CPLR R. 3212(f); CPLR R. 3211(d); Speculation not enough

We affirm. Initially, a motion to dismiss or one for summary judgment may be stayed or denied pending further discovery (see
CPLR 3211 [d]; 3212 [f]). To obtain such relief, plaintiff was obliged
to provide some evidentiary basis for its claim that further discovery
would yield material evidence and also "demonstrate how further
discovery might reveal material facts in the movant's exclusive
knowledge" (Scofield v Trustees of Union Coll. in Town of Schenectady, 267 AD2d 651, 652 [1999]; see Zinter Handling, Inc. v Britton, 46 AD3d 998,
1001 [2007]). Here, plaintiff provides nothing beyond speculation that
further discovery would yield material evidence. Also, plaintiff could
have obtained any such evidence from other sources. Mohawk, for
example, is in the best position to explain why it altered the list of
specified dealers for SUNY Stony Brook. Plaintiff could also rely on
its own records to discover whether Cassin breached his duty of loyalty
(see Chemfab Corp. v Integrated Liner Tech., 263 AD2d 788, 790 [1999]). Thus, we are unpersuaded that further discovery is needed prior to deciding defendants' motion.

Turning to the first cause of action, we do not agree with
defendants that it fails to state a claim. Accepting the complaint's
allegations as true, the first claim sufficiently alleges that
defendants used wrongful or unlawful means to obtain a competitive
advantage over plaintiff and that plaintiff would have consummated a
contract with SUNY Stony Brook but for defendants' interference (see B-S Indus. Contrs. v Burns Bros. Contrs., 256 AD2d 963, 965 [1998])^[FN2].
Nor were defendants entitled to summary judgment on the first claim, as
the motion papers did not address their actions in any detail. Their
failure to meet their initial burden on a summary judgment motion
required denial (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [*3][1985]).

…

Plaintiff's remaining arguments can be briefly disposed of.
Although plaintiff's unfair competition claims may rest upon the
misappropriation of confidential information, there is no competent
evidence in the record to suggest that such a misappropriation occurred
(see Chemfab Corp. v Integrated Liner Tech., 263 AD2d at
790). As for the punitive damages claim, such was improperly stated as
a separate cause of action and was appropriately dismissed (see Martin v Columbia Greene Humane Socy., Inc., 17 AD3d 839, 841 [2005]; Pileckas v Trzaskos, 126 AD2d 926, 927 [1987], lv denied 70 NY2d 601 [1987]).

The bold is mine.