined (see CPLR 1001[a]; Spector v Toys "R" [*3]Us, Inc., 12 AD3d 358, 359).

Leeward Isles Resorts, Ltd. v Hickox, 2009 NY Slip Op 03457 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

Assuming the non-joined parties are necessary parties within the
meaning of CPLR 1001(a), defendant has not shown as a matter of law
that he is entitled to dismissal of the complaint for failure to join
them. Defendant contends that these parties are beyond the jurisdiction
of the court and cannot be joined. However, even if these parties were
shown to be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, consideration of the
factors enumerated in CPLR 1001(b) would support allowing the action to
proceed, especially as "dismissal for failure to join a necessary party
should eventuate only as a last resort" (L-3 Communications Corp. v SafeNet, Inc., 45 AD3d 1, 11 [2007] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

The bold is mine.

De Bie v Tredegar Trust Co., 2009 NY Slip Op 03445 (App. Div., 1st, 2009)

None of the factors set forth in CPLR 1001(b) warranted proceeding
without the joinder of Joan and Alexis Jr. as necessary parties
(see Nowitz v Nowitz, 37 AD3d 788
[2007]). First of all, plaintiff has an alternative forum for relief in
Virginia, where issues pertaining to the trust have been litigated for
over a decade. In its May 19, 2004 order, the Virginia court directed
the parties to "undertake to settle all remaining issues pertinent to
[Tredegar]'s prayer for aid and guidance not disposed of by this Order,
including, without limitation, undertaking to agree on a mutually acceptable division of the Trust into two parts"
(emphasis added), the very relief plaintiff seeks herein. By filing in
New York, plaintiff subverted the authority of the Virginia court,
which had agreed, in its 2004 order, to supervise settlement of the
parties' remaining disputes relating to the trust, including the
division of the trust into two parts.

Second, Joan and Alexis Jr. would be prejudiced if the New York
action were to proceed in their absence. Because plaintiff has sought
partition of his interest in the trust, his interests are not aligned
with those of his ex-wife and son. They do not stand to benefit from
the recovery of $10 million on account of alleged breaches of fiduciary
duty by the trustee; the complaint makes clear that plaintiff seeks
judgment restoring such losses "to the Plaintiff's partitioned trust,"
i.e., recovery of these sums would be for plaintiff's benefit only.

Third, plaintiff engaged in forum shopping by filing suit
against Tredegar in New York. Plaintiff concedes that he sought to
avoid litigating this case in Virginia, given that court's [*2]history of ruling "harshly" against his interest.

Fourth, it would not be feasible to fashion an appropriate
protective order. As the motion court recognized, the parties have a
"long and tortured history" in this matter, and the relief sought by
plaintiff, i.e., partition of his interest in the trust, would subvert
the terms of the settlement agreement.

Fifth, an effective judgment cannot be rendered in the absence
of Joan and Alexis Jr. The fact that plaintiff has not asserted any
claims against them is of no moment, given that the relief he seeks
would subvert the settlement agreement and, if he were to prevail,
diminish the value of their interests in the trust.

The bold is mine.

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