Foundation

Although the neuropsychologist's affidavit indicated that he had
reviewed records relating to the infant plaintiff's medical history in
forming his opinion, he failed to identify any of these records. Thus,
there was no evidentiary foundation for his conclusion that the infant [*2]plaintiff's
"pervasive developmental delay (autism) developed long prior to his
history of elevated lead levels." The neuropsychologist also failed to
discuss the levels of lead in the infant plaintiff's blood, or to
explain why the levels of lead the child was exposed to could not have
caused and/or exacerbated his alleged delay and cognitive deficits.
Furthermore, the neuropsychologist's affidavit did not indicate the
training and experience he had in diagnosing lead-poisoning injuries in
children. Under these circumstances, the neuropsychologist's conclusory
opinion that the infant plaintiff's developmental disorder was not in
any way related to his history of elevated blood lead levels was
insufficient to make a prima facie showing of Daarta's entitlement to
judgment as a matter of law (see Baez v Sugrue, 300 AD2d 519, 520-521; Wynn v T.R.I.P. Redevelopment Assoc., 296 AD2d 176, 184; Walton v Albany Community Dev. Agency, 279 AD2d 93; see also Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 NY2d 628).