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CPLR § 5019 and substantive rights

CPLR § 5019 Validity and correction of judgment or order; amendment of docket.

Mount Sinai Hosp. v Country Wide Ins. Co., 2011 NY Slip Op 01008 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

The hospital then entered judgment against the insurer in satisfaction of that claim in the total sum of $25,327.50. The judgment consisted of benefits due the hospital for services rendered in the sum of $14,105.50, interest in the sum of $9,772, an attorney's fee in the sum of $850, and costs and disbursements in the sum of $600.

Thereafter, the insurer moved pursuant to CPLR 5019(a) to modify the amount of the judgment, belatedly asserting that the judgment exceeded the coverage limit of the subject policy due to payments previously made under the policy to other health care providers. The Supreme Court granted the insurer's motion, and ordered a hearing to determine the amount remaining on the policy. The plaintiffs appeal.

CPLR 5019(a) provides a court with the discretion to correct a technical defect or a ministerial error, and may not be employed as a vehicle to alter the substantive rights of a party (see Kiker v Nassau County, 85 NY2d 879, 880-881; Herpe v Herpe, 225 NY 323, 327; Rotunno v Gruhill Constr. Corp., 29 AD3d 772, 773; Haggerty v Market Basket Enters., Inc., 8 AD3d 618, 618-619; Novak v Novak, 299 AD2d 924, 925; Tait v Lattingtown Harbor Dev. Co., 12 AD2d 966, 967; see also Minnesota Laundry Serv., Inc. v Mellon, 263 App Div 889, 890, affd 289 NY 749; Fleming v Sarva, 15 Misc 3d 892, 895; Matter of Schlossberg v Schlossberg, 62 Misc 2d 699, 701). Here, in seeking to modify the amount of the judgment on the ground that the policy limits were nearly exhausted, the insurer was not seeking to correct a mere clerical error. Rather, it sought to change the judgment with respect to a substantive matter. As such, CPLR 5019(a) was not the proper procedural mechanism by which to seek such modification. Although the hospital raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we may review the issue because it presents a question of law which could not have been avoided if brought to the Supreme Court's attention at the proper juncture (see Gutierrez v State of New York, 58 AD3d 805, 807; Dugan v Crown Broadway, LLC, 33 AD3d 656, 656; Buywise Holding, LLC v Harris, 31 AD3d 681, 682).

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Wu-Tang and CPLR 3025

CPLR R. 3025 Amended and supplemental pleadings

Coles v Wu-Tang Prods., Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 00789 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

The record supports the trial court's determination that plaintiff, as a lyricist of the compositions, and defendant Diggs, as a producer of the music, regarded themselves as joint authors sharing equally in the ownership of a joint work (see Childress v Taylor, 945 F2d 500, 508 [2d Cir 1991]). The court properly granted plaintiff leave to conform the complaint to the evidence presented at trial by adding a claim against Diggs for his unauthorized receipt of a 50% producer's fee (see CPLR 3025[c]; Gonfiantini v Zino, 184 AD2d 368, 369-370 [1992]).

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I was looking around for this and realized that I never posted it.

Westchester Med. Ctr. v Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 69 AD3d 613 (App. Div., 2nd 2010)

A defendant seeking to vacate a judgment entered upon its default in appearing and answering the complaint must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for its delay in appearing and answering, as well as the existence of a meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138, 141 [1986]; Verde Elec. Corp. v Federal Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 672, 672-673 [2008]). The Special Deputy Superintendent of the State of New York Insurance Department acknowledged service upon him of the summons and complaint in this matter and notified the defendant, through Debra Sutton at its Pennsylvania office, of service as effected above (see Insurance Law § 1212; Montefiore Med. Ctr. v Auto One Ins. Co., 57 AD3d 958, 959 [2008]). In response, the defendant failed to meet its burden of showing a reasonable excuse for its failure to timely appear or answer the complaint and the existence of a meritorious defense. The affidavit of a senior claims examiner employed in the defendant's Texas office averred that there was no record of the summons and complaint in the defendant's computer system, but failed to demonstrate any knowledge of the office procedures employed in the handling of a summons and complaint received at the defendant's Pennsylvania office. Thus, that affidavit was insufficient to show that the failure to timely appear and answer was due to a clerical error which caused the summons and complaint to be overlooked (see Montefiore Med. Ctr. v Auto One Ins. Co., [*2]57 AD3d at 959; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 29 AD3d 968 [2006]; Kaperonis v Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 254 AD2d 334 [1998]; cf. Hospital for Joint Diseases v Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 55 AD3d 543, 544 [2008]).

Furthermore, the defendant failed to set forth facts from an individual with personal knowledge sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a meritorious defense. The affidavit of the plaintiff's biller showed that the forms N-F5 and UB-92 relating to this matter were mailed on April 23, 2008, and signed for by the defendant on April 28, 2008. At that time, according to the defendant's own records, there were still sufficient funds remaining under the policy to pay this bill (see 11 NYCRR 65-3.15; Nyack Hosp. v General Motors Acceptance Corp., 8 NY3d 294 [2007]). In response, the defendant offered only the same aforementioned affidavit, which also averred that there was no record of the bill in question in the defendant's computer system. This was insufficient for a similar reason; that is, the affiant failed to show any knowledge of the office procedures employed in the handling of billing forms received at the defendant's Pennsylvania office (see St. Barnabas Hosp. v American Tr. Ins. Co., 57 AD3d 517 [2008]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Allstate Ins. Co., 29 AD3d at 968; see generally New York Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Queens v Insurance Co. of State of Pa., 16 AD3d 391, 392 [2005]; Peacock v Kalikow, 239 AD2d 188, 190 [1997]; cf. St. Vincent's Hosp. of Richmond v Government Empls. Ins. Co., 50 AD3d 1123 [2008]). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to vacate the judgment entered upon its failure to appear or answer should have been denied.

The Supreme Court, in effect, denied, as academic, the plaintiff's motion to hold the defendant in contempt. In light of our determination, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for a determination on the merits of the plaintiff's motion.

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CPLR R. 2106: can’t be a party

CPLR R. 2106 Affirmation of truth of statement by attorney, physician, osteopath or dentist

Morrison Cohen LLP v Fink, 2011 NY Slip Op 00779 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

To successfully oppose a motion for leave to enter a default judgment, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense. As a party to the action, although an attorney by profession, defendant was required to submit an affidavit in opposition to plaintiff's motion for a default judgment. His submission of an affirmation instead of an affidavit was improper, "and its contents [were correctly] disregarded by the Supreme Court, thereby rendering the opposing papers insufficient to defeat the plaintiff's motion" (Pisacreta v Minniti, 265 AD2d 540 [1999]). Defendant's papers were deficient for the additional reason that the affidavit of the postal service worker on which he relied to demonstrate the inadequacy of "nail and mail" service pursuant to CPLR 308(4) was notarized by defendant himself, a party to the action.

Defendant is not entitled to relief, in the alternative, under CPLR 317 since he has failed to demonstrate that he "did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend" (id.; see Majestic Clothing Inc. v East Coast Stor., LLC, 18 AD3d 516, 517 [2005]).

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22 NYCRR 202.7(a)(2)

22 NYCRR 202.7 Calendaring of motions; uniform notice of motion form; affirmation of good faith

Garcia v City of New York, 2011 NY Slip Op 00629 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Larry S. Schachner, J.), entered December 24, 2009, which granted plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3126 to strike the answers of defendants City of New York, 1515 Bruckner Blvd. LLC, Citywide Contractors LLC and Kaila Construction Corporation unless they appear for their respective examinations before trial within 60 days of service of a copy of the order, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendants failed to comply with a preliminary conference order and two compliance conference orders issued over a period of 14 months to produce witnesses for examinations before trial. However, given counsel's failure to file an affirmation in compliance with 22 NYCRR 202.7(a)(2), it was a provident exercise of discretion to provide defendants with a final opportunity to produce witnesses for examinations before trial (see Reidel v Ryder TRS, Inc., 13 AD3d 170 [2004]).

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Construction in the first department

Bajraktari Mgt. Corp. v American Intl. Group, Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 00621 (App. Div., 1st 2011)

The insurance policy clearly and unambiguously defines "Continuity Date" as December 29, 2004. The motion court correctly declined to consider parol evidence to ascertain the parties' intention as to that date (see W.W.W. Assoc. v Giancontieri, 77 NY2d 157, 162 [1990]). "[A] contract is not rendered ambiguous just because one of the parties attaches a different, subjective meaning to one of its terms" (Moore v Kopel, 237 AD2d 124, 125 [1997]).

Plaintiffs' remaining arguments based upon their contention that the policy is ambiguous are unavailing. Their argument that the policy should be construed in a manner that would be consistent with "the reasonable expectations of a New York City property owner" is also unavailing (see Slayko v Security Mut. Ins. Co., 98 NY2d 289, 296-297 [2002]).

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Exclusion of witnesses and CPLR 4518(a)

I probably would have stumbled across it eventually, but I found it by way of JT.

CPLR R. 4518 Business records

Yellow Book of N.Y., L.P. v Cataldo, 2011 NY Slip Op 00678 (App. Div., 2nd 2010)

Cataldo's contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying his request to exclude a witness from the courtroom is without merit. The record supports the Supreme Court's determination that the witness at issue was employed by the plaintiff's successor-in-interest and was, therefore, a party representative. As such, and in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the witness was entitled to remain in the courtroom throughout the trial (see Auger v State of New York, 263 AD2d 929, 932; Liquori v Barrow, 160 AD2d 843, 844; Carlisle v County of Nassau, 64 AD2d 15, 18). Further, Cataldo failed to establish that he suffered any prejudice due to the continued presence of the witness (see People v Scheck, 24 AD3d 574).

Additionally, Cataldo contends that the plaintiff's documents should not have been admitted into evidence pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule because the plaintiff's witness was employed by the plaintiff's successor-in-interest and because she lacked personal knowledge of the information contained in the documents. As the witness at issue was fully familiar with the plaintiff's record-keeping procedures and practices, this contention is without merit (see CPLR 4518[a]; General Bank v Mark II Imports, 290 AD2d 240, 241). Cataldo's remaining contentions regarding the court's evidentiary rulings are unpreserved for appellate review.

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Clear and Convincing evidence required for injunction:

S.J.J.K. Tennis, Inc. v Confer Bethpage, LLC, 2011 NY Slip Op 00670 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

In order to prevail upon a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) the likelihood of success on the merits of the action, (2) that it will suffer irreparable injury absent the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and (3) that the balance of equities is in its favor (see CPLR 6301; Aetna Ins. Co. v Capasso, 75 NY2d 860, 862; Winchester Global Trust Co. Ltd. v Donovan, 58 AD3d 833, 834; Winzelberg v 1319 50th Realty Corp., 52 AD3d 700, 702; Coinmach Corp. v Alley Pond Owners Corp., 25 AD3d 642, 643; Stockley v Gorelik, 24 AD3d 535). The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending determination of the action (see Ruiz v Meloney, 26 AD3d 485, 486; Ying Fung Moy v Hohi Umeki, 10 AD3d 604, 605). The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the Supreme Court (see Doe v Axelrod, 73 NY2d 748, 750; Ruiz v Meloney, 26 AD3d at 486; Ying Fung Moy v Hohi Umeki, 10 AD3d at 605).

In the instant case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (see Mr. Natural, Inc. v Unadulterated Food Prods., 152 AD2d 729, 730; U.S. Ice Cream Corp. v Carvel Corp., 136 AD2d 626, 628).

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CPLR 317, 5015(a)(1)(3), and 3215(f)

CPLR R. 5015 Relief from judgment or ordersummons to the door

CPLR § 317 Defense by person to whom summons not personally delivered

CPLR § 3215 Default judgment

Jackson v Professional Transp. Corp., 2011 NY Slip Op 00650 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

The plaintiff correctly contends that the Supreme Court erred in granting the motion of the defendant Professional Transportation Corp. (hereinafter the defendant), inter alia, to vacate an order dated October 27, 2008, and the judgment entered December 10, 2009, upon the defendant's default. CPLR 317 allows a court to vacate a default where service has been made upon a defendant by means other than personal delivery and where the defendant "did not personally receive notice of the summons in time to defend and has a meritorious defense" (CPLR 317). Here, by its own admission, the defendant received the summons and complaint well before the motion for a default judgment was made and in ample time to seek leave to serve a late answer. Accordingly, the defendant failed to establish that it did not receive the summons in time to defend within the meaning of the statute (see Gartner v Unified Windows, Doors & Siding, Inc., 71 AD3d 631, 632; SFR Funding, Inc. v Studio Fifty Corp., 36 AD3d 604, 605; Majestic Clothing Inc. v East Coast Stor., LLC, 18 AD3d 516, 517-518; Fleetwood Park Corp. v Jerrick Waterproofing Co., 203 AD2d 238, 239; Essex Credit Corp. v Tarantini Assoc., 179 AD2d 973, [*2]974).

Additionally, the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse under CPLR 5015(a)(1) for its pattern of willful default and neglect (see Campbell-Jarvis v Alves, 68 AD3d 701, 702; Roussodimou v Zafiriadis, 238 AD2d 568, 569; Merwitz v Dental Care Sers., 155 AD2d 748, 750), and its unsubstantiated claims that the default was occasioned by the conduct of its insurance broker or its liability carrier are unavailing (see Gartner v Unified Windows, Siding & Doors, Inc., 71 AD3d at 632; Lemberger v Congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar, Inc., 33 AD3d 671, 672; Majestic Clothing Inc. v East Coast Stor., LLC, 18 AD3d at 518). Although the question of whether the defendant asserted a potentially meritorious defense need not be reached in view of the foregoing (see Burnett v Renne, 32 AD3d 449,450), we note, in any event, that the defendant's submissions failed to proffer a potentially meritorious defense.

The defendant similarly failed to establish that the default judgment was procured through fraud or misrepresentation within the meaning of CPLR 5015(a)(3) (see Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 69-70). Likewise, the verified complaint satisfied the plaintiff's obligation to file proof of the facts constituting the claim with the court pursuant to CPLR 3215(f), and even if the verified complaint did not satisfy the requirements of CPLR 3215(f), the default judgment would not have been rendered a nullity (see Araujo v Aviles, 33 AD3d 830; Coulter v Town of Highlands, 26 AD3d 456, 457).

The bold is mine I'll pull the cases cited in the last line some other time. If I'm interested, you should be too.

CPLR R. 3211(a)(1): Affidavits are not documentary evidence. Also IK.

The decision will surely be of use to some no-fault types. For a case with a more intricate discussion of what documentary evidence is and is not, read Fontanetta.

CPLR R. 3211(a)(1)

Hernandez v Chefs Diet Delivery, LLC, 2011 NY Slip Op 00647 (App. Div., 2nd 2011)

Contrary to the determination of the Supreme Court, the defendants failed to submit documentary evidence conclusively establishing that the plaintiffs were independent contractors and not employees (see generally Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326; Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88; Paramount Transp. Sys., Inc. v Lasertone Corp., 76 AD3d 519, 520). Initially, the federal income tax documents submitted by the defendants which identified some of the plaintiffs as independent contractors were insufficient to conclusively establish that the plaintiffs and the other drivers in the putative class were independent contractors. "While the manner in which the relationship is treated for income tax purposes is certainly a significant consideration, it is generally not singularly dispositive" (Gagen v Kipany Prods., Ltd., 27 AD3d 1042, 1043; see Matter of Stuckelman [Blodnick, Gordon, Fletcher & Sibell, P.C.-Commissioner of Labor], 16 AD3d 882). Furthermore, the various internal documents and the noncompete and confidentiality agreement signed by one of the plaintiffs were similarly insufficient to conclusively establish that the plaintiffs and the other putative class members were independent contractors. "The fact that a contract exists designating a person as an independent contractor is to be considered, but is not dispositive" (Araneo v Town Bd. for Town of Clarkstown, 55 AD3d 516, 518; see Gfeller v Russo, 45 AD3d 1301; Shah v Lokhandwala, 265 AD2d 396; Matter of Wilde [Enesco Imports Corp.—Sweeney], 236 AD2d 722, [*3]723; Carrion v Orbit Messenger, 192 AD2d 366; Matter of Pepsi Cola Buffalo Bottling Corp. [Hartnett], 144 AD2d 220, 222). In fact, to the extent that the noncompete provision of the agreement prohibited any of the drivers from engaging in other businesses that deliver food products on a regularly scheduled basis, the agreement itself weighed in favor of a finding that the drivers were not independent contractors (see Bynog v Cipriani Group, 1 NY3d at 198; cf. Rokicki v 24 Hour Courier Serv., 294 AD2d 555; Matter of Seaver [Glens Falls Newspapers-Hartnett], 162 AD2d 841). To the extent that the Supreme Court relied on the affidavits of several of the defendants, the Supreme Court erred as those affidavits were not documentary evidence (see Suchmacher v Manana Grocery, 73 AD3d 1017; Fontanetta v John Doe 1, 73 AD3d 78, 85; Berger v Temple Beth-El of Great Neck, 303 AD2d 346).

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