CPLR R. 3025(b)

A determination whether to grant leave to serve an amended pleading
is within the trial court's broad discretion, the exercise of which
will not be lightly disturbed (see Ingrami v Rovner, 45 AD3d 806; Keating v Nanuet Bd. of Educ., 44 AD3d 623,
624; CPLR 3025[b]). "In exercising its discretion, the court should
consider how long the amending party was aware of the facts upon which
the motion was predicated, whether a reasonable excuse for the delay
was offered, and whether prejudice resulted therefrom" (Mohammed v City of New York, 242 AD2d 321, 321; see F.G.L. Knitting Mills v 1087 Flushing Prop., 191 AD2d 533, 534). In addition, "[w]here . . . the [*2]proposed amendment is palpably insufficient as a matter of law or is totally devoid of merit, leave to amend should be denied" (Morton v Brookhaven Mem. Hosp., 32 AD3d 381, 381; Thone v Crown Equip. Corp., 27 AD3d 723, 724).

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in
denying that branch of the motion of the defendant Brian E. Chambers,
Jr., which was for leave to amend his answer. Chambers failed to offer
a reasonable excuse for his delay. Additionally, the facts upon which
Chambers based that branch of his motion which was for leave to amend
the answer were known to him when he initially answered the complaint.