Category: Appellate Division

1015

Wells Fargo Bank, NA v Emma, 2018 NY Slip Op 03728 [2d Dept. 2018]

Pursuant to CPLR 1015(a), "[i]f a party dies and the claim for or against him [or her] is not thereby extinguished the court shall order substitution of the proper parties" (emphasis added). "Generally, the death of a party divests a court of jurisdiction to act, and automatically stays proceedings in the action pending the substitution of a personal representative for the decedent" (Neuman v Neumann, 85 AD3d 1138, 1139). Here, the decedent's death did not divest the court of jurisdiction and warrant the imposition of a stay, since the decedent is not a party in this action (see Sample v Temkin, 87 AD3d 686, 687-688). Moreover, since the decedent made an absolute conveyance of all her interest in the property to the defendant and the plaintiff elected not to seek a deficiency judgment against the decedent's estate, the decedent was not a necessary party to the action (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Bachmann, 145 AD3d 712, 714; HSBC Bank USA v Ungar Family Realty Corp., 111 AD3d 673). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was to vacate the stay.

Infants

Matter of Fast Care Med. Diagnostics, PLLC/PV v Government Employees Ins. Co., 2018 NY Slip Op 03831 [2d Dept. 2018]

The underlying papers can be found HERE.

The petitioner, Fast Care Medical Diagnostics, PLLC, named herein as Fast Care Medical Diagnostics, PLLC/PV (hereinafter Fast Care), provided certain medical services to its assignor, "PV," in connection with injuries purportedly sustained by PV in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of such treatment, PV was 15 years old. PV and his mother executed an assignment of benefits, which assigned all rights and remedies to payment for health care services provided by Fast Care to which PV was entitled under article 51 of the Insurance Law. Fast Care submitted claims for these services to Government Employees Insurance Co. (hereinafter GEICO), for reimbursement of first-party no-fault insurance benefits (see Insurance Law § 5102). GEICO denied the claims on grounds of purported lack of medical necessity.

Fast Care sought arbitration of the dispute. The arbitrator dismissed the proceeding without prejudice, on the ground that Fast Care had failed to comply with CPLR 1209, which provides, in relevant part, that "[a] controversy involving an infant . . . shall not be submitted to arbitration except pursuant to a court order made upon application of the representative of such infant," subject to an exception that is not applicable here. Fast Care appealed to a master arbitrator, who confirmed the determination. The master arbitrator further found that Fast Care lacked standing, because the parent of the infant patient, rather than the infant himself, was required to execute an assignment of benefits. Fast Care then instituted this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to vacate the arbitration award.

An arbitration award may be vacated if the court finds that the rights of a party were prejudiced by (1) corruption, fraud, or misconduct in procuring the award; (2) partiality of an arbitrator; (3) the arbitrator exceeding his or her power; or (4) the failure to follow the procedures of CPLR article 75 (see CPLR 7511[b]). In addition, an arbitration award may be vacated "if it violates strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power" (Matter of Slocum v Madariaga, 123 AD3d 1046, 1046; see Matter of Kowaleski [New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs.], 16 NY3d 85, 90; Matter of United Fedn. of Teachers, Local 2, AFT, AFL-CIO v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 1 NY3d 72, 79). An arbitration award may also be vacated where it is in " explicit conflict'" with established laws and "the strong and well-defined policy considerations' embodied therein" (Matter of City of Oswego [Oswego City Firefighters Assn., Local 2707], 21 NY3d 880, 882, quoting Matter of New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York, 94 NY2d 321, 327 [emphasis omitted]).

We agree with the Supreme Court that the arbitrator's award was irrational and in conflict with CPLR 1209, which applies "only where an infant is a party" to an arbitration proceeding (Goldenberg v Goldenberg, 25 AD2d 670, 670, affd 19 NY2d 759; see Schneider v Schneider, 17 NY2d 123, 127). The infant patient was not a party to the arbitration; rather, Fast Care, as the infant's assignee, was the party that brought the arbitration (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.11[a]). Therefore, we agree with the court that the arbitrator disregarded established law in determining that the requirements of CPLR 1209 applied here (Schneider v Schneider, 17 NY2d at 127; see Goldenberg v Goldenberg, 25 AD2d at 670). Furthermore, the master arbitrator's determination that the assignment of benefits was not effective was not based on any requirement set forth in established law or regulations (see generally 11 NYCRR 65-2.4[c]).

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to vacate the awards and direct further arbitration proceedings as to the merits of Fast Care's claims (see Matter of City of Oswego [Oswego City Firefighters Assn., Local 2707], 21 NY3d at 882; see also Matter of Local 342 v Town of Huntington, 52 AD3d 720, 721; Matter of Kocsis [New York State Div. of Parole], 41 AD3d 1017, 1020; Matter of Rockland County Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v BOCES Staff Assn., 308 AD2d 452, 454).

Contempt/Service

Kozel v Kozel, 2018 NY Slip Op 03907 [1st Dept. 2018]

Contrary to the contention of the nonparty witness (Inga), she was properly served via email with plaintiff's order to show cause. While a criminal contempt proceeding requires personal service on the contemnor (see Matter of Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 144 AD2d 252, 255-256 [1st Dept 1988]), CPLR 308(5) permits a court to direct another manner of service if the methods set forth in the statute prove impracticable. Here, Inga left the jurisdiction after the same court and Justice found her in contempt, and offers no evidence that she was at either her residence in London or Lithuania. Under these circumstances, the court properly directed that she be served via email (see Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 78 AD3d 137, 141-142 [1st Dept 2010]). Since Inga was properly served with the contempt motion, and had knowledge of the terms of the subject orders of which she was in violation, the court was empowered to find her in contempt without plaintiff commencing a special proceeding (see Citibank v Anthony Lincoln-Mercury, 86 AD2d 828, 829 [1st Dept 1982]).

Kozel v Kozel, 2018 NY Slip Op 03906 [1st Dept. 2018]

Contrary to her contention, she was properly served with plaintiff's order to show cause. The order to show cause directed plaintiff to serve Inga under CPLR 308 and her counsel by overnight mail on or before June 20, 2016. Inga's claim that her counsel was untimely served because he did not receive papers until June 21, 2016 is without merit (see CPLR 2103[b][6] [service is complete upon deposit into the custody of the overnight delivery service]). Likewise, the record supports that Inga was personally served at the New York City apartment she and defendant owned, which constituted her "dwelling place or usual place of abode within the state" for the purposes of CPLR 308 (see Krechmer v Boulakh, 277 AD2d 288, 289 [2d Dept 2000]).

Inadvertently left out CPLR 2001

Cuthbert v Foreign Dev. Serv., Ltd., 2018 NY Slip Op 03812 [1st Dept. 2018]

The court providently exercised its discretion in granting defendants' motion for renewal and reargument of their prior motion for summary judgment so that they could submit a lease extension to which they had referred in their initial moving papers but which they had inadvertently failed to attach to the papers (see CPLR 2001).

Hernandez v Marcano, 2018 NY Slip Op 03816 [1st Dept. 2018]

The court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to renew, which sought to submit an affirmation by her treating physician that, although referred to in her opposition papers, had been inadvertently omitted from the set of papers filed in court (see CPLR 2221[e]). Plaintiff demonstrated that the omission was the result of law office failure and that consideration of the affirmation would not prejudice defendants (see Cruz v Castanos, 10 AD3d 277 [1st Dept 2004]; Cespedes v McNamee, 308 AD2d 409 [1st Dept 2003]; see also Telep v Republic El. Corp., 267 AD2d 57, 58 [1st Dept 1999]).

Privilege

Gottwald v Sebert, 2018 NY Slip Op 03819 [1st Dept. 2018]

The court properly granted plaintiffs' motion to compel Kesha to produce documents. The communications between her counsel and press agents do not reflect a discussion of legal strategy relevant to the pending litigation but, rather, a discussion of a public relations strategy, and are not protected under the attorney-client privilege (see WA Rte. 9, LLC v PAF Capital LLC, 136 AD3d 522 [1st Dept 2016]). Kesha also failed to satisfy her burden to establish that the documents sought were protected work product (see Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v American Home Assur. Co., 23 AD3d 190, 191 [1st Dept 2005]).

3101

McMahon v New York Organ Donor Network, 2018 NY Slip Op 03820 [1st Dept. 2018]

Disclosure of these records is not prohibited by federal law. Although defendant is not a covered entity under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (see 45 CFR 160.102; 160.103), it is authorized to receive medical records from covered entities "for the purpose of facilitating organ, eye or tissue donation and transplantation" (45 CFR 164.512[h]). It is also required to abide by HIPAA's privacy protections pursuant to New York Public Health Law (PHL) § 4351(8), which provides, "Any employee or agent of a federally designated organ procurement organization, eye bank or tissue bank . . . shall be held to the same standard of confidentiality as that imposed on employees of the hospital." However, because the subject disclosure would be made in the course of a judicial proceeding and pursuant to a qualified protective order, it is authorized under HIPAA (see 45 CFR 164.512[e][1][ii][B], [iv], [v]).

Nevertheless, PHL § 4351(8) renders defendant's documents subject to the protections of the physician-patient privilege set forth at CPLR 4504. This privilege is personal to the patient and is not terminated by death (Chanko v American Broadcasting Cos. Inc., 27 NY3d 46, 53 [2016]). It has not been expressly or implicitly waived in this case by the donors' next of kin (see Perez v Fleischer, 122 AD3d 1157, 1159 [3d Dept 2014], lv dismissed 25 NY3d 985 [2015]). However, plaintiff demonstrated that the information in the medical records is material and necessary to his claim and that "the circumstances warrant overcoming the privilege and permitting discovery of the records with all identifying patient information appropriately redacted to protect patient confidentiality" (see Seaman v Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., Inc., 25 AD3d 596, 597 [2d Dept 2006]; accord Cole v Panos, 128 AD3d 880, 883 [2d Dept 2015]). Allowing disclosure under these circumstances is consistent with the public policy underlying the whistleblower statute, i.e., to encourage employees to report hazards to supervisors and the public (see Leibowitz v Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y., 152 AD2d 169, 176 [2d Dept 1989]).

3103 (not required to create what does not exist) (ok to watch inspection)

Curran v New York City Tr. Auth., 2018 NY Slip Op 03798 [1st Dept. 2018]

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she would be prejudiced by defendants' representatives observing and recording her inspection and photographing of the subject bus. Defendants' representatives may be present during the inspection, provided they do not interfere with the examination.

Defendants are not required to create a document, such as a certification of no changes, if none exists, but plaintiff is entitled to discovery regarding any changes to the subject bus from the date of the accident to the date of the inspection.

Mailing

HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Gifford, 2018 NY Slip Op 03738 [1st Dept. 2018]

The affidavit of mailing, by a person who did not personally do the mailing but relied on his knowledge of his employer's office practices, does not demonstrate the affiant's familiarity with his employer's mailing practices and procedures with respect to notices of default (see Nationstar Mtge., LLC v Cogen, ___ AD3d ___, 2018 Slip Op 01413 [1st Dept 2018]; U.S. Bank N.A. v Brjimohan, 153 AD3d 1164 [1st Dept 2017]).

CPLR R. 4212

Koch v Sheresky, Aronson & Mayefsky LLP, 2018 NY Slip Op 03769 [1st Dept. 2018]

The court also properly denied plaintiff's motion for a hearing before an advisory jury pursuant to CPLR 4212. Plaintiff failed to explain the necessity for such a hearing or to substantiate her claim of bias on the part of the special referee, who had denied her motion for a protective order and directed her to appear for a deposition. Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of an advisory jury after the special referee denied her motion for a protective order suggests a strategy to avoid the discovery orders entered against her as a result of her willful noncompliance.